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Report of the 9/11 Commission

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Author Topic: Report of the 9/11 Commission  (Read 10526 times)
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« Reply #15 on: March 11, 2009, 03:11:14 pm »

Problems within the Intelligence Community
The intelligence community struggled throughout the 1990s and up to 9/11 to collect intelligence on and analyze the phenomenon of transnational terrorism. The combination of an overwhelming number of priorities, flat budgets, an outmoded structure, and bureaucratic rivalries resulted in an insufficient response to this new challenge.

Many dedicated officers worked day and night for years to piece together the growing body of evidence on al Qaeda and to understand the threats. Yet, while there were many reports on Bin Laden and his growing al Qaeda organization, there was no comprehensive review of what the intelligence community knew and what it did not know, and what that meant. There was no National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism between 1995 and 9/11.

Before 9/11, no agency did more to attack al Qaeda than the CIA. But there were limits to what the CIA was able to achieve by disrupting terrorist activities abroad and by using proxies to try to capture Bin Ladin and his lieutenants in Afghanistan. CIA officers were aware of those limitations.

To put it simply, covert action was not a silver bullet. It was important to engage proxies in Afghanistan and to build various capabilities so that if an opportunity presented itself, the CIA could act on it. But for more than three years, through both the late Clinton and early Bush administrations, the CIA relied on proxy forces, and there was growing frustration within the CIA's Counterterrorist Center and in the National Security Council staff with the lack of results. The development of the Predator and the push to aid the Northern Alliance were products of this frustration.

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« Reply #16 on: March 11, 2009, 03:11:31 pm »

Problems in the FBI
From the time of the first World Trade Center attack in 1993, FBI and Department of Justice leadership in Washington and New York became increasingly concerned about the terrorist threat from Islamist extremists to U.S. interests, both at home and abroad. Throughout the 1990s, the FBI's counterterrorism efforts against international terrorist organizations included both intelligence and criminal investigations. The FBI's approach to investigations was case-specific, decentralized, and geared toward prosecution. Significant FBI resources were devoted to after-the-fact investigations of major terrorist attacks, resulting in several prosecutions.

The FBI attempted several reform efforts aimed at strengthening its ability to prevent such attacks, but these reform efforts failed to implement organization-wide institutional change. On September 11, 2001, the FBI was limited in several areas critical to an effective preventive counterterrorism strategy. Those working counterterrorism matters did so despite limited intelligence collection and strategic analysis capabilities, a limited capacity to share information both internally and externally, insufficient training, perceived legal barriers to sharing information, and inadequate resources.

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« Reply #17 on: March 11, 2009, 03:11:50 pm »

Permeable Borders and Immigration Controls
There were opportunities for intelligence and law enforcement to exploit al Qaeda's travel vulnerabilities. Considered collectively, the 9/11 hijackers

included known al Qaeda operatives who could have been watchlisted;
presented passports manipulated in a fraudulent manner;
presented passports with suspicious indicators of extremism;
made detectable false statements on visa applications;
made false statements to border officials to gain entry into the United States; and
violated immigration laws while in the United States.
Neither the State Department's consular officers nor the Immigration and Naturalization Service's inspectors and agents were ever considered full partners in a national counterterrorism effort. Protecting borders was not a national security issue before 9/11.

Permeable Aviation Security
Hijackers studied publicly available materials on the aviation security system and used items that had less metal content than a handgun and were most likely permissible. Though two of the hijackers were on the U.S.TIPOFF terrorist watchlist, the FAA did not use TIPOFF data. The hijackers had to beat only one layer of security-the security checkpoint process. Even though several hijackers were selected for extra screening by the CAPPS system, this led only to greater scrutiny of their checked baggage. Once on board, the hijackers were faced with aircraft personnel who were trained to be nonconfrontational in the event of a hijacking.

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« Reply #18 on: March 11, 2009, 03:12:08 pm »

The 9/11 attacks cost somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to execute. The operatives spent more than $270,000 in the United States. Additional expenses included travel to obtain passports and visas, travel to the United States, expenses incurred by the plot leader and facilitators outside the United States, and expenses incurred by the people selected to be hijackers who ultimately did not participate.

