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Mein Kampf (Complete Text)

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Author Topic: Mein Kampf (Complete Text)  (Read 1337 times)
Aryan Warrior
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« Reply #75 on: July 19, 2008, 01:42:45 am »

This fact must always be clearly kept in mind. Only by remembering it
can we understand how it was possible that a nation in which nine-tenths
of the people had not joined in a revolution, where seven-tenths
repudiated it and six-tenths detested it--how this nation allowed the
Revolution to be imposed upon it by the remaining one-tenth of the

Gradually the barricade heroes in the Spartacist camp petered out, and
so did the nationalist patriots and idealists on the other side. As
these two groups steadily dwindled, the masses of the middle stratum, as
always happens, triumphed. The Bourgeoisie and the Marxists met together
on the grounds of accomplished facts, and the Republic began to be
consolidated. At first, however, that did not prevent the bourgeois
parties from propounding their monarchist ideas for some time further,
especially at the elections, whereby they endeavoured to conjure up the
spirits of the dead past to encourage their own feeble-hearted
followers. It was not an honest proceeding. In their hearts they had
broken with the monarchy long ago; but the foulness of the new regime
had begun to extend its corruptive action and make itself felt in the
camp of the bourgeois parties. The common bourgeois politician now felt
better in the slime of republican corruption than in the severe decency
of the defunct State, which still lived in his memory.

As I have already pointed out, after the destruction of the old Army the
revolutionary leaders were forced to strengthen statal authority by
creating a new factor of power. In the conditions that existed they
could do this only by winning over to their side the adherents of a
WELTANSCHAUUNG which was a direct contradiction of their own. From
those elements alone it was possible slowly to create a new army which,
limited numerically by the peace treaties, had to be subsequently
transformed in spirit so as to become an instrument of the new regime.

Setting aside the defects of the old State, which really became the
cause of the Revolution, if we ask how it was possible to carry the
Revolution to a successful issue as a political act, we arrive at the
following conclusions:

l. It was due to a process of dry rot in our conceptions of duty and

2. It was due also to the passive timidity of the Parties who were
supposed to uphold the State.

To this the following must be added: The dry rot which attacked our
concepts of duty and obedience was fundamentally due to our wholly
non-national and purely State education. From this came the habit of
confusing means and ends. Consciousness of duty, fulfilment of duty, and
obedience, are not ends in themselves no more than the State is an end
in itself; but they all ought to be employed as means to facilitate and
assure the existence of a community of people who are kindred both
physically and spiritually. At a moment when a nation is manifestly
collapsing and when all outward signs show that it is on the point of
becoming the victim of ruthless oppression, thanks to the conduct of a
few miscreants, to obey these people and fulfil one's duty towards them
is merely doctrinaire formalism, and indeed pure folly; whereas, on the
other hand, the refusal of obedience and fulfilment of duty in such a
case might save the nation from collapse. According to our current
bourgeois idea of the State, if a divisional general received from above
the order not to shoot he fulfilled his duty and therefore acted rightly
in not shooting, because to the bourgeois mind blind formal obedience is
a more valuable thing than the life of a nation. But according to the
National Socialist concept it is not obedience to weak superiors that
should prevail at such moments, in such an hour the duty of assuming
personal responsibility towards the whole nation makes its appearance.

The Revolution succeeded because that concept had ceased to be a vital
force with our people, or rather with our governments, and died down to
something that was merely formal and doctrinaire.

As regards the second point, it may be said that the more profound cause
of the fecklessness of the bourgeois parties must be attributed to the
fact that the most active and upright section of our people had lost
their lives in the war. Apart from that, the bourgeois parties, which
may be considered as the only political formations that stood by the old
State, were convinced that they ought to defend their principles only by
intellectual ways and means, since the use of physical force was
permitted only to the State. That outlook was a sign of the weakness and
decadence which had been gradually developing. And it was also senseless
at a period when there was a political adversary who had long ago
abandoned that standpoint and, instead of this, had openly declared that
he meant to attain his political ends by force whenever that became
possible. When Marxism emerged in the world of bourgeois democracy, as a
consequence of that democracy itself, the appeal sent out by the
bourgeois democracy to fight Marxism with intellectual weapons was a
piece of folly for which a terrible expiation had to be made later on.
For Marxism always professed the doctrine that the use of arms was a
matter which had to be judged from the standpoint of expediency and that
success justified the use of arms.

This idea was proved correct during the days from November 7 to 10,
1918. The Marxists did not then bother themselves in the least about
parliament or democracy, but they gave the death blow to both by turning
loose their horde of criminals to shoot and raise hell.

When the Revolution was over the bourgeois parties changed the title of
their firm and suddenly reappeared, the heroic leaders emerging from
dark cellars or more lightsome storehouses where they had sought refuge.
But, just as happens in the case of all representatives of antiquated
institutions, they had not forgotten their errors or learned anything
new. Their political programme was grounded in the past, even though
they themselves had become reconciled to the new regime. Their aim was
to secure a share in the new establishment, and so they continued the
use of words as their sole weapon.

Therefore after the Revolution the bourgeois parties also capitulated to
the street in a miserable fashion.

When the law for the Protection of the Republic was introduced the
majority was not at first in favour of it. But, confronted with two
hundred thousand Marxists demonstrating in the streets, the bourgeois
'statesmen' were so terror-stricken that they voted for the Law against
their wills, for the edifying reason that otherwise they feared they
might get their heads smashed by the enraged masses on leaving the

And so the new State developed along its own course, as if there had
been no national opposition at all.

The only organizations which at that time had the strength and courage
to face Marxism and its enraged masses were first of all the volunteer
corps (Note 19), and subsequently the organizations for self-defence, the
civic guards and finally the associations formed by the demobilized
soldiers of the old Army.

[Note 19. After the DEBACLE of 1918 several semi-military associations were
formed by demobilized officers who had fought at the Front. These were
semi-clandestine associations and were known as FREIKORPS (Volunteer
corps). Their principal purpose was to act as rallying centres for the
old nationalist elements.]

But the existence of these bodies did not appreciably change the course
of German history; and that for the following causes:

As the so-called national parties were without influence, because they
had no force which could effectively demonstrate in the street, the
Leagues of Defence could not exercise any influence because they had no
political idea and especially because they had no definite political aim
in view.

The success which Marxism once attained was due to perfect co-operation
between political purposes and ruthless force. What deprived nationalist
Germany of all practical hopes of shaping German development was the
lack of a determined co-operation between brute force and political aims
wisely chosen.

Whatever may have been the aspirations of the 'national' parties, they
had no force whatsoever to fight for these aspirations, least of all in
the streets.

The Defence Leagues had force at their disposal. They were masters of
the street and of the State, but they lacked political ideas and aims on
behalf of which their forces might have been or could have been employed
in the interests of the German nation. The cunning Jew was able in both
cases, by his astute powers of persuasion, in reinforcing an already
existing tendency to make this unfortunate state of affairs permanent
and at the same time to drive the roots of it still deeper.

