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Fragments of the Lost Writings of Proclus

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Author Topic: Fragments of the Lost Writings of Proclus  (Read 1603 times)
Major Weatherly
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« Reply #30 on: February 06, 2009, 01:26:26 pm »

Argument the Thirteenth.
Plato says, "that Divinity imparted to the world a motion adapted to a spherical body, viz. a circular motion, which especially subsists about intellect and wisdom." If; therefore, he grants that this motion is adapted to the world, he will also grant that heaven, or the universe, naturally resolves in a circle; but if it has this motion according to nature, we must say, that neither a motion upward, nor a motion downward, [nor a progressive motion,] * pertain to it. These, however, are the motions of the sublunary elements. † It is necessary, therefore, that heaven should be exempt from the rectilinear

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motions of [sublunary] bodies. Hence, it is neither fire, nor earth, nor any one of the bodies which are situated between these; nor is a celestial body light or heavy, if that which tend downwards is heavy, and that which tend upward is light; but if that which is moved in a circle is no one of these elements, it will be something different from them. If, therefore, generation and corruption, are among the number of things contrary to each other; but things which have contrary motions according to nature, are contraries, and one thing is contrary to one, (for this is said by Plato in the Protagoras,) — if this be the case, these things, indeed, will be corrupted and generated; but a celestial body will be unbegotten and incorruptible. If, however, these [i.e. the celestial and sublunary wholes] are in their parts, indeed, generated and corrupted, but the wholes always exist according to nature, remaining in their proper places, and if the world consists of these, viz. of heaven, and the wholes of the four elements;this being the case, the world will be without generation, and without corruption. Such things, therefore, as are in any way whatever generated and corrupted, are the effects, and not parts * of

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the world, the Gods which it contains (as Plato says) * borrowing parts from the world, and the genera of efficient causes, as things which are

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again to be restored to it. These, however, have the appearance of being parts of the universe, which are comprehended in it; though other effects also are comprehended in their proper causes, and are connected by them. Hence, if the world consists of things which are unbegotten and incorruptible, it will itself be unbegotten and incorruptible in a much greater degree. For the whole would be less excellent than its parts, if it indeed had generation and corruption, but the parts, on the contrary, were without generation, and without corruption; though it is Plato himself who says, that the whole is more excellent than the parts. For the whole is not for the sake of the parts, but the parts are for the sake of the whole. But that for the sake of which a thing exists, [or the final cause,] is better than those things which subsist for the sake of the final cause. The elements, however, are parts of that which has its composition from them. And hence, that which consists of the elements, is more excellent than the elements of which it consists. If, therefore, heaven, or the universe, consists of unbegotten and incorruptible elements, it will also itself be unbegotten and incorruptible. And this likewise is demonstrated from Platonic principles.


60:* The words within the brackets are added from the version of Mahotius, whose version of this sentence is, "Quare si à natura motum hunc obtinet, neque eum motum, quo sursùm itur, neque eum, quo deorsum descenditur, neque progressionem ipsi convenire dixerimus." But the Greek is, ει δε ταυτην εχει κατα φυσιν κινησιν, ουτ᾽ αν την επι το ανω κινησιν, ουτε την επι το κατω φαιμεν αυτοῳ προσηεκειν. It appears, therefore, that immediately after κατω, it is requisite to insert the words ουτε την κατα πορωειαν.

60:† This sentence shews the necessity of the above emendation. For the motion of fire and air is upward, of earth downward, and the motion of water is progressive.

61:* "Part" (says Proclus, in his Commentary on the Parmenides of Plato,) "has a manifold signification; for we call that p. 62 a part, which is in a certain respect the same with the whole, and which possesses all such things partially, as the whole does totally. Thus, we call each of the multitude of intellects, a part of the intellect which ranks as a whole, though all forms exist in each; and we say, that the inerratic sphere is a part of the universe, though this sphere also comprehends all things in itself, yet in a manner different from that in which they are comprehended by the world. In the second place, we denominate that to be a part which gives completion to a certain thing. Thus, we say, that the whole [celestial and sublunary] spheres, are parts of the universe, and that the ratiocinative power, and the power by which we opine, are parts of the soul; the former of which give completion to the universe, but the latter to the soul. In addition to these, likewise, we denominate, according to a common signification, every thing a part, which in any way whatever is co-arranged with certain things, in order to effect the consummation of one thing. For thus it may be said, that each of us is a part of the world, not that the universe, so far as it is the universe, receives its completion through its; for neither would the universe become imperfect, by the destruction of any one of us; but because we also are co-arranged with the parts of the universe that rank as wholes, and are governed in conjunction with all other things, and are, in short, in the world as in one animal, are ourselves parts of the universe, and give completion to it, not so far as it exists, but so far as it is prolific." What is here said, therefore, by Proclus, about the natures which are generated and corrupted in the world, are parts of it, according to the last signification of part, as above explained.

62:* See the Note on Argument the Fourteenth.

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« Reply #31 on: February 06, 2009, 01:26:49 pm »

p. 64

Argument the Fourteenth.
Every artist either gives subsistence to the matter of that which is the subject of his art, or he causes the matter which already exists to be adapted to his purpose. And if he makes the matter which already exists to be adapted to his purpose, he makes the matter [on which his art operates]. For the thing which is properly adapted to his purpose, indicates the matter [of his art], and not simply a subject. So far, therefore, as matter is without adaptation, it has not the power of matter [i.e. not of a matter fit for the operations of art]. Whether, therefore, the artist gives subsistence to his proper matter, or whether he makes the matter when it merely exists as a subject, to be adapted to his purpose, he is entirely the maker of the matter of his proper work. But if this is true of every partial artist, much more does the divine Artist make his proper matter, either giving subsistence to matter itself, or causing it to be adapted to his purpose; in order that he may not be more ignoble than the artificers of sublunary natures, by borrowing matter which he does not return, and to which he does not give subsistence; since these restore the parts which they borrowed from him, in order to accomplish

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the generation of mortal natures. * Since, therefore, the artificer of the universe is also the artificer of matter, which is defined to be the receptacle and nurse of generation, † he likewise made it to be the receptacle of generation. For it has no other existence than an existence as matter, since the definition of it is to be the receptacle of generation. Hence, whether the Demiurgus of the universe gave it the requisite adaptation, he made it to be the receptacle of generation, viz.

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he made it to be matter; or whether he gave subsistence to matter, he immediately made it to be the matter of the world. Hence also every artist makes one of these. But whichever he makes of these, he makes, as we have said, matter. If, therefore, the artificer of this universe made matter to be the receptacle of generation, he either gave subsistence to the vestiges of forms, by which matter became moved in a confused and disorderly manner, being of itself immovable and perfectly formless; or we must say that these vestiges of forms proceeded into matter from some other source, viz. froth some other deity, who belongs to the intelligible order. * If, therefore, the artificer of the universe is the cause of these vestiges of forms, is it not most absurd that he should make matter properly adapted to be the receptacle of generation, and should likewise impart these vestiges, through which matter would not be adapted to be properly fashioned, but would with difficulty be rendered fit for the hypostasis of generation? For that which is disorderly is hostile to that which is orderly. But the receptacle of generation is not hostile to generation