The conspiracy made extensive use of banks in the United States. The hijackers opened accounts in their own names, using passports and other identification documents. Their transactions were unremarkable and essentially invisible amid the billions of dollars flowing around the world every day.

To date, we have not been able to determine the origin of the money used for the 9/11 attacks. Al Qaeda had many sources of funding and a pre-9/11 annual budget estimated at $30 million. If a particular source of funds had dried up, al Qaeda could easily have found enough money elsewhere to fund the attack.

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« Reply #19 on: March 11, 2009, 03:12:28 pm »

An Improvised Homeland Defense
The civilian and military defenders of the nation's airspace-FAA and NORAD-were unprepared for the attacks launched against them. Given that lack of preparedness, they attempted and failed to improvise an effective homeland defense against an unprecedented challenge.

The events of that morning do not reflect discredit on operational personnel. NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector personnel reached out for information and made the best judgments they could based on the information they received. Individual FAA controllers, facility managers, and command center managers were creative and agile in recommending a nationwide alert, ground-stopping local traffic, ordering all aircraft nationwide to land, and executing that unprecedented order flawlessly.

At more senior levels, communication was poor. Senior military and FAA leaders had no effective communication with each other. The chain of command did not function well. The President could not reach some senior officials. The Secretary of Defense did not enter the chain of command until the morning's key events were over. Air National Guard units with different rules of engagement were scrambled without the knowledge of the President, NORAD, or the National Military Command Center.

Emergency Response
The civilians, firefighters, police officers, emergency medical technicians, and emergency management professionals exhibited steady determination and resolve under horrifying, overwhelming conditions on 9/11.Their actions saved lives and inspired a nation.

Effective decisionmaking in New York was hampered by problems in command and control and in internal communications. Within the Fire Department of New York, this was true for several reasons: the magnitude of the incident was unforeseen; commanders had difficulty communicating with their units; more units were actually dispatched than were ordered by the chiefs; some units self-dispatched; and once units arrived at the World Trade Center, they were neither comprehensively accounted for nor coordinated. The Port Authority's response was hampered by the lack both of standard operating procedures and of radios capable of enabling multiple commands to respond to an incident in unified fashion. The New York Police Department, because of its history of mobilizing thousands of officers for major events requiring crowd control, had a technical radio capability and protocols more easily adapted to an incident of the magnitude of 9/11.

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« Reply #20 on: March 11, 2009, 03:12:55 pm »

The Congress, like the executive branch, responded slowly to the rise of transnational terrorism as a threat to national security. The legislative branch adjusted little and did not restructure itself to address changing threats. Its attention to terrorism was episodic and splintered across several committees. The Congress gave little guidance to executive branch agencies on terrorism, did not reform them in any significant way to meet the threat, and did not systematically perform robust oversight to identify, address, and attempt to resolve the many problems in national security and domestic agencies that became apparent in the aftermath of 9/11.

So long as oversight is undermined by current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American people will not get the security they want and need. The United States needs a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee structure to give America's national intelligence agencies oversight, support, and leadership.

Are We Safer?
Since 9/11, the United States and its allies have killed or captured a majority of al Qaeda's leadership; toppled the Taliban, which gave al Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan; and severely damaged the organization. Yet terrorist attacks continue. Even as we have thwarted attacks, nearly everyone expects they will come. How can this be?

The problem is that al Qaeda represents an ideological movement, not a finite group of people. It initiates and inspires, even if it no longer directs. In this way it has transformed itself into a decentralized force. Bin Ladin may be limited in his ability to organize major attacks from his hideouts. Yet killing or capturing him, while extremely important, would not end terror. His message of inspiration to a new generation of terrorists would continue.

Because of offensive actions against al Qaeda since 9/11, and defensive actions to improve homeland security, we believe we are safer today. But we are not safe. We therefore make the following recommendations that we believe can make America safer and more secure.

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« Reply #21 on: March 11, 2009, 03:13:28 pm »

Three years after 9/11, the national debate continues about how to protect our nation in this new era. We divide our recommendations into two basic parts: What to do, and how to do it.