The Jew succeeded brilliantly in using his Press for the purpose of
spreading abroad the idea that the defence associations were of a
'non-political' character just as in politics he was always astute
enough to praise the purely intellectual character of the struggle and
demand that it must always be kept on that plane

Millions of German imbeciles then repeated this folly without having the
slightest suspicion that by so doing they were, for all practical
purposes, disarming themselves and delivering themselves defenceless
into the hands of the Jew.

But there is a natural explanation of this also. The lack of a great
idea which would re-shape things anew has always meant a limitation in
fighting power. The conviction of the right to employ even the most
brutal weapons is always associated with an ardent faith in the
necessity for a new and revolutionary transformation of the world.

A movement which does not fight for such high aims and ideals will never
have recourse to extreme means.

The appearance of a new and great idea was the secret of success in the
French Revolution. The Russian Revolution owes its triumph to an idea.
And it was only the idea that enabled Fascism triumphantly to subject a
whole nation to a process of complete renovation.

Bourgeois parties are not capable of such an achievement. And it was not
the bourgeois parties alone that fixed their aim in a restoration of the
past. The defence associations also did so, in so far as they concerned
themselves with political aims at all. The spirit of the old war legions
and Kyffauser tendencies lived in them and therewith helped politically
to blunt the sharpest weapons which the German nation then possessed and
allow them to rust in the hands of republican serfs. The fact that these
associations were inspired by the best of intentions in so doing, and
certainly acted in good faith, does not alter in the slightest degree
the foolishness of the course they adopted.

In the consolidated REICHSWEHR Marxism gradually acquired the support of
force, which it needed for its authority. As a logical consequence it
proceeded to abolish those defence associations which it considered
dangerous, declaring that they were now no longer necessary. Some rash
leaders who defied the Marxist orders were summoned to court and sent to
prison. But they all got what they had deserved.

The founding of the National Socialist German Labour Party incited a
movement which was the first to fix its aim, not in a mechanical
restoration of the past--as the bourgeois parties did--but in the
substitution of an organic People's State for the present absurd statal

From the first day of its foundation the new movement took its stand on
the principle that its ideas had to be propagated by intellectual means
but that, wherever necessary, muscular force must be employed to support
this propaganda. In accordance with their conviction of the paramount
importance of the new doctrine, the leaders of the new movement
naturally believe that no sacrifice can be considered too great when it
is a question of carrying through the purpose of the movement.

I have emphasized that in certain circumstances a movement which is
meant to win over the hearts of the people must be ready to defend
itself with its own forces against terrorist attempts on the part of its
adversaries. It has invariably happened in the history of the world that
formal State authority has failed to break a reign of terror which was
inspired by a WELTANSCHAUUNG. It can only be conquered by a new and
different WELTANSCHAUUNG whose representatives are quite as audacious
and determined. The acknowledgment of this fact has always been very
unpleasant for the bureaucrats who are the protectors of the State, but
the fact remains nevertheless. The rulers of the State can guarantee
tranquillity and order only in case the State embodies a WELTANSCHAUUNG
which is shared in by the people as a whole; so that elements of
disturbance can be treated as isolated criminals, instead of being
considered as the champions of an idea which is diametrically opposed to
official opinions. If such should be the case the State may employ the
most violent measures for centuries long against the terror that
threatens it; but in the end all these measures will prove futile, and
the State will have to succumb.

The German State is intensely overrun by Marxism. In a struggle that
went on for seventy years the State was not able to prevent the triumph
of the Marxist idea. Even though the sentences to penal servitude and
imprisonment amounted in all to thousands of years, and even though the
most sanguinary methods of repression were in innumerable instances
threatened against the champions of the Marxist WELTANSCHAUUNG, in the
end the State was forced to capitulate almost completely. The ordinary
bourgeois political leaders will deny all this, but their protests are

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Aryan Warrior
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« Reply #76 on: July 19, 2008, 01:43:05 am »

Seeing that the State capitulated unconditionally to Marxism on November
9th, 1918, it will not suddenly rise up tomorrow as the conqueror of
Marxism. On the contrary. Bourgeois simpletons sitting on office stools
in the various ministries babble about the necessity of not governing
against the wishes of the workers, and by the word 'workers' they mean
the Marxists. By identifying the German worker with Marxism not only are
they guilty of a vile falsification of the truth, but they thus try to
hide their own collapse before the Marxist idea and the Marxist

In view of the complete subordination of the present State to Marxism,
the National Socialist Movement feels all the more bound not only to
prepare the way for the triumph of its idea by appealing to the reason
and understanding of the public but also to take upon itself the
responsibility of organizing its own defence against the terror of the
International, which is intoxicated with its own victory.

I have already described how practical experience in our young movement
led us slowly to organize a system of defence for our meetings. This
gradually assumed the character of a military body specially trained for
the maintenance of order, and tended to develop into a service which
would have its properly organized cadres.

This new formation might resemble the defence associations externally,
but in reality there were no grounds of comparison between the one and
the other.

As I have already said, the German defence organizations did not have
any definite political ideas of their own. They really were only
associations for mutual protection, and they were trained and organized
accordingly, so that they were an illegal complement or auxiliary to the
legal forces of the State. Their character as free corps arose only from
the way in which they were constructed and the situation in which the
State found itself at that time. But they certainly could not claim to
be free corps on the grounds that they were associations formed freely
and privately for the purpose of fighting for their own freely formed
political convictions. Such they were not, despite the fact that some of
their leaders and some associations as such were definitely opposed to
the Republic. For before we can speak of political convictions in the
higher sense we must be something more than merely convinced that the
existing regime is defective. Political convictions in the higher sense
mean that one has the picture of a new regime clearly before one's mind,
feels that the establishment of this regime is an absolute necessity and
sets himself to carry out that purpose as the highest task to which his
life can be devoted.

The troops for the preservation of order, which were then formed under
the National Socialist Movement, were fundamentally different from all
the other defence associations by reason of the fact that our formations
were not meant in any way to defend the state of things created by the
Revolution, but rather that they were meant exclusively to support our
struggle for the creation of a new Germany.

In the beginning this body was merely a guard to maintain order at our
meetings. Its first task was limited to making it possible for us to
hold our meetings, which otherwise would have been completely prevented
by our opponents. These men were at that time trained merely for
purposes of attack, but they were not taught to adore the big stick
exclusively, as was then pretended in stupid German patriotic circles.
They used the cudgel because they knew that it can be made impossible
for high ideals to be put forward if the man who endeavours to propagate
them can be struck down with the cudgel. As a matter of fact, it has
happened in history not infrequently that some of the greatest minds
have perished under the blows of the most insignificant helots. Our
bodyguards did not look upon violence as an end in itself, but they
protected the expositors of ideal aims and purposes against hostile
coercion by violence. They also understood that there was no obligation
to undertake the defence of a State which did not guarantee the defence
of the nation, but that, on the contrary, they had to defend the nation
against those who were threatening to destroy nation and State.