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which has an orderly arrangement. If, however, there is a certain other cause of the vestiges of forms, is it not irrational to suppose that this cause makes matter to be properly and easily adapted, but that the other causes it to be adapted with difficulty; and that the former of these causes should wait, till that which he had produced with a proper adaptation should first become unadapted, in order that he might afterwards make this universe, for the sake of which he caused matter to have a proper adaptation, as if he was not able to give perfection to that which is adapted, till it became unadapted? For it is absurd to suppose that he made matter to be easily adapted, in order that it might alone itself, by itself, receive the vestiges of forms. For in this case he would cause it to be properly adapted, that generation might be inordinately produced. But if he made matter for the purpose of its receiving generation with arrangement, how is it possible that, from those things from which, at the same time that he caused matter to be properly adapted, he gave subsistence to generation, he should wait till a disorderly arrangement took place, in order that he might thus give arrangement to that which was without arrangement, just as if he was incapable of giving subsistence to order without the privation of order? If, therefore, these things are

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absurd, and the vestiges of forms were not prior in time to the arrangement of them, and the subject matter, together with the vestiges of forms, is unbegotten, the order likewise which is in them is unbegotten; nor is there any thing pertaining to these which is prior or posterior. Moreover, neither was matter first generated, and afterwards the vestiges of forms; for the very essence of it is to be matter in conjunction with the vestiges of forms. Hence, it contains these vestiges, from which it derives its subsistence as matter, and is not prior to these vestiges. For, at the same time that it is adapted to receive them, the cause which imparts them, also imparts that which is the very being of matter. Hence, if matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, having a perpetual existence, it always possessed the vestiges of forms; and, together with these also, it possessed order, as we have demonstrated. * Order, therefore, is unbegotten and incorruptible. And no one of these three ranks as first, or second, or third [according to a temporal subsistence]; but these distinctions exist only in our conceptions. Hence, this distinction in conception being taken away, all these have a simultaneous existence, viz. matter, the vestiges

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of forms, and order. But from that from which order derives its subsistence, the world also is derived; so that the world will be unbegotten and incorruptible.


65:* Proclus here alludes to the following passage in the Timæus of Plato: νοησαντες οι παιδες την του πατρος ταξιν, επειθοντο αυτῃ, και λαβοντες αθανατον αρχην θνητου ζωου, μιμουμενοι τον σφετερον δημιουργον, πυρος και γης υδατος τε και αερος απο του κοσμου δανειζομενοι μορια, ως αποδοθησομενα παλιν, κ.τ.λ. i.e. "An soon as his children [i.e. the junior gods] understood the order of their father [viz. of the Demiurgus], they became obedient to this order; and receiving the immortal principle of mortal animal, in imitation of their artificer, they borrowed from the world the parts of tire and earth, water and air, as things which they should restore back again," &c.

65:† Matter is thus defined by Plato in the Timæus: for he there says of it, τινα ουν δυναμιν και φυσιν αυτο υποληπτεον, τοιανδε μαλιστα πασης ειναι γενεσεωσ υποδοχεν αυτο, οιον τιθηνην. But for οιον τιθηνην, which is the reading of all the editions of the Timæus, it is necessary, both from the citation of Proclus and the version of Ficinus, to read, και οιον τιθηνην. For his version of the latter part of this extract is, "Hanc utique generationis horum omnium receptaculum, et quasi nutricem esse." So that, according to Plato, "matter is the receptacle, and, as it were, nurse of all generation."

66:* Viz. from Phanes, according to Orpheus, or animal itself, according to Plato, which deity subsists at the extremity of the intelligible order. See the Second Book of my translation of Proclus on the Timæus.

68:* See more on this subject in the Second Book of my Translation of Proclus on the Timæus.

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« Reply #32 on: February 06, 2009, 01:27:07 pm »

Argument the Fifteenth.
The paradigm of the world is celebrated [by Plato] * by these three names, viz. only-begotten, eternal, all-perfect. And the last of these names pertains also to the universe, but to no other generated nature; for no other generated nature is all-perfect. With respect to the only-begotten, this is not present with all mundane natures, though it is with all the celestial orbs: for each of these is only-begotten. A perpetual existence, however, is common to all forms; for if this is not, we shall not find any thing of which all forms participate in common. But if it is necessary that every form should possess perpetuity, for this is an image of the eternal, it is requisite to consider what is the meaning of the ever. Whether, therefore, does it signify that which exists for an infinite time, both with reference to the past

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and the future, or that which, with respect to the past, has indeed a beginning, but, with reference to the future, has no end? * For if this is the meaning of the ever, what will that he which is similar to the eternal? For the eternal has in no respect whatever a subsistence at a certain time only, nor any extension of existence, nor the prior and posterior, but is infinite according to both these. But the infinite is not simultaneously present with the universe, † but subsists in becoming to be [or in perpetually rising into existence]. ‡ If, however, the eternal is that [which we have above said it is], either nothing is similar to it, or, prior to all things the world, resembles it. But it is absurd, since the Demiurgus is most excellent, and wishes to make, and does make, things similar to the paradigm of the universe, [that the world should be

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in no respect similar to its eternal paradigm]. * The world, therefore, being in the greatest possible degree similar to its paradigm, possesses perpetuity both with reference to the past and the future, and not according to one of these only. For if this is denied, that which is without arrangement will be similar to the paradigm of the universe, through being unbegotten; and that which possesses arrangement will be similar to it, through its incorruptibility. If these things, therefore, are impossible, every thing which is unbegotten is incorruptible, and every thing incorruptible is unbegotten; in order that both may be similar to the eternal [paradigm], and not infinite only, according to one of these. And on this account, that which is arranged is no more infinite than that which is without arrangement. That which was generated, therefore, conformably to the paradigm, ought, according to both these, to be similar to the paradigm. But that which was generated conformably to the paradigm, was

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the world. Hence the world, not having [a temporal] generation, is incorruptible, nor, being unbegotten, will it ever be corrupted. For a thing of this kind [viz. a thing which may be corrupted,] is only infinite with reference to the time past. But the world is unbegotten, and at the same time incorruptible. It also possesses infinity according to both these, in order that, as Plato says, it may be in every respect similar to its eternal paradigm.


69:* This is asserted by Plato of the paradigm of the world in the Timæus, which, as we have before observed, is there denominated by him αυτοζωον, or animal itself.

70:* The original is here defective, for it is κατα θατερα δε τελευτην. But it is obviously necessary to read, κατα θατερα δε ου μην τελευτην. Mahotius also, in his version, has as "ex altere autem finem non habet."

70:† In the original of this sentence there is nothing more than ουχ αμα δε το απειρον; and, conformably to this, the version of Mahotius has "infinitum autem non simul constat.'' But it appears to me to be necessary to read ουχ αμα δε το απειρον τω παντι παρεστιν, agreeably to my translation.

70:‡ Conformably to this, Proclus says of the universe (in Tim. lib. ii.) "that, always rising into existence, it is always perfect".

71:* The words within the brackets are omitted in the original, and are supplied from the version of Mahotius. For in the Greek there is nothing more than αλλ᾽ ατοπον, το μηδενα τροπον του δημιουργου αριστου οντος, και βουλομενου ομοια ποιειν τῳ παραδειγματι και ποιουντος. It is requisite, therefore, immediately after το μηδενα τροπον, to add, τον κοσμον ομοιον ειναι τῳ παραδειγματι αιωνιῳ.

