Report of the 9/11 Commission

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33. For Bin Ladin's confrontation with the Saudi regime, see, e.g., Peter L. Bergen, Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Ladin (Touchstone, 2001), pp. 80-82. On aid provided by a dissident member of the royal family, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 27, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 26, 2003. See also FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996.

34. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda ,p.34.

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35. Intelligence report, Bin Ladin's business activities in 1992, Mar. 31, 1994; Intelligence report, Terrorism: Historical Background of the Islamic Army and bin Ladin's Move from Afghanistan to Sudan, Nov. 26, 1996; CIA analytic report,"Old School Ties," Mar. 10, 2003.

36.Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 301-302, 305-306, 315-317, 367-368); Intelligence report,Terrorism: Historical Background of the Islamic Army and bin Ladin's Move from Afghanistan to Sudan, Nov. 26, 1996; CIA analytic report,"Old School Ties," Mar. 10, 2003.

37. See Intelligence report, Bin Ladin's business activities in 1992, Mar. 31, 1994; Intelligence report, Shipment of Arms and Boats to Yemen for Use by an Islamic Extremist,Aug. 9, 1996; Intelligence report,Terrorism: Responsibilities and Background of Islamic Army Shura Council, Dec. 19, 1996; CIA analytic report,"Old School Ties," Mar. 10, 2003; FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Nov. 12, 1996; CIA analytic report, "Usama Bin Ladin:Al-Qa'ida's Business and Financial Links in Southeast Asia," CTC 2002-40066CH, June 6, 2002. For Bin Ladin's involvement in the Bosnian conflicts, see Evan F. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe:The Afghan-Bosnian Network (Berg, 2004).

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38.Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript p. 354); FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Dec. 21, 1998;"RP Cops Aware of Long-Term Rightwing Muslim Connection," Manila Times, Apr. 26, 2002.

39.Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript pp. 354-355); FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Feb. 4, 1998. See also Republic of Singapore, Ministry of Home Affairs, Report to Parliament, "The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism," Jan. 7, 2003.

40. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 100, 235.

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41. See CIA analytic report,"Arizona: Long-Term Nexus For Islamic Extremists," CTC 2002-30037H, May 15, 2002; Steven Emerson, American Jihad (Free Press, 2002), pp. 129-137.

42. Intelligence report, Fatwa to attack U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia and movement of explosives to Saudi Arabia, Jan. 8 1997; trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 265-266); trial testimony of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 21, 2001 (transcript p. 1163); FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Nov. 12, 1996; FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999.

43. On Wali Khan's relationship with Bin Ladin, see Intelligence report, Usama Bin Ladin's Historical Links to 'Abdallah Azzam,Apr. 18, 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Muhammad, Al Ansar al Arab fi Afghanistan. On the Blind Sheikh, Bin Ladin eventually spoke publicly of his admiration. See ABC News interview,"To Terror's Source," May 28, 1998. In late 1992, Abu Zubaydah confided to his diary that he was getting ready to go to one of al Qaeda's military camps:"Perhaps later I will tell you about the Qa'ida and Bin Ladin group." Intelligence report, translation of Abu Zubaydah's diary, June 9, 2002. Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed masterminded the 1995 Manila air plot, and KSM helped fund Yousef 's attempt to blow up the World Trade Center in 1993. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004.The Blind Sheikh was linked to Yousef and the 1993 World Trade Center attack, while Wali Khan was convicted together with Yousef for the Manila air conspiracy.

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44. Intelligence report, Usama Bin Ladin Links to a Southern Yemeni Group, Mar. 5, 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; CIA analytic report,"Old School Ties," Mar. 10, 2003, p. 4.

45. U.S. intelligence did not learn of al Qaeda's role in Somalia until 1996. Intelligence report, Bin Ladin's Activities in Somalia and Sudanese NIF Support, Apr. 30, 1997.