After the fight which took place at the meeting in the Munich
Hofbräuhaus, where the small number of our guards who were present won
everlasting fame for themselves by the heroic manner in which they
stormed the adversaries; these guards were called THE STORM DETACHMENT.
As the name itself indicates, they represent only a DETACHMENT of the
Movement. They are one constituent element of it, just as is the Press,
the propaganda, educational institutes, and other sections of the Party.

We learned how necessary was the formation of such a body, not only from
our experience on the occasion of that memorable meeting but also when
we sought gradually to carry the Movement beyond Munich and extend it to
the other parts of Germany. Once we had begun to appear as a danger to
Marxism the Marxists lost no opportunity of trying to crush beforehand
all preparations for the holding of National Socialist meetings. When
they did not succeed in this they tried to break up the meeting itself.
It goes without saying that all the Marxist organizations, no matter of
what grade or view, blindly supported the policy and activities of their
representations in every case. But what is to be said of the bourgeois
parties who, when they were reduced to silence by these same Marxists
and in many places did not dare to send their speakers to appear before
the public, yet showed themselves pleased, in a stupid and
incomprehensible manner, every time we received any kind of set-back in
our fight against Marxism. The bourgeois parties were happy to think
that those whom they themselves could not stand up against, but had to
knuckle down to, could not be broken by us. What must be said of those
State officials, chiefs of police, and even cabinet ministers, who
showed a scandalous lack of principle in presenting themselves
externally to the public as 'national' and yet shamelessly acted as the
henchmen of the Marxists in the disputes which we, National Socialists,
had with the latter. What can be said of persons who debased themselves
so far, for the sake of a little abject praise in the Jewish Press, that
they persecuted those men to whose heroic courage and intervention,
regardless of risk, they were partly indebted for not having been torn
to pieces by the Red mob a few years previously and strung up to the

One day these lamentable phenomena fired the late but unforgotten
Prefect Pöhner--a man whose unbending straightforwardness forced him to
hate all twisters and to hate them as only a man with an honest heart
can hate--to say: "In all my life I wished to be first a German and then
an official, and I never wanted to mix up with these creatures who, as
if they were kept officials, prostituted themselves before anybody who
could play lord and master for the time being."

It was a specially sad thing that gradually tens of thousands of honest
and loyal servants of the State did not only come under the power of
such people but were also slowly contaminated by their unprincipled
morals. Moreover, these kind of men pursued honest officials with a
furious hatred, degrading them and driving them from their positions,
and yet passed themselves off as 'national' by the aid of their lying

From officials of that kind we could expect no support, and only in very
rare instances was it given. Only by building up its own defence could
our movement become secure and attract that amount of public attention
and general respect which is given to those who can defend themselves
when attacked.

As an underlying principle in the internal development of the Storm
Detachment, we came to the decision that not only should it be perfectly
trained in bodily efficiency but that the men should be so instructed as
to make them indomitably convinced champions of the National Socialist
ideas and, finally, that they should be schooled to observe the
strictest discipline. This body was to have nothing to do with the
defence organizations of the bourgeois type and especially not with any
secret organization.

My reasons at that time for guarding strictly against letting the Storm
Detachment of the German National Socialist Labour Party appear as a
defence association were as follows:

On purely practical grounds it is impossible to build up a national
defence organization by means of private associations, unless the State
makes an enormous contribution to it. Whoever thinks otherwise
overestimates his own powers. Now it is entirely out of the question to
form organizations of any military value for a definite purpose on the
principle of so-called 'voluntary discipline'. Here the chief support
for enforcing orders, namely, the power of inflicting punishment, is
lacking. In the autumn, or rather in the spring, of 1919 it was still
possible to raise 'volunteer corps', not only because most of the men
who came forward at that time had been through the school of the old
Army, but also because the kind of duty imposed there constrained the
individual to absolute obedience at least for a definite period of time.

That spirit is entirely lacking in the volunteer defence organizations
of to-day. The more the defence association grows, the weaker its
discipline becomes and so much the less can one demand from the
individual members. Thus the whole organization will more and more
assume the character of the old non-political associations of war
comrades and veterans.

It is impossible to carry through a voluntary training in military
service for larger masses unless one is assured absolute power of
command. There will always be few men who will voluntarily and
spontaneously submit to that kind of obedience which is considered
natural and necessary in the Army.

Moreover, a proper system of military training cannot be developed where
there are such ridiculously scanty means as those at the disposal of the
defence associations. The principal task of such an institution must be
to impart the best and most reliable kind of instruction. Eight years
have passed since the end of the War, and during that time none of our
German youth, at an age when formerly they would have had to do military
service, have received any systematic training at all. The aim of a
defence association cannot be to enlist here and now all those who have
already received a military training; for in that case it could be
reckoned with mathematical accuracy when the last member would leave the
association. Even the younger soldier from 1918 will no longer be fit
for front-line service twenty years later, and we are approaching that
state of things with a rapidity that gives cause for anxiety. Thus the
defence associations must assume more and more the aspect of the old
ex-service men's societies. But that cannot be the meaning and purpose
of an institution which calls itself, not an association of ex-service
men but a DEFENCE association, indicating by this title that it
considers its task to be, not only to preserve the tradition of the old
soldiers and hold them together but also to propagate the idea of
national defence and be able to carry this idea into practical effect,
which means the creation of a body of men who are fit and trained for
military defence.

But this implies that those elements will receive a military training
which up to now have received none. This is something that in practice
is impossible for the defence associations. Real soldiers cannot be made
by a training of one or two hours per week. In view of the enormously
increasing demands which modern warfare imposes on each individual
soldier to-day, a military service of two years is barely sufficient to
transform a raw recruit into a trained soldier. At the Front during the
War we all saw the fearful consequences which our young recruits had to
suffer from their lack of a thorough military training. Volunteer
formations which had been drilled for fifteen or twenty weeks under an
iron discipline and shown unlimited self-denial proved nevertheless to
be no better than cannon fodder at the Front. Only when distributed
among the ranks of the old and experienced soldiers could the young
recruits, who had been trained for four or six months, become useful
members of a regiment. Guided by the 'old men', they adapted themselves
gradually to their task.

In the light of all this, how hopeless must the attempt be to create a
body of fighting troops by a so-called training of one or two hours in
the week, without any definite power of command and without any
considerable means. In that way perhaps one could refresh military
training in old soldiers, but raw recruits cannot thus be transformed
into expert soldiers.

How such a proceeding produces utterly worthless results may also be
demonstrated by the fact that at the same time as these so-called
volunteer defence associations, with great effort and outcry and under
difficulties and lack of necessities, try to educate and train a few
thousand men of goodwill (the others need not be taken into account) for
purposes of national defence, the State teaches our young men democratic
and pacifist ideas and thus deprives millions and millions of their
national instincts, poisons their logical sense of patriotism and
gradually turns them into a herd of sheep who will patiently follow any
arbitrary command. Thus they render ridiculous all those attempts made
by the defence associations to inculcate their ideas in the minds of the
German youth.