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« Reply #33 on: February 06, 2009, 01:27:26 pm »

Argument the Sixteenth.
If there are two wills in the Demiurgus, one indeed will be this, that what is moved in a confused and disorderly manner should not exist, as Plato says [in the Timæus]; for being willing [says he] that there should be nothing evil, he brought that which was confused from the inordinate into order. And if the Demiurgus has likewise another will, viz. that the universe should be bound, (for, speaking to the junior Gods, he says, "You shall never be dissolved, in consequence of obtaining my will, which is a greater bond than any of those bonds by which you were

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connected at the commencement of your generation;")—and if these wills are the very being of the things which partake of them, one of them willing that the inordinate should not exist, but the other, that what is orderly should be preserved;—if this be the case, it is necessary either that these wills should always exist in the Demiurgus, or each of them sometimes, or one of them always, but the other at a certain time. It is false, however, that either of these wills should exist only at a certain time. For it is evident, that to be willing at one time, and at another not, can by no means accord with the nature of an eternal being, though he should at first not have been willing, but afterwards should be willing; or, on the contrary, should at first have been willing, but afterwards unwilling. For there will be in this willingness and unwillingness the prior and posterior, and the was, and the will be. But these, Plato says, are the species of time. Time, however, is not in the Demiurgus, but proceeds from, and is posterior to him. Hence he was always willing that the confused and disorderly should not exist, and that what has an orderly arrangement should exist. His will, therefore, essentially producing that which he wished, and both the inordinate and the orderly having a perpetual subsistence, he always produces then by

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his very being. * If, however, he always produces that which he wishes to produce, he will certainly, through one of these wills, always abolish the inordinate, but will preserve, through the other, that which is reduced into order. For thus he will effect, through both, that which it is proper for him to effect; destroying that which he does not wish to exist, and preserving and defending that which he wishes to exist. Each of these wills, therefore, of the Demiurgus, effecting that which it is its province to effect, it is necessary that what is produced by each should be perpetual. For the maker and the thing made exist simultaneously with each other, as Plato says in the Philebus: for there he asserts, "that the thing which is becoming to be beautiful, and the artificer and maker of it, subsist together, and that the one is not without the other." † That which is disorderly, therefore, is always abolished,

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through the eternal will of the Demiurgus that it should not exist, and that which is orderly is preserved, on account of his will that it should always exist; each of these wills being eternal. But if both the inordinate and the orderly are perpetually generated, the inordinate will not be prior to the orderly, nor the orderly to the inordinate. If, however, the inordinate is not prior to the orderly, that which is orderly will not have a beginning posterior to the inordinate; and if the orderly is not prior to the inordinate, it will not have an end prior to the inordinate. * But if it neither began posterior to, nor will end prior to, the inordinate, order is without a beginning and without an end, and is both unbegotten and incorruptible. Moreover, the world is nothing else than order, and that which is arranged. The world, therefore, is un-begotten and incorruptible. For it is absurd to say, since there are two wills in divinity, either that one of these should be always effective, but the other not always; or that one of these should produce by its very being, but the other not; since both possess the same essence, and have through the same cause an eternal subsistence. † For one

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of these, in consequence of being good, as Plato says, was willing that the disorderly should not exist; but the other, in consequence of not being evil, was willing that the orderly should exist. By how much, therefore, to be essentially good, is more adapted to divinity than not to be evil, by so much more divine is the will that what is inordinate should not exist, than the will which ordains that what is orderly should exist. For to be good is more adapted to divinity than not to be evil. Hence, it is perfectly absurd to make the will which is more adapted to him, not to be more eternal and efficacious, if it be lawful so to speak, since it is more divine. So that if it is consequent to these wills that the world should be unbegotten through one of them, but incorruptible through the other, it will be in a greater degree unbegotten than incorruptible; since it possesses the former through the more principal and more divine will of the Demiurgus, but the latter through a subordinate will. Moreover, one of these, viz. the incorruptibility of the world, is manifest to all; and consequently the other will be much more manifest than this, viz. that the world is unbegotten. If, therefore, the two are one, the universe will be similarly unbegotten and incorruptible. But if they are two, but that which exists in consequence of being good is more powerful than that which

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exists in consequence of not being evil, the universe is in a greater degree unbegotten than incorruptible. It would, however, seem, that there is rather one will in the Demiurgus than two wills: for it is the province of the same will to reject the inordinate, whether it be prior or posterior to order, and to produce, without any temporal beginning, that which is orderly, and preserve it in arrangement without end. For there is not any thing which is more adapted to every artificer than order. Every artificer, therefore, wishes to give a proper arrangement to the work which he produces; so that order, so far as he is an artificer, is to him the object of desire. But if there is one object of desire, the appetition also is one, being the appetition of order. If, however, there is one appetition and will, which are directed to the object of the will, there will certainly be one will always producing prior to time that which is arranged, and connecting a thing of this kind for ever. But being one, it is absurd, or rather impossible, to distribute it into parts, and to attribute one part of it to divinity, and this the more imperfect part, but not to attribute to him another part, and this of a more perfect nature. For that which is more perfect pertains to divinity, since it has a greater power than that which is more imperfect.


74:* This sentence in the original is, τησ ουν βουλησεως αυτῳ τῳ ειναι ποιουσης ο βουλεται, ἢ αει τῳ ειναι ποιησει. But for ἢ αιε, κ.τ.λ. it is necessary to read και αει, κ.τ.λ. conformably to the above translation, and also to the version of Mahotius, which is, "cum igitur voluntas ipso esse, quod vult efficiat, et semper sit utraque, semper ipso esse efficiet."

74:† Hence, as the world subsists in becoming to be, and the artificer of it is an eternally energising being, and the one cannot exist without the other, the world must necessarily be perpetually rising into existence.

75:* This follows from what is above demonstrated, viz. that both the inordinate and the orderly are perpetually generated.

75:† For το ευλογον here, in the original, I read το κιωνιον.

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« Reply #34 on: February 06, 2009, 01:27:55 pm »

p. 78

Argument the Seventeenth.
The following axioms, which are Aristotelic, are by a much greater priority Platonic, viz. "Every thing which is generable, is also corruptible, and every thing unbegotten is incorruptible." * For the former of these is mentioned by Plato in the Republic, and the latter in the Phædrus. In the Republic, therefore, Socrates, personating the Muses, says, "Since every thing which is generated is corruptible;" † and [in the Phædrus) he says, since the soul is unbegotten, it is necessarily also incorruptible. For he spews that every principle is unbegotten, and because unbegotten, he demonstrates that it is also incorruptible. ‡ For these things being true, it is necessary that every thing which is corruptible should be generable; since, if it is unbegotten, the corruptible will be incorruptible, which is impossible. Every thing also which is incorruptible is unbegotten; for if generable, the incorruptible will be corruptible. These things, therefore, necessarily following, if the universe is incorruptible,

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it is also unbegotten; * as is evident from the above premises. For the Demiurgus, according to Plato, is the source of immortal natures; † but the immortal is indestructible, as it is said in the Phædo. For scarcely will any thing else be indestructible, if the immortal is not a thing of this kind. ‡ And this, indeed, Cebes says, and Socrates grants. § If, therefore, every thing which was generated by the Demiurgus is indestructible, (for that which was generated by him is immortal, and this is indestructible,) it is also necessary that it should be unbegotten, through what we have demonstrated to be consequent to the two preceding axioms; one of which is, that every thing generable is corruptible; but the other, that every thing ingenerable is incorruptible. So that, not only according to Aristotle, but also according