The enemy is not just "terrorism." It is the threat posed specifically by Islamist terrorism, by Bin Ladin and others who draw on a long tradition of extreme intolerance within a minority strain of Islam that does not distinguish politics from religion, and distorts both.

The enemy is not Islam, the great world faith, but a perversion of Islam. The enemy goes beyond al Qaeda to include the radical ideological movement, inspired in part by al Qaeda, that has spawned other terrorist groups and violence. Thus our strategy must match our means to two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda network and, in the long term, prevailing over the ideology that contributes to Islamist terrorism.

The first phase of our post-9/11 efforts rightly included military action to topple the Taliban and pursue al Qaeda. This work continues. But long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. If we favor one tool while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort.

What should Americans expect from their government? The goal seems unlimited: Defeat terrorism anywhere in the world. But Americans have also been told to expect the worst: An attack is probably coming; it may be more devastating still.

Vague goals match an amorphous picture of the enemy. Al Qaeda and other groups are popularly described as being all over the world, adaptable, resilient, needing little higher-level organization, and capable of anything. It is an image of an omnipotent hydra of destruction. That image lowers expectations of government effectiveness.

It lowers them too far. Our report shows a determined and capable group of plotters. Yet the group was fragile and occasionally left vulnerable by the marginal, unstable people often attracted to such causes. The enemy made mistakes. The U.S. government was not able to capitalize on them.

No president can promise that a catastrophic attack like that of 9/11 will not happen again. But the American people are entitled to expect that officials will have realistic objectives, clear guidance, and effective organization. They are entitled to see standards for performance so they can judge, with the help of their elected representatives, whether the objectives are being met.

We propose a strategy with three dimensions: (1) attack terrorists and their organizations, (2) prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism, and (3) protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks.

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« Reply #22 on: March 11, 2009, 03:14:00 pm »

Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations

Root out sanctuaries.The U.S. government should identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries and have realistic country or regional strategies for each, utilizing every element of national power and reaching out to countries that can help us.
Strengthen long-term U.S. and international commitments to the future of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Confront problems with Saudi Arabia in the open and build a relationship beyond oil, a relationship that both sides can defend to their citizens and includes a shared commitment to reform.
Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism
In October 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked if enough was being done "to fashion a broad integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists." As part of such a plan, the U.S. government should

Define the message and stand as an example of moral leadership in the world. To Muslim parents, terrorists like Bin Ladin have nothing to offer their children but visions of violence and death. America and its friends have the advantage-our vision can offer a better future.
Where Muslim governments, even those who are friends, do not offer opportunity, respect the rule of law, or tolerate differences, then the United States needs to stand for a better future.
Communicate and defend American ideals in the Islamic world, through much stronger public diplomacy to reach more people, including students and leaders outside of government. Our efforts here should be as strong as they were in combating closed societies during the Cold War.
Offer an agenda of opportunity that includes support for public education and economic openness.
Develop a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism, using a flexible contact group of leading coalition governments and fashioning a common coalition approach on issues like the treatment of captured terrorists.
Devote a maximum effort to the parallel task of countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Expect less from trying to dry up terrorist money and more from following the money for intelligence, as a tool to hunt terrorists, understand their networks, and disrupt their operations.
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« Reply #23 on: March 11, 2009, 03:14:18 pm »