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Aryan Warrior
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« Reply #77 on: July 19, 2008, 01:43:24 am »

Almost more important is the following consideration, which has always
made me take up a stand against all attempts at a so-called military
training on the basis of the volunteer associations.

Assuming that, in spite of all the difficulties just mentioned, a
defence association were successful in training a certain number of
Germans every year to be efficient soldiers, not only as regards their
mental outlook but also as regards bodily efficiency and the expert
handling of arms, the result must necessarily be null and void in a
State whose whole tendency makes it not only look upon such a defensive
formation as undesirable but even positively hate it, because such an
association would completely contradict the intimate aims of the
political leaders, who are the corrupters of this State.

But anyhow, such a result would be worthless under governments which
have demonstrated by their own acts that they do not lay the slightest
importance on the military power of the nation and are not disposed to
permit an appeal to that power only in case that it were necessary for
the protection of their own malignant existence.

And that is the state of affairs to-day. It is not ridiculous to think
of training some ten thousand men in the use of arms, and carry on that
training surreptitiously, when a few years previously the State, having
shamefully sacrificed eight-and-a-half million highly trained soldiers,
not merely did not require their services any more, but, as a mark of
gratitude for their sacrifices, held them up to public contumely. Shall
we train soldiers for a regime which besmirched and spat upon our most
glorious soldiers, tore the medals and badges from their breasts,
trampled on their flags and derided their achievements? Has the present
regime taken one step towards restoring the honour of the old army and
bringing those who destroyed and outraged it to answer for their deeds?
Not in the least. On the contrary, the people I have just referred to
may be seen enthroned in the highest positions under the State to-day.
And yet it was said at Leipzig: "Right goes with might." Since, however,
in our Republic to-day might is in the hands of the very men who
arranged for the Revolution, and since that Revolution represents a most
despicable act of high treason against the nation--yea, the vilest act
in German history--there can surely be no grounds for saying that might
of this character should be enhanced by the formation of a new young
army. It is against all sound reason.

The importance which this State attached, after the Revolution of 1918,
to the reinforcement of its position from the military point of view is
clearly and unmistakably demonstrated by its attitude towards the large
self-defence organizations which existed in that period. They were not
unwelcome as long as they were of use for the personal protection of the
miserable creatures cast up by the Revolution.

But the danger to these creatures seemed to disappear as the debasement
of our people gradually increased. As the existence of the defence
associations no longer implied a reinforcement of the national policy
they became superfluous. Hence every effort was made to disarm them and
suppress them wherever that was possible.

History records only a few examples of gratitude on the part of princes.
But there is not one patriot among the new bourgeoisie who can count on
the gratitude of revolutionary incendiaries and assassins, persons who
have enriched themselves from the public spoil and betrayed the nation.
In examining the problem as to the wisdom of forming these defence
associations I have never ceased to ask: 'For whom shall I train these
young men? For what purpose will they be employed when they will have to
be called out?' The answer to these questions lays down at the same time
the best rule for us to follow.

If the present State should one day have to call upon trained troops of
this kind it would never be for the purpose of defending the interests
of the nation VIS-À-VIS those of the stranger but rather to protect the
oppressors of the nation inside the country against the danger of a
general outbreak of wrath on the part of a nation which has been
deceived and betrayed and whose interests have been bartered away.

For this reason it was decided that the Storm Detachment of the German
National Socialist Labour Party ought not to be in the nature of a
military organization. It had to be an instrument of protection and
education for the National Socialist Movement and its duties should be
in quite a different sphere from that of the military defence

And, of course, the Storm Detachment should not be in the nature of a
secret organization. Secret organizations are established only for
purposes that are against the law. Therewith the purpose of such an
organization is limited by its very nature. Considering the loquacious
propensities of the German people, it is not possible to build up any
vast organization, keeping it secret at the same time and cloaking its
purpose. Every attempt of that kind is destined to turn out absolutely
futile. It is not merely that our police officials to-day have at their
disposal a staff of eaves-droppers and other such rabble who are ready
to play traitor, like Judas, for thirty pieces of silver and will betray
whatever secrets they can discover and will invent what they would like
to reveal. In order to forestall such eventualities, it is never
possible to bind one's own followers to the silence that is necessary.
Only small groups can become really secret societies, and that only
after long years of filtration. But the very smallness of such groups
would deprive them of all value for the National Socialist Movement.
What we needed then and need now is not one or two hundred dare-devil
conspirators but a hundred thousand devoted champions of our
WELTANSCHAUUNG. The work must not be done through secret conventicles
but through formidable mass demonstrations in public. Dagger and pistol
and poison-vial cannot clear the way for the progress of the movement.
That can be done only by winning over the man in the street. We must
overthrow Marxism, so that for the future National Socialism will be
master of the street, just as it will one day become master of the

There is another danger connected with secret societies. It lies in the
fact that their members often completely misunderstand the greatness of
the task in hand and are apt to believe that a favourable destiny can be
assured for the nation all at once by means of a single murder. Such a
belief may find historical justification by appealing to cases where a
nation had been suffering under the tyranny of some oppressor who at the
same time was a man of genius and whose extraordinary personality
guaranteed the internal solidity of his position and enabled him to
maintain his fearful oppression. In such cases a man may suddenly arise
from the ranks of the people who is ready to sacrifice himself and
plunge the deadly steel into the heart of the hated individual. In order
to look upon such a deed as abhorrent one must have the republican
mentality of that petty CANAILLE who are conscious of their own crime.
But the greatest champion (Note 20) of liberty that the German people have
ever had has glorified such a deed in WILLIAM TELL.

[Note 20. Schiller, who wrote the famous drama of WILLIAM TELL.]

During 1919 and 1920 there was danger that the members of secret
organizations, under the influence of great historical examples and
overcome by the immensity of the nation's misfortunes, might attempt to
wreak vengeance on the destroyers of their country, under the belief
that this would end the miseries of the people. All such attempts were
sheer folly, for the reason that the Marxist triumph was not due to the
superior genius of one remarkable person but rather to immeasurable
incompetence and cowardly shirking on the part of the bourgeoisie. The
hardest criticism that can be uttered against our bourgeoisie is simply
to state the fact that it submitted to the Revolution, even though the
Revolution did not produce one single man of eminent worth. One can
always understand how it was possible to capitulate before a
Robespierre, a Danton, or a Marat; but it was utterly scandalous to go
down on all fours before the withered Scheidemann, the obese Herr
Erzberger, Frederick Ebert, and the innumerable other political pigmies
of the Revolution. There was not a single man of parts in whom one could
see the revolutionary man of genius. Therein lay the country's
misfortune; for they were only revolutionary bugs, Spartacists wholesale
and retail. To suppress one of them would be an act of no consequence.
The only result would be that another pair of bloodsuckers, equally fat
and thirsty, would be ready to take his place.