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to Plato, it is demonstrated through these two axioms, that the world neither had a temporal generation, nor is corruptible. For if * that which is inordinate is unbegotten, but that which is arranged is incorruptible, that which is without arrangement will be more excellent than that which is arranged. For as the ingenerable is to the generable, so is the incorruptible to the corruptible; so that it will be alternately, as that which is ingenerable is to that which is incorruptible, so is that which is generable to that which is corruptible: and as that which is generable is to that which is corruptible, so is generation to corruption. If, therefore, generation is better than corruption, and the generable is essentially more excellent than the corruptible, the ingenerable also will be more excellent than the incorruptible. Hence, if that which is inordinate is ingenerable and corruptible, but that which is arranged is incorruptible and generable, that which is without arrangement [so far as it is ingenerable] will be more excellent than that which is arranged; and that which from the inordinate produces that which is arranged, will produce that which is less from that which is more

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excellent; in consequence of producing from that which is ingenerable and corruptible, that which is afterwards generable and incorruptible. One of these, therefore, will not be ingenerable and corruptible, but the other generable and incorruptible; or vice versa. But neither is the maker evil; so that what is arranged is not corruptible. And if that which is arranged is from that which is without arrangement, the unarranged is not incorruptible; since it is not, when that which is arranged has an existence. Or, if this is not admitted, each of these will be generable and corruptible. But whether that which is inordinate is generable, being generated from that which is arranged; or whether that which is arranged is corruptible, he who corrupts that which is well arranged, either did not properly harmonise it, and therefore is not good; or he corrupts that which is well harmonised, and is evil. All these consequences, however, are impossible. Hence, that which is inordinate is not prior to that which is orderly: and therefore it follows, that what is orderly is unbegotten, and in like manner that it is also incorruptible.


78:* This is demonstrated by Aristotle in his Treatise on the Heavens. See Book the Second of my Translation of that work.

78:† See the Eighth Book of the Republic.

78:‡ Vid. Phædr. Art. p. 22.

79:* In the original, morrow τουτων δε επομενων, εξ αναγκης ει αφθαρτον το παν εστιν. But it is evidently necessary between το παν and εστιν, to insert και αγενητον, and instead of a comma after επομενων, to place a comma after αναγκης, conformably to the above translation. The MS. also, from which Mahotius made his translation, appears to have wanted the words και αγενητον.

79:† This is asserted in the Timæus.

79:‡ In the original, σχολῃ γαρ αν τι αλλο ειν ανωλεθρον, ει το αθανατον ειη τοιουτον. But both the sense and the version of Mahotius require, that after αθανατον, we should read ουκ ειν τοιουτον.

79:§ See my Translation of the Phædo.

80:* In the original, και γαρ εστι το μεν ατακτον, αγενητον. But it appears to me to be evidently necessary to read, agreeably to the above translation, και γαρ ει εστιν, κ.τ.λ.

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« Reply #35 on: February 06, 2009, 01:29:53 pm »

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Argument the Eighteenth.
If things which always subsist according to sameness, and in a similar manner, alone pertain to the most divine of all things, as Plato says in the Politicus,—if this be the case, and if the Demiurgus ranks among the most divine of beings, it pertains to him to subsist eternally after the same and in a similar manner. But if he does not rank among the most divine of things, neither must we say that he is a God who has an eternal existence, nor that he is the best of causes. We assert, however, these things of him as it is written in the Timæus. A subsistence, therefore, according to the same and in a similar manner, is adapted to his nature. For, if that which does not exist always should possess a subsistence according to invariable sameness, that which does not exist always will always be the same. And if that which is the best of causes does not exist invariably the same, it will not be the best. But these things being absurd, it is necessary that the best of causes, and which exists eternally, should be most divine; and that being most divine, it should subsist always according to the same, and in a similar manner. It pertains, however, to that which thus subsists, never to have any variation

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in its existence: for this is contrary to an eternally invariable sameness of subsistence. But it pertains to that which never at any time subsists differently, never at one time to cease from being an effective cause, and at another to be effective; or at one time to be, and at another not to be effective. For this is to subsist differently at different times; viz. to be now effective, but afterwards not, and not to be now effective, but to be effective afterwards. But that which never at any one time is not efficient, and afterwards efficient, or now efficient, and afterwards non-efficient, must necessarily always be an efficient cause in energy, or always not be such a cause. For there are no other consequences besides these. For the extremes are, to be always efficient, and to be always non-efficient. But the media are, for the efficient cause to produce that afterwards which it did not produce before; or, on the contrary, not to produce again that which it had once produced. * It is, however, impossible that the Demiurgus

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being the Demiurgus, should never at any time be an effective cause: for it is not adapted to an artificer to be always unemployed. For how can he be an artificer who never produces any thing? It is necessary, therefore, that the Demiurgus should be an efficient cause, and that he should always fabricate that of which he is the efficient. But the Demiurgus, who always fabricates, must necessarily always make the world. It is necessary, therefore, that the world should neither have a temporal beginning of being fabricated, nor an end. For, if it had a beginning, it would not always have been adorned; and if it should have an end, it will not always be adorned. It is necessary, however, that the world should always be adorned, because it is also necessary that the Demiurgus should always adorn. But this will be the case, if he always snakes with invariable sameness of energy: and he will thus make, if he always subsists after the same and in a similar manner. It is necessary, therefore, that the world should be a world without a beginning and without an end, and that it should be unbegotten and incorruptible. Hence, if the Demiurgus possesses an invarible sameness of subsistence, it is necessary that the world should be without generation, and without corruption. So

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that if Plato clearly asserts this [of the Demiurgus], the world also, according to him, is unbegotten and incorruptible.

If, therefore, Plato says, in the Politicus and the Timæus, * that God is absent. from the world, and again is present with it, being first absent from, and afterwards present with it, (for after this manner, says he, the universe subsisted, as it was likely it should, when Divinity was not present with it); and if Plato similarly asserts both these things, and therefore says, that at one time the world is changed from a disorderly into an orderly condition of being, but that at another time it passes from an orderly into an inordinate state, until Divinity again assumes the helm of government;—if, therefore, this is asserted by Plato, it

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is not proper that Atticus should alone direct his attention to what is said in the Timæus. For there Divinity, who was at one time absent from, is represented as being at another time present with, that from which he was absent. But it is requisite that Atticus should also consider what is asserted in the Politicus, in which the Divinity, who at one time was present with, is represented as absent from that with which he was present. And as through the former he produced order from that which was in a disorderly state, so through the latter, after order, he caused a privation of order to take place. If, therefore, Plato says, that both these mutations were produced by the Demiurgus, respecting that visible god the world, prior to the existence of the world, it is impossible that they should have any subsistence except in our mental conception. For, since Divinity always exists with invariable sameness, he does not say that the world subsists differently at different times, as if possessing this variable subsistence through him, which can only be asserted of partial natures; but he says [speaking enigmatically], that the world is either arranged, or deprived of arrangement, through Divinity being differently affected at different times. If, however, it is impossible that Divinity should be thus affected, because he possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, it is

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likewise impossible that the world should have at one time a disorderly, and at another an orderly existence. And I should say, that this is truly a divine contrivance of the wisdom of Plato, by which he infers, from the eternal energy of Divinity, that the world is at one and the same time unbegotten and incorruptible; and assigns the absence and presence of Divinity as the cause of the order and disorder of the world. * For, if Divinity alone is the cause of the alternate order and disorder of the world, and it is impossible for him not to subsist, because it is impossible for Divinity to subsist differently at different times, it is also absurd to conceive an alternate subsistence of order and disorder about the world. If, therefore, Divinity is always invariably the same, he is not at one time present with, and at another absent from the world. And if this be the case, the world is not at one time arranged, and at another without arrangement. For the presence of Divinity indeed with the world would confer order, but his absence the privation of order

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on it. But if the world was not at one time arranged, nor at another was, or will be, without arrangement, it always was arranged. But if it was always arranged, it was arranged from an infinite time, and will for an infinite time continue to be arranged. And this Plato proclaims in such a manner, as to become manifest even to the deaf, viz. that the paradigm of the world exists through all eternity, and that the world always was, and is, and will be. As, therefore, the world will be to infinity, so likewise it was from infinity, and it is not proper, since Plato gives it an infinite duration, both with respect to the past and the future, that the friends of Plato should make it to be finite with respect to the past, but infinite with respect to the future; but it is requisite that they should speak conformably to the decision of their master. For thus the world will possess an imitation of the perpetuity of eternity; not having only the half, but the whole of the infinity of time. This, however, was the thing proposed by the Demiurgus, viz. to assimilate time to eternity, and the world to eternal animal [its exemplar], by giving it an existence through the whole of time.