Protect against and Prepare for Terrorist Attacks

Target terrorist travel, an intelligence and security strategy that the 9/11 story showed could be at least as powerful as the effort devoted to terrorist finance.
Address problems of screening people with biometric identifiers across agencies and governments, including our border and transportation systems, by designing a comprehensive screening system that addresses common problems and sets common standards. As standards spread, this necessary and ambitious effort could dramatically strengthen the world's ability to intercept individuals who could pose catastrophic threats.
Quickly complete a biometric entry-exit screening system, one that also speeds qualified travelers.
Set standards for the issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification, such as driver's licenses.
Develop strategies for neglected parts of our transportation security system. Since 9/11, about 90 percent of the nation's $5 billion annual investment in transportation security has gone to aviation, to fight the last war.
In aviation, prevent arguments about a new computerized profiling system from delaying vital improvements in the "no-fly" and "automatic selectee" lists. Also, give priority to the improvement of checkpoint screening.
Determine, with leadership from the President, guidelines for gathering and sharing information in the new security systems that are needed, guidelines that integrate safeguards for privacy and other essential liberties.
Underscore that as government power necessarily expands in certain ways, the burden of retaining such powers remains on the executive to demonstrate the value of such poweres and ensure adequate supervision of how they are used, including a new board to oversee the implementation of the guidelines needed for gathering and sharing information in these new security systems.
Base federal funding for emergency preparedness solely on risks and vulnerabilities, putting New York City and Washington, D.C., at the top of the current list. Such assistance should not remain a program for general revenue sharing or pork-barrel spending.
Make homeland security funding contingent on the adoption of an incident command system to strengthen teamwork in a crisis, including a regional approach. Allocate more radio spectrum and improve connectivity for public safety communications, and encourage widespread adoption of newly developed standards for private-sector emergency preparedness-since the private sector controls 85 percent of the nation's critical infrastructure.

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« Reply #24 on: March 11, 2009, 03:14:55 pm »

The strategy we have recommended is elaborate, even as presented here very briefly. To implement it will require a government better organized than the one that exists today, with its national security institutions designed half a century ago to win the Cold War. Americans should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system created a generation ago for a world that no longer exists.

Our detailed recommendations are designed to fit together. Their purpose is clear: to build unity of effort across the U.S. government. As one official now serving on the front lines overseas put it to us: "One fight, one team."

We call for unity of effort in five areas, beginning with unity of effort on the challenge of counterterrorism itself:

unifying strategic intelligence and operational planning against Islamist terrorists across the foreign-domestic divide with a National Counterterrorism Center;
unifying the intelligence community with a new National Intelligence Director;
unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a network-based information sharing system that transcends traditional governmental boundaries;
unifying and strengthening congressional oversight to improve quality and accountability; and
strengthening the FBI and homeland defenders.
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« Reply #25 on: March 11, 2009, 03:15:29 pm »

Unity of Effort: A National Counterterrorism Center
The 9/11 story teaches the value of integrating strategic intelligence from all sources into joint operational planning-with both dimensions spanning the foreign-domestic divide.

In some ways, since 9/11, joint work has gotten better. The effort of fighting terrorism has flooded over many of the usual agency boundaries because of its sheer quantity and energy. Attitudes have changed. But the problems of coordination have multiplied. The Defense Department alone has three unified commands (SOCOM, CENTCOM, and NORTHCOM) that deal with terrorism as one of their principal concerns.
Much of the public commentary about the 9/11 attacks has focused on "lost opportunities." Though characterized as problems of "watchlisting," "information sharing," or "connecting the dots," each of these labels is too narrow. They describe the symptoms, not the disease.
Breaking the older mold of organization stovepiped purely in executive agencies, we propose a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) that would borrow the joint, unified command concept adopted in the 1980s by the American military in a civilian agency, combining the joint intelligence function alongside the operations work.
The NCTC would build on the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center and would replace it and other terrorism "fusion centers" within the government. The NCTC would become the authoritative knowledge bank, bringing information to bear on common plans. It should task collection requirements both inside and outside the United States.
The NCTC should perform joint operational planning, assigning lead responsibilities to existing agencies and letting them direct the actual execution of the plans.
Placed in the Executive Office of the President, headed by a Senate-confirmed official (with rank equal to the deputy head of a cabinet department) who reports to the National Intelligence Director, the NCTC would track implementation of plans. It would be able to influence the leadership and the budgets of the counterterrorism operating arms of the CIA, the FBI, and the departments of Defense and Homeland Security.
The NCTC should not be a policymaking body. Its operations and planning should follow the policy direction of the president and the National Security Council.
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« Reply #26 on: March 11, 2009, 03:15:55 pm »

Unity of Effort: A National Intelligence Director
Since long before 9/11-and continuing to this day-the intelligence community is not organized well for joint intelligence work. It does not employ common standards and practices in reporting intelligence or in training experts overseas and at home. The expensive national capabilities for collecting intelligence have divided management. The structures are too complex and too secret.