During those years we had to take up a determined stand against an idea
which owed its origin and foundation to historical episodes that were
really great, but to which our own despicable epoch did not bear the
slightest similarity.

The same reply may be given when there is question of putting somebody
'on the spot' who has acted as a traitor to his country. It would be
ridiculous and illogical to shoot a poor wretch (Note 21) who had betrayed
the position of a howitzer to the enemy while the highest positions of the
government are occupied by a rabble who bartered away a whole empire,
who have on their consciences the deaths of two million men who were
sacrificed in vain, fellows who were responsible for the millions maimed
in the war and who make a thriving business out of the republican regime
without allowing their souls to be disturbed in any way. It would be
absurd to do away with small traitors in a State whose government has
absolved the great traitors from all punishment. For it might easily
happen that one day an honest idealist, who, out of love for his
country, had removed from circulation some miserable informer that had
given information about secret stores of arms might now be called to
answer for his act before the chief traitors of the country. And there
is still an important question: Shall some small traitorous creature be
suppressed by another small traitor, or by an idealist? In the former
case the result would be doubtful and the deed would almost surely be
revealed later on. In the second case a petty rascal is put out of the
way and the life of an idealist who may be irreplaceable is in jeopardy.

[Note 21. The reference here is to those who gave information to the
Allied Commissions about hidden stores of arms in Germany.]

For myself, I believe that small thieves should not be hanged while big
thieves are allowed to go free. One day a national tribunal will have to
judge and sentence some tens of thousands of organizers who were
responsible for the criminal November betrayal and all the consequences
that followed on it. Such an example will teach the necessary lesson,
once and for ever, to those paltry traitors who revealed to the enemy
the places where arms were hidden.

On the grounds of these considerations I steadfastly forbade all
participation in secret societies, and I took care that the Storm
Detachment should not assume such a character. During those years I kept
the National Socialist Movement away from those experiments which were
being undertaken by young Germans who for the most part were inspired
with a sublime idealism but who became the victims of their own deeds,
because they could not ameliorate the lot of their fatherland to the
slightest degree.

If then the Storm Detachment must not be either a military defence
organization or a secret society, the following conclusions must result:

1. Its training must not be organized from the military standpoint but
from the standpoint of what is most practical for party purposes. Seeing
that its members must undergo a good physical training, the place of
chief importance must not be given to military drill but rather to the
practice of sports. I have always considered boxing and ju-jitsu more
important than some kind of bad, because mediocre, training in
rifle-shooting. If the German nation were presented with a body of young
men who had been perfectly trained in athletic sports, who were imbued
with an ardent love for their country and a readiness to take the
initiative in a fight, then the national State could make an army out of
that body within less than two years if it were necessary, provided the
cadres already existed. In the actual state of affairs only the
REICHSWEHR could furnish the cadres and not a defence organization that
was neither one thing nor the other. Bodily efficiency would develop in
the individual a conviction of his superiority and would give him that
confidence which is always based only on the consciousness of one's own
powers. They must also develop that athletic agility which can be
employed as a defensive weapon in the service of the Movement.

2. In order to safeguard the Storm Detachment against any tendency
towards secrecy, not only must the uniform be such that it can
immediately be recognized by everybody, but the large number of its
effectives show the direction in which the Movement is going and which
must be known to the whole public. The members of the Storm Detachment
must not hold secret gatherings but must march in the open and thus, by
their actions, put an end to all legends about a secret organization. In
order to keep them away from all temptations towards finding an outlet
for their activities in small conspiracies, from the very beginning we
had to inculcate in their minds the great idea of the Movement and
educate them so thoroughly to the task of defending this idea that their
horizon became enlarged and that the individual no longer considered it
his mission to remove from circulation some rascal or other, whether big
or small, but to devote himself entirely to the task of bringing about
the establishment of a new National Socialist People's State. In this
way the struggle against the present State was placed on a higher plane
than that of petty revenge and small conspiracies. It was elevated to
the level of a spiritual struggle on behalf of a WELTANSCHAUUNG, for
the destruction of Marxism in all its shapes and forms.

3. The form of organization adopted for the Storm Detachment, as well as
its uniform and equipment, had to follow different models from those of
the old Army. They had to be specially suited to the requirements of the
task that was assigned to the Storm Detachment.

These were the ideas I followed in 1920 and 1921. I endeavoured to
instil them gradually into the members of the young organization. And
the result was that by the midsummer of 1922 we had a goodly number of
formations which consisted of a hundred men each. By the late autumn of
that year these formations received their distinctive uniforms. There
were three events which turned out to be of supreme importance for the
subsequent development of the Storm Detachment.
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« Reply #78 on: July 19, 2008, 01:43:38 am »

1. The great mass demonstration against the Law for the Protection of
the Republic. This demonstration was held in the late summer of 1922 on
the KÖNIGS-PLATZ in Munich, by all the patriotic societies. The National
Socialist Movement also participated in it. The march-past of our party,
in serried ranks, was led by six Munich companies of a hundred men each,
followed by the political sections of the Party. Two bands marched with
us and about fifteen flags were carried. When the National Socialists
arrived at the great square it was already half full, but no flag was
flying. Our entry aroused unbounded enthusiasm. I myself had the honour
of being one of the speakers who addressed that mass of about sixty
thousand people.

The demonstration was an overwhelming success; especially because it was
proved for the first time that nationalist Munich could march on the
streets, in spite of all threats from the Reds. Members of the
organization for the defence of the Red Republic endeavoured to hinder
the marching columns by their terrorist activities, but they were
scattered by the companies of the Storm Detachment within a few minutes
and sent off with bleeding skulls. The National Socialist Movement had
then shown for the first time that in future it was determined to
exercise the right to march on the streets and thus take this monopoly
away from the international traitors and enemies of the country.

The result of that day was an incontestable proof that our ideas for the
creation of the Storm Detachment were right, both from the psychological
viewpoint and as to the manner in which this body was organized.

On the basis of this success the enlistment progressed so rapidly that
within a few weeks the number of Munich companies of a hundred men each
became doubled.

2. The expedition to Coburg in October 1922.

Certain People's Societies had decided to hold a German Day at Coburg. I
was invited to take part, with the intimation that they wished me to
bring a following along. This invitation, which I received at eleven
o'clock in the morning, arrived just in time. Within an hour the
arrangements for our participation in the German Congress were ready. I
picked eight hundred men of the Storm Detachment to accompany me. These
were divided into about fourteen companies and had to be brought by
special train from Munich to Coburg, which had just voted by plebiscite
to be annexed to Bavaria. Corresponding orders were given to other
groups of the National Socialist Storm Detachment which had meanwhile
been formed in various other localities.

This was the first time that such a special train ran in Germany. At all
the places where the new members of the Storm Detachment joined us our
train caused a sensation. Many of the people had never seen our flag.
And it made a very great impression.