The principal result, however, of all that has been said is this, that no one, with respect to the world, is so pious as Plato, or any other who, conformably to him, says, that the world subsists in a

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disorderly condition, when Divinity is no longer invariably the same, viz. when the Divinity [by whom the world was fabricated] is not an intelligible Cod. For a subsistence according to invariable sameness pertains to the intelligible gods. Either, therefore, both the world and the Demiurgus are gods, or neither of them is a god. And in the latter case, one of them not being a god, will produce disorder, but the other a subsistence which is not invariably the same. And the privation of order of the one will arise from the want of an invariable sameness of subsistence in the other. For the one [i.e. the world] will no otherwise be disorderly, than because the other [i.e. the Demiurgus] is not with invariable sameness, either present with or absent from the world: for it is necessary that the world should be entirely similar to its maker. If, therefore, in conception only, Divinity is at one time present with and at another absent from the world, it follows that the world, in conception only, is at one time arranged, and at another without arrangement. For it is necessary that what subsists in conception only should pertain to both; so that if, from Divinity being present, the world is arranged, it necessarily follows that it is not arranged when he is not present. But if, in reality, [i.e. not in conception

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only,] the universe is at one time * arranged, and at another without arrangement, by a much greater priority, Divinity will in reality be at one time present with, and at another absent from the universe. For it will not follow [absolutely], from the world being arranged, or being without arrangement, that Divinity is either absent from or present with it; but the contrary will take place: so that the prior assertion will be true, to which this is necessarily consequent. † If, therefore, this is impossible, because Divinity subsists eternally with invariable sameness, it is also impossible that the world should at one time be without arrangement, and at another be arranged. For that which is consequent to what is impossible, is necessarily impossible; since, as the dialectic laws say, the possible is consequent to that which is possible. Hence, by admitting that it is possible for the world to have been once

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without arrangement, it will also be possible for it to have been arranged at a certain time, and for Divinity to have been once absent from, and again present with, the world. If, therefore, the latter is impossible, the former likewise is impossible: hence the world is always arranged, and Divinity is always present with the world. And neither was the world arranged from a prior disorderly state of subsistence: for neither was Divinity once absent, and afterwards present; nor will the world, from being arranged, afterwards be without arrangement. For the maker of it was not once * present with, and afterwards wilt be absent from it. And, according to Plato, if the world is necessarily generable and corruptible, there is an equal necessity that the Demiurgus of the world should not rank among the most divine of beings, though it pertains to him to have an invariable sameness of subsistence. If, therefore, it is necessary to be piously disposed towards the maker of the universe, it is also necessary to be thus disposed towards the world; or if we form erroneous conceptions about the latter, our conceptions will, by a much greater priority, be erroneous and unbecoming

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about the former; and not only about him, but likewise about every thing divine. For, if an invariable sameness of subsistence is common to all divine natures, it is necessary either to preserve this in all of them, and after the same manner to preserve it with respect to the Demiurgus; or, if we reject this in one of them, neither will it be credible in the rest.


83:* For that which produces afterwards what it did not before, so far as it produces, unites with that extreme, which is always efficient. And that which does not produce again what it had once produced, so far as it does not produce, unites with the other extreme, which is always non-efficient. They are therefore media between these two extremes.

85:* In the Politicus Plato says, "that the universe at one time is conducted by another divine cause, receiving again an externally acquired life, and a renewed immortality from the Demiurgus; but that at another time, when he remits the reins of government, it proceeds by itself, and being thus left for a time, performs many myriads of retrograde revolutions." See vol. iv. p. 122 of my Translation of Plato, in which the fable, of which these words are a part, is beautifully explained from Proclus. And in the Timæus, it is said by Plato, "that when the Demiurgus began to adorn the universe, he first of all figured with forms and numbers, fire and earth, water and air, which possessed indeed certain vestiges of the true elements, but were in every respect so constituted as it is likely any thing will be from which Deity is absent." See vol. ii. of my Translation of Plato.

87:* Plato does not mean to insinuate by this, that Divinity is actually at one time present with, and at another absent from, the world, for he is eternally present with it, and in a manner invariably the same; but in thus speaking, he only indicates what would be the necessary consequence of his being alternately present with and absent from the universe.

90:* In the original, ποτε is erroneously omitted, as is evident both from the sense of the passage, and the version of Mahotius.

90:† By the prior assertion, Proclus means this, that the world, in conception only, is at one time arranged, and at another without arrangement, in consequence of the maker of it being, in conception only, at one time present with, and at another absent from it.

91:* In the original, ουτε γαρ εκεινος ου παρων αυθις ου παρεστι. But for ου παρων, it is requisite to read ποτε παρων. The version of Mahotius also is, conformably to this emendation, "Non enim ille ante præsens, postea non præsens erit."

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Simplicius having observed, that Proclus is the only philosopher that he is acquainted with, who thought that place was a body, adds, "he, therefore, admitting the axioms of Aristotle concerning place, and the fourfold division of the investigation of it, says it is necessary that place should be either matter or form, or the boundary of the containing body, or an interval equal to the space between the boundaries of the containing body. For, if place is not any one of the things that are in it, nor of the things which surround it, it cannot be locally changed, if nothing that is in it or about it sustains any mutation. The natures, however, which are in it are form and matter; but the natures which surround it are the boundary of the circumambient, and that which is intermediate." Proclus having demonstrated, therefore, that place is neither matter nor form, through the same arguments as are used by Aristotle, and having subverted the hypothesis that it is the boundary of the containing body, from the absurdities with which

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the hypothesis is attended, infers that place is an interval; and thus he adapts the demonstration to his own opinion. Since, however, he clearly and concisely explains his hypothesis, it will perhaps be better to hear his own words, which are as follow: "it remains, therefore, if place is neither the form of that which is in place, nor matter, nor the boundary of the comprehending body, that the interval which is between the boundaries of the containing body must be conceived to be the primary place of each body. All the mundane interval, however, of the whole world will be different from the above-mentioned interval. This, therefore, is either nothing, or it is a certain thing. And if, indeed, it is nothing, local motion will be from nothing to nothing, though all motion is according to something which ranks among beings. Places, likewise, which are according to nature, will be nothing, though every thing which subsists conformably to nature is necessarily something belonging to beings. But if it is a certain thing, it is entirely either incorporeal or corporeal. If, however, it, is incorporeal, an absurdity will follow: for it is necessary that place should be equal to that which is in place. But how is it possible for body, and that which is incorporeal, to be equal? For the equal is in quantities, and in homogeneous quantities, as in lines with lines, superficies with

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superficies, and bodies with bodies. hence, place is a body, if it is an interval. But if it is a body, it is either moved, or immovable. If, however, it is in any way whatever moved, it must necessarily be moved according to place; so that again place will be in want of place. But this is impossible, as it also appeared to be to Theophrastus and Aristotle. Hence Aristotle says, that a vessel is place which may be moved, but that place is an immovable vessel; indicating by this, that place is naturally immovable.