46. Intelligence report, Bin Ladin's Activities in Eritrea, Mar. 10, 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999; FBI report of investigation, interview of Essam Mohamed al Ridi, Dec. 7, 1999; trial testimony of Essam Mohamed al Ridi, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 14, 2001 (transcript pp. 578-593); trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 279-285). In June 1998, Bin Ladin was indicted on charges arising out of the Somalia attack in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

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47. For background about the attack on the training facility, see, e.g., Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 132, 242. On the proposed attack in Saudi Arabia, see Intelligence report, Fatwa to attack U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia and movement of explosives to Saudi Arabia, Jan. 8, 1997; FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Fadl, Nov. 12, 1996; Feb. 13, 1998. On associates taking credit, see Intelligence report made available to the Commission.

48. CIA analytic report, "Khobar Bombing: Saudi Shia, Iran, and Usama Bin Ladin All Suspects," CTC 9630015, July 5, 1996; DIA analytic report, Defense Intelligence Threat Review 96-007, July 1996; Intelligence report made available to the Commission. See also Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 224-225, 300-302.

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49. Intelligence report, Usama Bin Ladin's Attempts to Acquire Uranium, Mar. 18, 1997; CIA analytic report, "Usama Bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability?" CTC 97-30002, Jan. 6, 1997; trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript pp. 357-366); Feb. 13, 2001 (transcript pp. 528-529); Feb. 20, 2001 (transcript pp. 982-985).

50.Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 13, 2001 (transcript p. 528).

51. CIA analytic report,"Old School Ties," Mar. 10, 2003.

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52. Intelligence report, Establishment of a Tripartite Agreement Among Usama Bin Ladin, Iran, and the NIF, Jan. 31, 1997; Intelligence report, Cooperation Among Usama Bin Ladin's Islamic Army, Iran, and the NIF, Jan. 31 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 290-293); FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999.

53. CIA analytic report,"Ansar al-Islam:Al Qa'ida's Ally in Northeastern Iraq," CTC 2003-40011CX, Feb. 1, 2003.

54. Ibid.; Intelligence report, al Qaeda and Iraq, Aug. 1, 1997.

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55. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, May 22, 2003; May 24, 2003. At least one of these reports dates the meeting to 1994, but other evidence indicates the meeting may have occurred in February 1995. Greg interview (June 25, 2004).

Two CIA memoranda of information from a foreign government report that the chief of Iraq's intelligence service and a military expert in bomb making met with Bin Ladin at his farm outside Khartoum on July 30, 1996. The source claimed that Bin Ladin asked for and received assistance from the bomb-making expert, who remained there giving training until September 1996, which is when the information was passed to the United States. See Intelligence reports made available to the Commission.The information is puzzling, since Bin Ladin left Sudan for Afghanistan in May 1996, and there is no evidence he ventured back there (or anywhere else) for a visit. In examining the source material, the reports note that the information was received "third hand," passed from the foreign government service that "does not meet directly with the ultimate source of the information, but obtains the information from him through two unidentified intermediaries, one of whom merely delivers the information to the Service." The same source claims that the bomb-making expert had been seen in the area of Bin Ladin's Sudan farm in December 1995.

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56. Intelligence report, Possible Islamic Army Foreknowledge of an "Egyptian Operation" and Logistical and Security Assistance Provided for the Attackers, Feb. 13, 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 4, 1997.

57.Tim Carney interview (Dec. 4, 2003).

58. Trial testimony of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 21, 2001 (transcript pp. 1280-1282).

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59. On the Sudanese economy, see, e.g., Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 114-115, 132-133. For details about Saudi pressure on the Bin Ladin family, see, e.g., Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004). Regarding management of Bin Ladin's finances, see CIA analytic report,"Usama Bin Ladin:Al-Qa'ida's Financial Facilitators," OTI IA 2001-134-HXC, Oct. 18, 2001; CIA analytic report,"Shaykh Sa'id:Al-Qa'ida's Loyal Senior Accountant,"CTC 2003-30072H, July 2, 2003; Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Sept. 17, 1998; Aug. 4, 1999. On the financial crisis in al Qaeda at this time, see trial testimony of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 21, 2001 (transcript pp. 1282-1284).

60.Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 165-174, 190-205, 255-258); Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript pp. 382-391); trial testimony of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden,Feb.21, 2001 (transcript pp. 1282-1284).

