The Art of War

[Kristin Galpin]

51:3 Cf. IV. § 6.

51:4 The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. # is perhaps not so much actual invisibility (see supra, § 9) as "showing no sign" of what you mean to do, of the plans that are formed in your brain.

52:1 # is expanded by Tu Mu into # [For #, see XIII, note on heading.] He explains # in like fashion: # "though the enemy may have clever and capable officers, they will not be able to lay any plans against us."

52:2 All the commentators except Li Ch‘üan make # refer to the enemy. So Ts‘ao Kung: # is defined as #. The T‘u Shu has #, with the same meaning. See IV. § 13. The Yü Lan reads #, evidently a gloss.

52:3 I.e., everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what they cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations which has preceded the battle. It seems justifiable, then, to render the first # by "tactics" and the second by "strategy."

52:4 As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: "There is but one root-principle (#) underlying victory, but the tactics (#) which lead up to it are infinite in number." With this compare Col. Henderson; "The rules of strategy are few and simple. They may be learned in a week. They may be taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen diagrams. But such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an army like Napoleon than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to write like Gibbon."

53:1 # is # Liu Chou-tzŭ's reading for # in the original text.

53:2 Like water, taking the line of least resistance.

53:3 The T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan read #,—the latter also #. The present text is derived from Chêng Yu-hsien.

53:4 Water, fire, wood, metal, earth.

53:5 That is, as Wang Hsi says: # "they predominate alternately."

54:1 Literally, "have no invariable seat."

54:2 Cf. V. § 6. The purport of the passage is simply to illustrate the want of fixity in war by the changes constantly taking place in Nature. The comparison is not very happy, however, because the regularity of the phenomena which Sun Tzŭ mentions is by no means paralleled in war.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.sacred-texts.com/tao/aow/aow14.htm

[Kristin Galpin]

[Kristin Galpin]

VII. MANŒUVRING 1.

1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign. 2


2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonise the different elements thereof before pitching his camp. 3


p. 56

[Kristin Galpin]

[Kristin Galpin]

3. After that, comes tactical manœuvring, than which there is nothing more difficult. 1


The difficulty of tactical manœuvring consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain. 2


p. 57

[Kristin Galpin]

[Kristin Galpin]

4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of deviation. 1


p. 58

[Kristin Galpin]

[Kristin Galpin]

5. Manœuvring with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous. 1


6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. 2 On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores. 3



7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, 4


p. 59

[Kristin Galpin]

[Kristin Galpin]

and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch, 1 doing a hundred li in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.


8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination. 2


9. If you march fifty li in order to outmanœuvre the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal. 3


10. If you march thirty li with the same object, two-thirds of your army will arrive. 4



p. 60

[Kristin Galpin]

[Kristin Galpin]

11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost. 1


12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbours. 2


13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls 3 and precipices, 4 its marshes 5 and swamps. 6





14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides. 7

[Kristin Galpin]

[Kristin Galpin]

p. 61

15. In war, practise dissimulation. and you will succeed. 1 Move only if there is a real advantage to be gained. 2



15. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by circumstances.

16. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, 3 your compactness that of the forest. 4



17. In raiding and plundering be like fire, 5 in immovability like a mountain. 6




p. 62