If, however, place is immovable, it is either incapable of being divided by the bodies that fall into it, so that body will proceed through body, or it may be divided by them, in the same manner as air and water are divided by the bodies which exist in them. But if, indeed, it may be divided, the whole being cut, the parts will be moved on each side of the dissevered whole. And first, place will be moved, since the parts of it are moved; but it has been demonstrated that it is immovable. Secondly, the parts being cut, we must inquire whither that part which is cut proceeds: for again there will be found another interval between the parts of the dissevered whole, which is the recipient of the divided part, and into which this part proceeding is said to be in place; and this will be the consequence to infinity. Place, therefore,

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is an indivisible body. It; however, it is indivisible, it will either be an immaterial or a material body. But if material, it is not indivisible. For all material bodies, when other material bodies proceed into them, become divided by those bodies; as when, for instance, our bodies fall into water. But immaterial bodies alone are not adapted to be divided by any thing; and this from necessity. For every immaterial body is impassive; but every thing which may be divided is not impassive, since division is a passion of bodies, destructive of their union. For of that which is continuous, so far as continuous, you will not find any other passion than division, which destroys its continuity. Place, therefore,—that we may collect all that has been demonstrated,—is a body, immovable, indivisible, immaterial. But if this be the case, it is very evident that place is more immaterial than all bodies, both than those that are moved, and those that are immaterial in things that are moved. Hence, if light is the most simple of these, for fire is more incorporeal than the other elements, arid light is more incorporeal than fire itself, place will be the most pure and genuine light which is in bodies. If, therefore we conceive that there are two spheres, one of light alone, but the other consisting of many bodies, and that both these are equal to each other in bulk, but that the one is

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firmly established together with the centre, and that the other is inserted in this, we shall see the whole world existing in place, and moved in immovable light. And this light, indeed, is, according to itself, immovable, in order that it may imitate place, but is moved according to a part, in order that it may possess something less than place.

"This hypothesis is rendered credible from what is asserted by Plato, in the [tenth book of the] Republic. For the light which is there mentioned, and is adapted to the rainbow, is said by him to be place. It is also confirmed by the Chaldean oracles respecting the fontal soul; since it is there said, that this soul 'abundantly animates light, fire, æther, and the worlds.' For this is the light which is above the empyrean world, and is a monad prior to the triad of the empyrean, ethereal, and material worlds. This light, too, is the first recipient of the eternal allotments of the gods, and unfolds self-visible spectacles in itself to those that are worthy to behold them. For in this light, according to the Chaldean oracle, things without figure become figured. And perhaps it is on this account called place (τοπος), as being a certain type (τυπος) of the whole mundane body, and as making things which are without interval to possess interval."

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After this, Proclus doubts, against himself, how body can proceed through body, and whether this light is inanimate, or participates of soul. "But," says he, "it is impossible that it should be inanimate, both because it is more excellent than the animated natures that are in it, and because the oracles say that this is animated prior to other things. If, however, it is animated, how is it immovable? And he dissolves the first doubt from the impassivity of immaterial bodies: for an immaterial body neither resists nor is resisted, since that which is resisted possesses a nature capable of suffering by the things which resist. Nor, since it is impassive, can it be divided; so that neither will it be possible to adduce that absurd consequence, that the whole will proceed through that which is smallest; for if an immaterial body is not adapted to be divided, neither will it be divided equally with that which is smallest. But if this will not be the case, neither will the whole proceed through it." Again, he solves the second doubt, by saying, that this immaterial body is animated by the fontal soul, and that it has a divine life, and is essentially self-motive, but not in energy. For if we admit that in [the rational] soul the self-motive is twofold, the one according to essence, but the other according to energy, and if we assert that the one is immovable, but the other

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moved, * what should hinder us from asserting that place participates of a life of this kind, and that it lives according to an immutable essence, but the world according to an essence self-motive in energy. "If, however," says he, "you wish to see the motion of place according to energy, you must survey it as motive of the bodies that are moved, and which evolve the parts of place according to interval; because they are neither able to be in every place, nor to be present with all the parts of place according to each of its parts. And this is an intervening medium with reference to soul, which moves without interval. For it seems that life, indeed, so far as life imparts motion, but place being that which primarily participates of life, confers motion according to the parts of itself, and thus peculiarly unfolds local motion, causing each of the parts of that which is moved to desire to be in the whole itself, since it is unable, through the natural peculiarity of interval, to subsist in a divided manner in the whole itself. For every thing which desires to be a certain thing, but fails of becoming that which is the object of its wish through a defect of nature, continues nevertheless to aspire after that which, through imbecility, it

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is tillable to obtain. For it is requisite," says he, "that the medium between an incorporeal and intransitive life, such as is that of the fontal soul, and a transitive and corporeal life, should be a life which is intransitive, indeed, but corporeal." He adds, "but it appears to me, that the centres of the whole world, considered as one thing, are fixed in this immaterial body. For if the oracles assert that the centres of the material world are fixed in the tether which is above it, we must say, by ascending analogously, that the centres of the highest of the worlds are established in the light of this world. May it not likewise be said, that this light is the first image of the paternal profundity, * and on this account is supermundane, because that profundity is also supermundane?"†

In addition to the above-mentioned opinion of Proclus concerning place, the following is the hypothesis of Damascius of Damascus, the preceptor of Simplicius, a man most inquisitive, and who laboured much in philosophy. His disquisitions on place appear to me to be no less admirable than novel. From the utility of place, therefore, he wishes to discover its essence, and he thus writes: "Every thing in generation, in consequence of falling off from a nature impartible, and without interval, both according to essence and energy, has a twofold separation,—the one according to essence, but the other according to energy, or passion.

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[paragraph continues] That also in generation, which is according to energy, is twofold; the one being connascent with essence, according to which, essence is in a continual flux; but the other proceeding from essence, according to which it energises differently at different times, possessing extended, and not at-once-collected energies. And the separation, indeed, of energy is immediately in want of motion; and motion is consubsistent with it. The separation, also, according to motion, becomes energetic or passive. But the separation of essence becomes likewise twofold; the one being a divulsion into multitude, but the other passing into bulk. And the separation, according to magnitude and bulk, becomes immediately connected with position, in consequence of the parts falling into different situations. Position likewise is twofold; the one being connascent with essence, as of my body, the head is upward, and the feet downward; but the other being adventitious, as at one time I have position in a house, and at another in the forum; and it is evident that the former continues as long as the thing exists, but that the other becomes different at different times. But we properly say, that those things have position, the parts of which are extended, and are distant from each other. Hence position appears properly to belong to magnitudes, and the boundaries which they contain, because these are distant according to continuity. But numbers, although they are separated, yet, at the same time, do not appear to have position, because they are not distant and extended, unless you should say that these also receive magnitude and interval. For all intervals, in consequence of destroying a subsistence collected into one, cause that which is in them to be changed into another, in which also they are said to be placed by position, losing, as it were, independent power; just as, by departing from themselves in their energies, they are said to be moved, and to change. Of these intervals, therefore, in order that they may not be perfectly extended to the indefinite, there are collective measures; time, indeed, being the measure of some things, according to the energy in motion: but of others, definite multitude, which is number, being the measure,

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according to a distinction of essence: and of others, definite magnitude, as a cubit, or something of this kind, according to continuity. Of others, again, place is the measure, according to a dispersion of position. Hence, things that are moved are said to be moved in time; but they are said to have position of essence, and motion itself, in place, so far as essence itself also participates of being moved. And that place indeed subsists about position, and is something belonging to things situated, is evident. For we say, that those things are in place which have position; and upward and downward are the differences of place, surveyed according to position; in the same manner as the right hand and the left, before and behind.