The community's head-the Director of Central Intelligence-has at least three jobs: running the CIA, coordinating a 15-agency confederation, and being the intelligence analyst-in-chief to the president. No one person can do all these things.
A new National Intelligence Director should be established with two main jobs: (1) to oversee national intelligence centers that combine experts from all the collection disciplines against common targets- like counterterrorism or nuclear proliferation; and (2) to oversee the agencies that contribute to the national intelligence program, a task that includes setting common standards for personnel and information technology.
The national intelligence centers would be the unified commands of the intelligence world-a long-overdue reform for intelligence comparable to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols law that reformed the organization of national defense. The home services-such as the CIA, DIA, NSA, and FBI-would organize, train, and equip the best intelligence professionals in the world, and would handle the execution of intelligence operations in the field.
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« Reply #27 on: March 11, 2009, 03:16:09 pm »

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« Reply #28 on: March 11, 2009, 03:16:34 pm »

This National Intelligence Director (NID) should be located in the Executive Office of the President and report directly to the president, yet be confirmed by the Senate. In addition to overseeing the National Counterterrorism Center described above (which will include both the national intelligence center for terrorism and the joint operations planning effort), the NID should have three deputies:
For foreign intelligence (a deputy who also would be the head of the CIA)
For defense intelligence (also the under secretary of defense for intelligence)
For homeland intelligence (also the executive assistant director for intelligence at the FBI or the under secretary of homeland security for information analysis and infrastructure protection)
The NID should receive a public appropriation for national intelligence, should have authority to hire and fire his or her intelligence deputies, and should be able to set common personnel and information technology policies across the intelligence community.
The CIA should concentrate on strengthening the collection capabilities of its clandestine service and the talents of its analysts, building pride in its core expertise.
Secrecy stifles oversight, accountability, and information sharing. Unfortunately, all the current organizational incentives encourage overclassification. This balance should change; and as a start, open information should be provided about the overall size of agency intelligence budgets.
Unity of Effort: Sharing Information
The U.S. government has access to a vast amount of information. But it has a weak system for processing and using what it has. The system of "need to know" should be replaced by a system of "need to share."

The President should lead a government-wide effort to bring the major national security institutions into the information revolution, turning a mainframe system into a decentralized network. The obstacles are not technological. Official after official has urged us to call attention to problems with the unglamorous "back office" side of government operations.
But no agency can solve the problems on its own-to build the network requires an effort that transcends old divides, solving common legal and policy issues in ways that can help officials know what they can and cannot do. Again, in tackling information issues, America needs unity of effort.
Unity of Effort: Congress Congress took too little action to adjust itself or to restructure the executive branch to address the emerging terrorist threat. Congressional oversight for intelligence-and counterterrorism-is dysfunctional. Both Congress and the executive need to do more to minimize national security risks during transitions between administrations.

For intelligence oversight, we propose two options: either a joint committee on the old model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy or a single committee in each house combining authorizing and appropriating committees. Our central message is the same: the intelligence committees cannot carry out their oversight function unless they are made stronger, and thereby have both clear responsibility and accountability for that oversight.
Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland security. There should be one permanent standing committee for homeland security in each chamber.
We propose reforms to speed up the nomination, financial reporting, security clearance, and confirmation process for national security officials at the start of an administration, and suggest steps to make sure that incoming administrations have the information they need.
Unity of Effort: Organizing America's Defenses in the United States
We have considered several proposals relating to the future of the domestic intelligence and counterterrorism mission. Adding a new domestic intelligence agency will not solve America's problems in collecting and analyzing intelligence within the United States. We do not recommend creating one.

We propose the establishment of a specialized and integrated national security workforce at the FBI, consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence and national security.
At several points we asked: Who has the responsibility for defending us at home? Responsibility for America's national defense is shared by the Department of Defense, with its new Northern Command, and by the Department of Homeland Security.They must have a clear delineation of roles, missions, and authority.