As we arrived at the station in Coburg we were received by a deputation
of the organizing committee of the German Day. They announced that it
had been 'arranged' at the orders of local trades unions--that is to
say, the Independent and Communist Parties--that we should not enter the
town with our flags unfurled and our band playing (we had a band
consisting of forty-two musicians with us) and that we should not march
with closed ranks.

I immediately rejected these unmilitary conditions and did not fail to
declare before the gentlemen who had arranged this 'day' how astonished
I was at the idea of their negotiating with such people and coming to an
agreement with them. Then I announced that the Storm Troops would
immediately march into the town in company formation, with our flags
flying and the band playing.

And that is what happened.

As we came out into the station yard we were met by a growling and
yelling mob of several thousand, that shouted at us: 'Assassins',
'Bandits', 'Robbers', 'Criminals'. These were the choice names which
these exemplary founders of the German Republic showered on us. The
young Storm Detachment gave a model example of order. The companies fell
into formation on the square in front of the station and at first took
no notice of the insults hurled at them by the mob. The police were
anxious. They did not pilot us to the quarters assigned to us on the
outskirts of Coburg, a city quite unknown to us, but to the Hofbräuhaus
Keller in the centre of the town. Right and left of our march the tumult
raised by the accompanying mob steadily increased. Scarcely had the last
company entered the courtyard of the Hofbräuhaus when the huge mass made
a rush to get in after them, shouting madly. In order to prevent this,
the police closed the gates. Seeing the position was untenable I called
the Storm Detachment to attention and then asked the police to open the
gates immediately. After a good deal of hesitation, they consented.

We now marched back along the same route as we had come, in the
direction of our quarters, and there we had to make a stand against the
crowd. As their cries and yells all along the route had failed to
disturb the equanimity of our companies, the champions of true
Socialism, Equality, and Fraternity now took to throwing stones. That
brought our patience to an end. For ten minutes long, blows fell right
and left, like a devastating shower of hail. Fifteen minutes later there
were no more Reds to be seen in the street.

The collisions which took place when the night came on were more
serious. Patrols of the Storm Detachment had discovered National
Socialists who had been attacked singly and were in an atrocious state.
Thereupon we made short work of the opponents. By the following morning
the Red terror, under which Coburg had been suffering for years, was
definitely smashed.

Adopting the typically Marxist and Jewish method of spreading
falsehoods, leaflets were distributed by hand on the streets, bearing
the caption: "Comrades and Comradesses of the International
Proletariat." These leaflets were meant to arouse the wrath of the
populace. Twisting the facts completely around, they declared that our
'bands of assasins' had commenced 'a war of extermination against the
peaceful workers of Coburg'. At half-past one that day there was to be a
'great popular demonstration', at which it was hoped that the workers of
the whole district would turn up. I was determined finally to crush this
Red terror and so I summoned the Storm Detachment to meet at midday.
Their number had now increased to 1,500. I decided to march with these
men to the Coburg Festival and to cross the big square where the Red
demonstration was to take place. I wanted to see if they would attempt
to assault us again. When we entered the square we found that instead of
the ten thousand that had been advertised, there were only a few hundred
people present. As we approached they remained silent for the most part,
and some ran away. Only at certain points along the route some bodies of
Reds, who had arrived from outside the city and had not yet come to know
us, attempted to start a row. But a few fisticuffs put them to flight.
And now one could see how the population, which had for such a long time
been so wretchedly intimidated, slowly woke up and recovered their
courage. They welcomed us openly, and in the evening, on our return
march, spontaneous shouts of jubilation broke out at several points
along the route.

At the station the railway employees informed us all of a sudden that
our train would not move. Thereupon I had some of the ringleaders told
that if this were the case I would have all the Red Party heroes
arrested that fell into our hands, that we would drive the train
ourselves, but that we would take away with us, in the locomotive and
tender and in some of the carriages, a few dozen members of this
brotherhood of international solidarity. I did not omit to let those
gentry know that if we had to conduct the train the journey would
undoubtedly be a very risky adventure and that we might all break our
necks. It would be a consolation, however, to know that we should not go
to Eternity alone, but in equality and fraternity with the Red gentry.

Thereupon the train departed punctually and we arrived next morning in
Munich safe and sound.

Thus at Coburg, for the first time since 1914, the equality of all
citizens before the law was re-established. For even if some coxcomb of
a higher official should assert to-day that the State protects the lives
of its citizens, at least in those days it was not so. For at that time
the citizens had to defend themselves against the representatives of the
present State.

At first it was not possible fully to estimate the importance of the
consequences which resulted from that day. The victorious Storm Troops
had their confidence in themselves considerably reinforced and also
their faith in the sagacity of their leaders. Our contemporaries began
to pay us special attention and for the first time many recognized the
National Socialist Movement as an organization that in all probability
was destined to bring the Marxist folly to a deserving end.

Only the democrats lamented the fact that we had not the complaisance to
allow our skulls to be cracked and that we had dared, in a democratic
Republic, to hit back with fists and sticks at a brutal assault, rather
than with pacifist chants.

Generally speaking, the bourgeois Press was partly distressed and partly
vulgar, as always. Only a few decent newspapers expressed their
satisfaction that at least in one locality the Marxist street bullies
had been effectively dealt with.

And in Coburg itself at least a part of the Marxist workers who must be
looked upon as misled, learned from the blows of National Socialist
fists that these workers were also fighting for ideals, because
experience teaches that the human being fights only for something in
which he believes and which he loves.

The Storm Detachment itself benefited most from the Coburg events. It
grew so quickly in numbers that at the Party Congress in January 1923
six thousand men participated in the ceremony of consecrating the flags
and the first companies were fully clad in their new uniform.

Our experience in Coburg proved how essential it is to introduce one
distinctive uniform for the Storm Detachment, not only for the purpose
of strengthening the ESPRIT DE CORPS but also to avoid confusion and the
danger of not recognizing the opponent in a squabble. Up to that time
they had merely worn the armlet, but now the tunic and the well-known
cap were added.

But the Coburg experience had also another important result. We now
determined to break the Red Terror in all those localities where for
many years it had prevented men of other views from holding their
meetings. We were determined to restore the right of free assembly. From
that time onwards we brought our battalions together in such places and
little by little the red citadels of Bavaria, one after another, fell
before the National Socialist propaganda. The Storm Troops became more
and more adept at their job. They increasingly lost all semblance of an
aimless and lifeless defence movement and came out into the light as an
active militant organization, fighting for the establishment of a new
German State.

This logical development continued until March 1923. Then an event
occurred which made me divert the Movement from the course hitherto
followed and introduce some changes in its outer formation.

In the first months of 1923 the French occupied the Ruhr district. The
consequence of this was of great importance in the development of the
Storm Detachment.