"But that place bounds, measures, and orderly arranges position, you may learn from hence: for we say, that a thing has position, though it should be disorderly posited, in any way whatever; but a thing is then said to have its proper convenient position, when it receives its proper place, just as any thing, whatever it may be, proceeds into being, but then has its proper opportune subsistence, when it exists in a becoming time. Through place, therefore, every part of a thing has a good position; the head of my body, indeed, upward, but the foot downward; the liver in the right-hand parts, but the heart in the middle: and the eyes, through which seeing, we walk, are before; but the back, by which we carry burthens, is behind. These, indeed, are differences through place; just as of the parts of an embryo, one is fabricated before another, through time, and one age orderly proceeds prior to another; nor are the Trojan confounded with the Peloponnesian transactions: for prior and posterior are the differences of time, just as upward and downward, and the other four divisions are the differences of place; as also Aristotle acknowledges. The parts of the world, therefore, have their proper position in the whole, on account of place. Hence, speaking superficially, place, simply so called, is, according to this conception, that which bounds the position of bodies; but speaking of place as having a natural subsistence, it is that which

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bounds the position according to corporeal parts, conformably to nature, both with respect to each other and to the whole, and also the position according to the whole with respect to the parts. For, as different parts of the earth and the heavens are arranged in different situations, on account of place, and some parts are northern but others southern, so the whole heaven and the whole earth, being parts of the world, have a convenient measure of position, and an orderly distribution on account of place; the former being allotted the circumference of the universe, but the latter possessing the middle of it: and it is place which imparts coincidence to the parts of the universe. If, likewise, place (τοπος) is denominated from conjecture, (εκ τουτο παζειν, lege εκ του τοπαζειν) becoming place from being situated near to things conjectural, * as being a certain conjecture of intellectual distinction, thus also what has been said of place will accord with this etymology. For to images, which have a conjectural subsistence, place imparts an establishment, and a similitude to their paradigms. For unless each of the parts of things, which are separated by interval, was situated according to its proper place, an image would never he similar to its paradigm, but every order, convenient measure, and elegant arrangement, would vanish. And, indeed, if you take away place, you will see the disposition of bodies extraneous and disordered, and tending to perfect indefiniteness. For in what position will each of the parts stop, when they are not adapted to any? On this account, therefore, things which are naturally moved, are moved in order that they may obtain their proper position; and things which are permanent, abide in a convenient measure of position through a love of place. Hence place is the cause of something to bodies, and to all corporeal natures, and what it is may perhaps be understood from what has been said.

"It will follow, however, from this, that such a place is neither

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the boundary of that which contains,—for how is this the cause of order or distinction, since it is rather defined by the things which exist in, and are comprehended by it?—nor yet will it be body; fur, though some one should say that it is an immaterial body, which has parts distant and different from each other,—this also will require that which may arrange it, and cause this part to be situated in the middle, and that in the circumference. Nor is it possible that a thing of this kind can be interval: for, through the same causes, interval, in consequence of possessing difference, and having its parts differently situated, will also require a certain convenient position. Place, therefore, appears to be the measure of things posited, just as time is said to be the number of the motion of things moved. Since, however, position is twofold, the one being essential, and the other adventitious, place also will be twofold, the one becoming the perfect element of that which has position, but the other subsisting according to accident. There is also a certain difference of essential position, so far as, in a certain respect, wholes themselves have the proper position of their proper parts, both with respect to each other, and to the universe; or so far as parts have a proper position with reference to the whole and the remaining parts. Hence, place also becomes twofold; the one peculiar, belonging to individual places; but the other being defined according to position in the whole. For, as whole is twofold, the one belonging to each of the parts,—according to the definite and distinct subsistence of each, according to which we say, that the earth is a certain whole, and not the earth only, but also an animal and a plant, and each of the parts in these; but the other being more comprehensive, as when we say the whole world, the whole earth, and the whole air, and of each wholeness * there are proper parts; —in like manner, of place

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we say, that one is the convenient position of the proper parts of a thing, as of try parts in the whole of ray body; but another the convenient position of the whole as of a part, in the place of its more comprehensive wholeness. Thus, the place of the earth, is the place of terrestrial natures; and this so far as earth possesses the middle of the universe. For, though the earth should be deprived of its position about the middle of the universe, it would still retain the convenient position of its proper parts in their proper whole; but it would not then possess its convenient position as a part of the universe. Hence, if the whole earth were hurled upward, it would fall again to the middle; and the parts which it contains would preserve their formation with respect to each other, even when it was removed from the middle. Thus, also, a mad suspended in the air would have the convenient order of his proper parts; but he would no longer have the convenient order as of a part to the whole. And since parts belong more to things more total, than wholes themselves do; for they do not so much vanquish subordinate, as they are vanquished by more excellent natures; and this because first are in a greater ratio to second natures, than second to third natures; this being the case, though a clod of earth should have a proper convenient position in the air, yet it would tend downward, through a desire of that which is more total. For that which is peculiar is every where dead and cold, when divulsed from that which is common, and deprived of its appropriate connexion; just as plants, when torn up by the roots, though they are in complete possession of all their parts, yet immediately droop, in consequence of being divulsed from their common wholeness. For all things live on account of the one mundane animal. Hence, as long as every thing is rooted in the world, through proximate wholenesses, so long it lives, and is preserved; but if it is divulsed from its proximate, it is also torn from the common wholeness. Thus, therefore, the natural tendencies of bodies, and their permanencies in their proper places, are preserved, by admitting place to be a thing of this kind. And the

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local motion of things which are moved, is nothing else than the assumption of different positions, at different times, till that which is moved obtains its appropriate position; the intermediate air or water being divided, and receiving the position which it then has, as long as that which is stronger proceeds. The position, also, of the parts of air, is that which a clod of earth or I receive when moved. The place to which I change is not definitely my peculiar place, but the place of surrounding air, in a different part of which I am also naturally adapted to become situated at different times. Hence, it being dubious how things which are moved are moved in place, since things in place may be justly said to be at rest rather than to be moved, let us see how the philosopher Syrianus states the doubt, and gives the solution of it:—'Some one may ask,' says he, 'how things which are moved, are moved in place, since things moved, are rather from whence, whither. For, in short, things in place appear to be at rest. May we not, therefore, say, that things which are moved, are in place and not in place? For they are not in the first, and, as it were, proper place of themselves; since if they were they would be at rest. But they are in place, surveyed according to its extent; just as we say that the sun is in the constellation called the Lion, because the extent of the Lion comprehends the sun. We also say that a flying eagle is in the air, and that a ship sailing with a prosperous wind is in the sea: for all these have place considered in its extent, or assumed with a greater latitude, but they have not a first and peculiar place, as long as they are moved.' And most of those, indeed, who speak about place, appear to me especially to direct their attention to this external place. For, on being asked, what is the place of the earth? they reply, that it is the middle of the universe; which is the peculiar place of the universe, and of the earth as in the universe. On being also asked, what is the place of the heavens? they say, that which surrounds; but they do not, in their reply, adduce that place of the earth which gives convenient position to its parts; and, in a similar manner, that

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place of the heavens through which its parts are orderly arranged. Hence, all moll, us it seems, assert that place is separate from that which is in place. For, in reality, that which pertains to each particular from more total place, is separate from that which is in place, and is not precedaneously the place of that thing. They also consider place as immovable, looking to this more common place, and which is considered in its extent. For the peculiar place of every thing, and which is co-essentiallised with it, is also moved together with it. But common place abides, being peculiar to that which is more total and comprehensive, as body."