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61. Because the U.S. embassy in Khartoum had been closed in response to terrorist threats, the U.S. Ambassador to Sudan was working out of the embassy in Nairobi.The Sudanese regime notified him there by fax. See Tim Carney interview (Dec. 4, 2003); Donald Petterson interview (Sept. 30, 2003); DOS cable, Nairobi 7020, "Sudan: Foreign Minister on Developments re Terrorism and Peace," May 21, 1996. On the attempted assassination of Bin Ladin, see FBI report of investigation, interview of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, Oct. 15, 2000; FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999.

62. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 23, 2003.

63. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale Univ. Press, 2000), p. 133; Steve Coll, Ghost Wars:The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2004), p. 9; Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 12, 2003; Sept. 27, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 27, 2003.The current Afghan Foreign Minister told us that one of Bin Ladin's planes landed in Islamabad for refueling. See Abdullah Abdullah interview (Oct. 23, 2003).

64. Rashid, Taliban, pp. 88-90.

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65. See Owen Bennet Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (Yale Univ. Press, 2002); Raffat Pasha interview (Oct. 25, 2003); Rashid, Taliban;Waleed Ziad,"How the Holy Warriors Learned to Hate," New York Times, June 18, 2004, p. A31.

66. See, e.g., Marvin Weinbaum interview (Aug. 12, 2003);William Milam interview (Dec. 29, 2003). Milam described "strategic depth" as Pakistan's need for a friendly, pliable neighbor on the west due to its hostile relationship with India on the east.

67. On Pakistan's consent, see Ahmed Rashid interview (Oct. 27, 2003); see also Rashid, Taliban, p. 139; Intelligence report,Terrorism: Activities of Bin Ladin's in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India, July 14, 1997; FBI investigation, interview of former al Qaeda associate, Mar. 19, 2001, p. 26. On the Afghanistan-Pakistan-centered network of guesthouses and training camps, see CIA analytic report, "Sketch of a South Asia-Based Terrorist Training and Logistic Network," DI TR 95-12, Dec. 1995; CIA analytic report,"The Rise of UBL and Al-Qa'ida and the Intelligence Community Response," Mar. 19, 2004 (draft), p. 11.

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68. On Bin Ladin's money problems, see trial testimony of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 21, 2003 (transcript pp. 1282-1286); Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003); DOS cable, Nairobi 11468, "Sudan: Major Usama Bin Ladin Asset Deregistered,"Aug. 6, 1996; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 30, 2003. See also Robert Block,"In War on Terrorism, Sudan Struck a Blow by Fleecing Bin Laden," Wall Street Journal, Dec. 3, 2001, p.A1.

69. FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999; trial testimony of Ashif Juma, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 15, 2001 (transcript pp. 626-627); trial testimony of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 22, 2001 (transcript pp. 1264-1267); FBI report of investigation, interview of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, Aug. 28, 2000. See also Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 27, 2003.

70. See trial testimony of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 22, 2001 (transcript pp. 1282-1286).

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71. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003; Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 41; Rashid, Taliban, pp. 19-21, 133.

72. For Bin Ladin's 1996 fatwa, see Bin Ladin, "Declaration of War,"Aug. 23, 1996. On constraints from the Sudanese, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. On warnings from the Saudi monarchy, see Intelligence report,Timeline of events from 1993 bombing of World Trade Center through 9/11 (citing cables from Apr. 1997).

73. On Bin Ladin's promise to Taliban leaders, see government exhibit no. 1559-T, United States v. bin Laden. For the Bin Ladin interview, see CNN broadcast, interview of Bin Ladin by Peter Arnett on Mar. 20, 1997, May 9, 1997 (available online at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/binladen/binladenintvw-cnn.pdf). According to KSM, Bin Ladin moved to Kandahar "by order of Emir Al-Mouminin," that is, Mullah Omar. See Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003. On the Taliban's invitation to UBL, see Mike briefing (Dec. 12, 2003); Rashid, Taliban, p. 129. Rashid has also described the move as part of Bin Ladin's plan to solidify his relationship with, and eventually gain control over, the Taliban. Ahmed Rashid interview (Oct. 27, 2003).