It is not yet possible, nor would it be in the interest of the nation,
to write or speak openly and freely on the subject. I shall speak of it
only as far as the matter has been dealt with in public discussions and
thus brought to the knowledge of everybody.

The occupation of the Ruhr district, which did not come as a surprise to
us, gave grounds for hoping that Germany would at last abandon its
cowardly policy of submission and therewith give the defensive
associations a definite task to fulfil. The Storm Detachment also, which
now numbered several thousand of robust and vigorous young men, should
not be excluded from this national service. During the spring and summer
of 1923 it was transformed into a fighting military organization. It is
to this reorganization that we must in great part attribute the later
developments that took place during 1923, in so far as it affected our

Elsewhere I shall deal in broad outline with the development of events
in 1923. Here I wish only to state that the transformation of the Storm
Detachment at that time must have been detrimental to the interests of
the Movement if the conditions that had motivated the change were not to
be carried into effect, namely, the adoption of a policy of active
resistance against France.

The events which took place at the close of 1923, terrible as they may
appear at first sight, were almost a necessity if looked at from a
higher standpoint; because, in view of the attitude taken by the
Government of the German REICH, conversion of the Storm Troops into a
military force would be meaningless and thus a transformation which
would also be harmful to the Movement was ended at one stroke. At the
same time it was made possible for us to reconstruct at the point where
we had been diverted from the proper course.

In the year 1925 the German National Socialist Labour Party was
re-founded and had to organize and train its Storm Detachment once again
according to the principles I have laid down. It must return to the
original idea and once more it must consider its most essential task to
function as the instrument of defence and reinforcement in the spiritual
struggle to establish the ideals of the Movement.

The Storm Detachment must not be allowed to sink to the level of
something in the nature of a defence organization or a secret society.
Steps must be taken rather to make it a vanguard of 100,000 men in the
struggle for the National Socialist ideal which is based on the profound
principle of a People's State.

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« Reply #79 on: July 19, 2008, 01:43:59 am »



In the winter of 1919, and still more in the spring and summer of 1920,
the young Party felt bound to take up a definite stand on a question
which already had become quite serious during the War. In the first
volume of this book I have briefly recorded certain facts which I had
personally witnessed and which foreboded the break-up of Germany. In
describing these facts I made reference to the special nature of the
propaganda which was directed by the English as well as the French
towards reopening the breach that had existed between North and South in
Germany. In the spring of 1915 there appeared the first of a series of
leaflets which was systematically followed up and the aim of which was
to arouse feeling against Prussia as being solely responsible for the
war. Up to 1916 this system had been developed and perfected in a
cunning and shameless manner. Appealing to the basest of human
instincts, this propaganda endeavoured to arouse the wrath of the South
Germans against the North Germans and after a short time it bore fruit.
Persons who were then in high positions under the Government and in the
Army, especially those attached to headquarters in the Bavarian Army,
merited the just reproof of having blindly neglected their duty and
failed to take the necessary steps to counter such propaganda. But
nothing was done. On the contrary, in some quarters it did not appear to
be quite unwelcome and probably they were short-sighted enough to think
that such propaganda might help along the development of unification in
Germany but even that it might automatically bring about consolidation
of the federative forces. Scarcely ever in history was such a wicked
neglect more wickedly avenged. The weakening of Prussia, which they
believed would result from this propaganda, affected the whole of
Germany. It resulted in hastening the collapse which not only wrecked
Germany as a whole but even more particularly the federal states.

In that town where the artificially created hatred against Prussia raged
most violently the revolt against the reigning House was the beginning
of the Revolution.

It would be a mistake to think that the enemy propaganda was exclusively
responsible for creating an anti-Prussian feeling and that there were no
reasons which might excuse the people for having listened to this
propaganda. The incredible fashion in which the national economic
interests were organized during the War, the absolutely crazy system of
centralization which made the whole REICH its ward and exploited the
REICH, furnished the principal grounds for the growth of that
anti-Prussian feeling. The average citizen looked upon the companies for
the placing of war contracts, all of which had their headquarters in
Berlin, as identical with Berlin and Berlin itself as identical with
Prussia. The average citizen did not know that the organization of these
robber companies, which were called War Companies, was not in the hands
of Berlin or Prussia and not even in German hands at all. People
recognized only the gross irregularities and the continual encroachments
of that hated institution in the Metropolis of the REICH and directed
their anger towards Berlin and Prussia, all the more because in certain
quarters (the Bavarian Government) nothing was done to correct this
attitude, but it was even welcomed with silent rubbing of hands.

The Jew was far too shrewd not to understand that the infamous campaign
which he had organized, under the cloak of War Companies, for plundering
the German nation would and must eventually arouse opposition. As long
as that opposition did not spring directly at his own throat he had no
reason to be afraid. Hence he decided that the best way of forestalling
an outbreak on the part of the enraged and desperate masses would be to
inflame their wrath and at the same time give it another outlet.

Let Bavaria quarrel as much as it liked with Prussia and Prussia with
Bavaria. The more, the merrier. This bitter strife between the two
states assured peace to the Jew. Thus public attention was completely
diverted from the international maggot in the body of the nation;
indeed, he seemed to have been forgotten. Then when there came a danger
that level-headed people, of whom there are many to be found also in
Bavaria, would advise a little more reserve and a more judicious
evaluation of things, thus calming the rage against Prussia, all the Jew
had to do in Berlin was to stage a new provocation and await results.
Every time that was done all those who had profiteered out of the
conflict between North and South filled their lungs and again fanned the
flame of indignation until it became a blaze.

It was a shrewd and expert manoeuvre on the part of the Jew, to set the
different branches of the German people quarrelling with one another, so
that their attention would be turned away from himself and he could
plunder them all the more completely.

Then came the Revolution.

Until the year 1918, or rather until the November of that year, the
average German citizen, particularly the less educated lower
middle-class and the workers, did not rightly understand what was
happening and did not realize what must be the inevitable consequences,
especially for Bavaria, of this internecine strife between the branches
of the German people; but at least those sections which called
themselves 'National' ought to have clearly perceived these consequences
on the day that the Revolution broke out. For the moment the COUP D'ÉTAT
had succeeded, the leader and organizer of the Revolution in Bavaria put
himself forward as the defender of 'Bavarian' interests. The
international Jew, Kurt Eisner, began to play off Bavaria against
Prussia. This Oriental was just about the last person in the world that
could be pointed to as the logical defender of Bavarian interests. In
his trade as newspaper reporter he had wandered from place to place all
over Germany and to him it was a matter of sheer indifference whether
Bavaria or any other particular part of God's whole world continued to

In deliberately giving the revolutionary rising in Bavaria the character
of an offensive against Prussia, Kurt Eisner was not acting in the
slightest degree from the standpoint of Bavarian interests, but merely
as the commissioned representative of Jewry. He exploited existing
instincts and antipathies in Bavaria as a means which would help to make
the dismemberment of Germany all the more easy. When once dismembered,
the REICH would fall an easy prey to Bolshevism.