93:* This fragment is extracted from the Commentaries of Simplicius on the Physics of Aristotle, p. 143.

99:* For the rational soul is eternal in essence, but temporal in energy. Hence, according to the former, it is immovable; but according to the latter, is moved.

100:* The paternal profundity, according to the Chaldaic Theology, consists of three triads, each of which triads contains father, power, and intellect. See my collection of the Chaldean Oracles, in the Classical Journal.

103:* Sensible objects are conjectural, because the proper knowledge of them belongs to opinion.

104:* The world is a whole of wholes, which wholes or wholenesses are the celestial and elementary spheres. See the Introduction to my Translation of the Timæus of Plato.

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Major Weatherly
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« Reply #37 on: February 06, 2009, 01:31:21 pm »

p. 108

From Olympiodorus, in Aristot. Meteor. p. 59,
"It is requisite to know that the divine Proclus, in his Commentaries on the Timæus * of Plato, refers metals to the seven planets, and says, that lead is ascribed to Saturn, through its weight, dulness, and coldness. But electrum [or a metal composed of gold and silver] is referred to Jupiter, through the well-tempered and vivific nature of the star. In a similar manner, also, with respect to the metal which is called migma; † but the migma is more highly valued than gold, and is well tempered. Again, iron is ascribed to Mars, on account of its incisive power and sharpness; but gold to the sun, which is, as it were, the fountain of light. Copper is referred to Venus, on account of its florid nature; and also because

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[paragraph continues] Venus is near to the sun, in the same manner as copper is to gold. Tin is referred to Mercury, through its clearness and splendour, and at the same time, likewise, because Mercury is near to the moon, just as tin is to silver. And silver is ascribed to the moon; since silver when placed near to gold, appears to be illuminated by the gold, and to become more splendid, in the same manner as the moon is illuminated by the sun."


108:* This extract probably formed a part of a Sixth Book of Proclus on the Timæus, which is lost, as it is not to be found in any of the Five Books that are now extant.

108:† From what Proclus says of this metal, called migma, or, a mixture, it appears to be the same with orichalcum, which Plato, in the Critias or Atlanticus, says, "shines with a fiery splendour." Pliny, in list. Nat. lib. xxxiv. cap. 2, says, that this kind of metal has not existed for a long time, owing to the barrenness of the earth. It is, however, mentioned by Martianus the lawyer, who flourished in the time of Alexander Severus, as if it then existed.

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« Reply #38 on: February 06, 2009, 01:31:46 pm »

From the MS. Commentary of Proclus on the Tenth Book of the Republic of Plato. *
Proclus having observed, that some persons in his time have been seen sitting or standing on the sepulchres in which they had been buried, which, says he, is also related by the ancients of Aristeas, Hermodorus, and Epimenides, subjoins the following examples, the first of which is taken from the History of Clearchus, the disciple of Aristotle.

Cleonymus, the Athenian, who was a man fond of hearing philosophic discourses, becoming

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very sorrowful on the death of one of his associates, and giving himself up to despair, apparently died, and was laid out according to custom; but his mother, as she was folding him in her embraces, taking off his garment, and kissing him, perceived in him a gentle breathing, and, being extremely joyful on the occasion, delayed his burial. Cleonymus in a short time afterwards was restored to life, and narrated all that he saw and heard when he was in a separate state. He said, that his soul appeared, as if liberated from certain bonds, to soar from its body, and that having ascended above the earth, he saw in it places all-various both for their figure and colour, and streams of rivers unknown to men; and that at last he came to a certain region sacred to Vesta, which was under the direction of dæmoniacal powers in indescribable female forms.

The second example is from the historian Naumachius, who flourished (says Proclus) in the time of our ancestors, and is of one Polycritus, who was an illustrious and principal man among the Ætolians. This Polycritus died, and returned to life in the ninth month after his death; came to the general assembly of the Ætolians, and joined with them in their consultations about what measures were best to be

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adopted. Hiero, the Ephesian, and other historians, testify the truth of this, in that account of transactions which they sent to king Antigonus, and their other absent friends.

The third is as follows: In Nicopolis, not long since, the same thing happened to one Eurynous. This man, who was buried in the front of the city, revived fifteen days after, and said that he saw and heard many wonderful things under the earth, which he was ordered not to relate. He lived some time after this, and his conduct was more just after his revival than before.

The fourth is of Rufus, a priest of the Thessalonians, who lived near the time of the historian Naumachius. This man was restored to life the third day after his death, for the purpose of performing certain sacred ceremonies, which he had promised to perform, and having fulfilled his promise, again died.

The fifth and last is of one Philonæa, who lived under the reign of Philip. She was the daughter of Demostratus and Charite, who lived in Amphipolis, and died soon after her marriage to one Craterus. She revived, however, in the sixth month after her death, and, through her love of a youth named Machates, who came to Demostratus from his own country Pelle, had

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connexion with him privately for many nights successively: this amour, however, being at length detected, she again died; previous to which, she declared that she acted in this manner according to the will of terrestrial dæmons. Her dead body was seen by every one lying in her father's house; and on digging the place, which prior to this had contained her body, it was found to be empty, by those of her kindred who came thither, through unbelief of what had happened to her. * The truth of this narration is testified both by the epistles of Hipparchus and those of Arridæus to Philip, in which they give an account of the affairs of Amphipolis.

Proclus then, with his usual sagacity, observes, concerning the cause of this phænomenon, as follows: "Many other of the ancients have collected a history of those that have apparently died, and afterwards revived; and among these are the natural philosopher Democritus, in his writings concerning Hades, and that wonderful Conotes, the familiar of Plato †; * * * for the death was not, as it seemed, an entire desertion of the whole life of the body, but a cessation,

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caused by some blow, or perhaps a wound; but the bonds of the soul yet remained rooted about the marrow, and the heart contained in its profundity the empyreuma of life; and this remaining, it again acquired the life which had been extinguished, in consequence of becoming adapted to animation."

Lastly, Proclus adds: "that it is possible for the soul to depart from, and enter into the body, is evident from him who, according to Clearchus, used a soul-attracting wand on a sleeping lad; and who persuaded Aristotle, as Clearchus relates in his Treatise on Sleep, that the soul may be separated from the body, and that it enters into the body, and uses it as a lodging. For, striking the lad with the wand, he drew out, and, as it were, led his soul, for the purpose of evincing that the body was immovable when the soul was at a distance from it, and that it was preserved uninjured; but the soul being again led into the body, by means of the wand, after its entrance narrated every particular. From this circumstance, therefore, both the spectators and Aristotle were persuaded that the soul is separate from the body."





109:* The learned reader, who is desirous of seeing the original of the above Translation, will find it in the Notes to my Translation of Plato's Republic.

112:* See this instance of revivification more fully detailed by Phlegon Tralliamis, in his Treatise de Mirabilibus et Longævis.

112:† There is an unfortunate chasm here in the Manuscript of two or three lines.

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