The Department of Defense and its oversight committees should regularly assess the adequacy of Northern Command's strategies and planning to defend against military threats to the homeland.
The Department of Homeland Security and its oversight committees should regularly assess the types of threats the country faces, in order to determine the adequacy of the government's plans and the readiness of the government to respond to those threats.
* * *

We call on the American people to remember how we all felt on 9/11, to remember not only the unspeakable horror but how we came together as a nation-one nation. Unity of purpose and unity of effort are the way we will defeat this enemy and make America safer for our children and grandchildren.

We look forward to a national debate on the merits of what we have recommended, and we will participate vigorously in that debate.

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« Reply #29 on: March 12, 2009, 03:06:46 pm »

List of Illustrations and Tables   ix

Member List   xi

Staff List   xiii-xiv

Preface   xv

1.1 Inside the Four Flights   1
1.2 Improvising a Homeland Defense   14
1.3 National Crisis Management   35

2.1 A Declaration of War   47
2.2 Bin Ladin's Appeal in the Islamic World   48
2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988-1992)   55
2.4 Building an Organization, Declaring War on the United States (1992-1996)   59
2.5 Al Qaeda's Renewal in Afghanistan (1996-1998)   63

3.1 From the Old Terrorism to the New: The First World Trade Center Bombing   71
3.2 Adaptation-and Nonadaptation-in the Law Enforcement Community   73
3.3 . . . and in the Federal Aviation Administration   82
3.4 . . . and in the Intelligence Community   86
3.5 . . . and in the State Department and the Defense Department   93
3.6 . . . and in the White House   98
3.7 . . . and in the Congress   102

4.1 Before the Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania   108
4.2 Crisis: August 1998   115
4.3 Diplomacy   121
4.4 Covert Action   126
4.5 Searching for Fresh Options   134

5.1 Terrorist Entrepreneurs   145
5.2 The "Planes Operation"   153
5.3 The Hamburg Contingent   160
5.4 A Money Trail?   169

6.1 The Millennium Crisis   174
6.2 Post-Crisis Reflection: Agenda for 2000   182

6.3 The Attack on the USS Cole   190
6.4 Change and Continuity   198
6.5 The New Administration's Approach   203

7.1 First Arrivals in California   215
7.2 The 9/11 Pilots in the United States   223
7.3 Assembling the Teams   231
7.4 Final Strategies and Tactics   241

8.1 The Summer of Threat   254
8.2 Late Leads-Mihdhar, Moussaoui, and KSM   266

9.1 Preparedness as of September 11   278
9.2 September 11, 2001   285
9.3 Emergency Response at the Pentagon   311
9.4 Analysis   315

10. WARTIME   325
10.1 Immediate Responses at Home   326
10.2 Planning for War   330
10.3 "Phase Two" and the Question of Iraq   334

11.1 Imagination   339
11.2 Policy   348
11.3 Capabilities   350
11.4 Management   353

12.1 Reflecting on a Generational Challenge   361
12.2 Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations   365

12.3 Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism   374
12.4 Protect against and Prepare for Terrorist Attacks   383


13.1 Unity of Effort across the Foreign-Domestic Divide   400
13.2 Unity of Effort in the Intelligence Community   407
13.3 Unity of Effort in Sharing Information   416
13.4 Unity of Effort in the Congress   419
13.5 Organizing America's Defenses in the United States   423
Appendix A: Common Abbreviations 429

Appendix B:Table of Names 431

Appendix C: Commission Hearings 439

Notes 449

p. 15 FAA Air Traffic Control Centers
p. 15 Reporting structure, Northeast Air Defense Sector
p. 32-33 Flight paths and timelines
p. 49 Usama Bin Ladin
p. 64 Map of Afghanistan
p. 148 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
p. 238-239 The 9/11 hijackers
p. 279 The World Trade Center Complex as of 9/11
p. 284 The World Trade Center radio repeater system
p. 288 The World Trade Center North Tower stairwell with deviations
p. 312 The Twin Towers following the impact of American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175
p. 313 The Pentagon after being struck by American Airlines Flight 77
p. 313 American Airlines Flight 93 crash site, Shanksville, Pennsylvania
p. 413 Unity of effort in managing intelligence

Thomas H. Kean, CHAIR

Lee H. Hamilton, VICE CHAIR

Richard Ben-Veniste

Bob Kerrey

Fred F. Fielding

John F. Lehman

Jamie S. Gorelick

Timothy J. Roemer

Slade Gorton

James R. Thompson

Philip Zelikow, Executive Director
Christopher A. Kojm, Deputy Executive Director
Daniel Marcus, General Counsel

Joanne M. Accolla
Staff Assistant

Alexis Albion
Professional Staff Member

Scott H. Allan, Jr.

John A. Azzarello

Caroline Barnes
Professional Staff Member

Warren Bass
Professional Staff Member

Ann M. Bennett
Information Control Officer

Mark S. Bittinger
Professional Staff Member

Madeleine Blot

Antwion M. Blount
Systems Engineer

Sam Brinkley
Professional Staff Member

Geoffrey Scott Brown
Research Assistant

Daniel Byman
Professional Staff Member

Dianna Campagna
Manager of Operations

Samuel M.W. Caspersen

Melissa A. Coffey
Staff Assistant

Lance Cole

Marquittia L. Coleman
Staff Assistant

Marco A. Cordero
Professional Staff Member

Rajesh De

George W. Delgrosso

Gerald L. Dillingham
Professional Staff Member

Thomas E. Dowling
Professional Staff Member

Steven M. Dunne
Deputy General Counsel

Thomas R. Eldridge

Alice Falk

John J. Farmer, Jr.
Senior Counsel & Team Leader

Alvin S. Felzenberg
Deputy for Communications

Lorry M. Fenner
Professional Staff Member

Susan Ginsburg
Senior Counsel & Team Leader

T. Graham Giusti
Security Officer

Nicole Marie Grandrimo
Professional Staff Member

Douglas N. Greenburg

Barbara A. Grewe
Senior Counsel, Special Projects

Elinore Flynn Hartz
Family Liaison

Leonard R. Hawley
Professional Staff Member

L. Christine Healey
Senior Counsel & Team Leader

Karen Heitkotter
Executive Secretary

Walter T. Hempel II
Professional Staff Member
 C. Michael Hurley
Senior Counsel & Team Leader

Dana J. Hyde
Counsel Professional

John W. Ivicic
Security Officer

Michael N. Jacobson

Hunter W. Jamerson

Bonnie D. Jenkins

Reginald F. Johnson
Staff Assistant

R.William Johnstone
Professional Staff Member

Stephanie L. Kaplan
Special Assistant & Managing Editor

Miles L. Kara, Sr.
Professional Staff Member

Janice L. Kephart

Hyon Kim

Katarzyna Kozaczuk
Financial Assistant

Gordon Nathaniel Lederman

Daniel J. Leopold
Staff Assistant

Sarah Webb Linden
Professional Staff Member

Douglas J. MacEachin
Professional Staff Member & Team Leader

Ernest R. May
Senior Adviser

Joseph McBride

James Miller
Professional Staff Member

Kelly Moore
Professional Staff Member

Charles M. Pereira
Professional Staff Member

John Raidt
Professional Staff Member

John Roth
Senior Counsel & Team Leader

Peter Rundlet

Lloyd D. Salvetti
Professional Staff Member

Kevin J. Scheid
Staff Member & Team Leader

Kevin Shaeffer
Professional Staff Member

Tracy J. Shycoff
Deputy for Administration & Finance

Dietrich L. Snell
Senior Counsel & Team Leader

Jonathan DeWees Stull
Communications Assistant

Lisa Marie Sullivan
Staff Assistant

Quinn John Tamm, Jr.
Professional Staff Member

Catharine S.Taylor
Staff Assistant

Yoel Tobin

Emily Landis Walker
Professional Staff Member & Family Liaison

Garth Wermter
Senior IT Consultant

Serena B.Wille

Peter Yerkes
Public Affairs Assistant

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