The tactics employed by him were continued for a time after his death.
The Marxists, who had always derided and exploited the individual German
states and their princes, now suddenly appealed, as an 'Independent
Party' to those sentiments and instincts which had their strongest roots
in the families of the reigning princes and the individual states.

The fight waged by the Bavarian Soviet Republic against the military
contingents that were sent to free Bavaria from its grasp was
represented by the Marxist propagandists as first of all the 'Struggle
of the Bavarian Worker' against 'Prussian Militarism.' This explains why
it was that the suppression of the Soviet Republic in Munich did not
have the same effect there as in the other German districts. Instead of
recalling the masses to a sense of reason, it led to increased
bitterness and anger against Prussia.

The art of the Bolshevik agitators, in representing the suppression of
the Bavarian Soviet Republic as a victory of 'Prussian Militarism' over
the 'Anti-militarists' and 'Anti-Prussian' people of Bavaria, bore rich
fruit. Whereas on the occasion of the elections to the Bavarian
Legislative Diet, Kurt Eisner did not have ten thousand followers in
Munich and the Communist party less than three thousand, after the fall
of the Bavarian Republic the votes given to the two parties together
amounted to nearly one hundred thousand.

It was then that I personally began to combat that crazy incitement of
some branches of the German people against other branches.

I believe that never in my life did I undertake a more unpopular task
than I did when I took my stand against the anti-Prussian incitement.
During the Soviet regime in Munich great public meetings were held at
which hatred against the rest of Germany, but particularly against
Prussia, was roused up to such a pitch that a North German would have
risked his life in attending one of those meetings. These meetings often
ended in wild shouts: "Away from Prussia", "Down with the Prussians",
"War against Prussia", and so on. This feeling was openly expressed in
the Reichstag by a particularly brilliant defender of Bavarian sovereign
rights when he said: "Rather die as a Bavarian than rot as a Prussian".

One should have attended some of the meetings held at that time in order
to understand what it meant for one when, for the first time and
surrounded by only a handful of friends, I raised my voice against this
folly at a meeting held in the Munich Löwenbräu Keller. Some of my War
comrades stood by me then. And it is easy to imagine how we felt when
that raging crowd, which had lost all control of its reason, roared at
us and threatened to kill us. During the time that we were fighting for
the country the same crowd were for the most part safely ensconced in
the rear positions or were peacefully circulating at home as deserters
and shirkers. It is true that that scene turned out to be of advantage
to me. My small band of comrades felt for the first time absolutely
united with me and readily swore to stick by me through life and death.

These conflicts, which were constantly repeated in 1919, seemed to
become more violent soon after the beginning of 1920. There were
meetings--I remember especially one in the Wagner Hall in the
Sonnenstrasse in Munich--during the course of which my group, now grown
much larger, had to defend themselves against assaults of the most
violent character. It happened more than once that dozens of my
followers were mishandled, thrown to the floor and stamped upon by the
attackers and were finally thrown out of the hall more dead than alive.

The struggle which I had undertaken, first by myself alone and
afterwards with the support of my war comrades, was now continued by the
young movement, I might say almost as a sacred mission.

I am proud of being able to say to-day that we--depending almost
exclusively on our followers in Bavaria--were responsible for putting an
end, slowly but surely, to the coalition of folly and treason. I say
folly and treason because, although convinced that the masses who joined
in it meant well but were stupid, I cannot attribute such simplicity as
an extenuating circumstance in the case of the organizers and their
abetters. I then looked upon them, and still look upon them to-day, as
traitors in the payment of France. In one case, that of Dorten, history
has already pronounced its judgment.

The situation became specially dangerous at that time by reason of the
fact that they were very astute in their ability to cloak their real
tendencies, by insisting primarily on their federative intentions and
claiming that those were the sole motives of the agitation. Of course it
is quite obvious that the agitation against Prussia had nothing to do
with federalism. Surely 'Federal Activities' is not the phrase with
which to describe an effort to dissolve and dismember another federal
state. For an honest federalist, for whom the formula used by Bismarck
to define his idea of the REICH is not a counterfeit phrase, could not
in the same breath express the desire to cut off portions of the
Prussian State, which was created or at least completed by Bismarck. Nor
could he publicly support such a separatist attempt.

What an outcry would be raised in Munich if some prussian conservative
party declared itself in favour of detaching Franconia from Bavaria or
took public action in demanding and promoting such a separatist policy.
Nevertheless, one can only have sympathy for all those real and honest
federalists who did not see through this infamous swindle, for they were
its principal victims. By distorting the federalist idea in such a way
its own champions prepared its grave. One cannot make propaganda for a
federalist configuration of the REICH by debasing and abusing and
besmirching the essential element of such a political structure, namely
Prussia, and thus making such a Confederation impossible, if it ever had
been possible. It is all the more incredible by reason of the fact that
the fight carried on by those so-called federalists was directed against
that section of the Prussian people which was the last that could be
looked upon as connected with the November democracy. For the abuse and
attacks of these so-called federalists were not levelled against the
fathers of the Weimar Constitution--the majority of whom were South
Germans or Jews--but against those who represented the old conservative
Prussia, which was the antipodes of the Weimar Constitution. The fact
that the directors of this campaign were careful not to touch the Jews
is not to be wondered at and perhaps gives the key to the whole riddle.

Before the Revolution the Jew was successful in distracting attention
from himself and his War Companies by inciting the masses, and
especially the Bavarians, against Prussia. Similarly he felt obliged,
after the Revolution, to find some way of camouflaging his new plunder
campaign which was nine or ten times greater. And again he succeeded, in
this case by provoking the so-called 'national' elements against one
another: the conservative Bavarians against the Prussians, who were just
as conservative. He acted again with extreme cunning, inasmuch as he who
held the reins of Prussia's destiny in his hands provoked such crude and
tactless aggressions that again and again they set the blood boiling in
those who were being continually duped. Never against the Jew, however,
but always the German against his own brother. The Bavarian did not see
the Berlin of four million industrious and efficient working people, but
only the lazy and decadent Berlin which is to be found in the worst
quarters of the West End. And his antipathy was not directed against
this West End of Berlin but against the 'Prussian' city.

In many cases it tempted one to despair.
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« Reply #80 on: July 19, 2008, 01:44:19 am »

The ability which the Jew has displayed in turning public attention away
from himself and giving it another direction may be studied also in what
is happening to-day.

In 1918 there was nothing like an organized anti-Semitic feeling. I
still remember the difficulties we encountered the moment we mentioned
the Jew. We were either confronted with dumb-struck faces or else a
lively and hefty antagonism. The efforts we made at the time to point
out the real enemy to the public seemed to be doomed to failure. But
then things began to change for the better, though only very slowly. The
'League for Defence and Offence' was defectively organized but at least
it had the great merit of opening up the Jewish question once again. In
the winter of 1918-1919 a kind of anti-semitism began slowly to take
root. Later on the National Socialist Movement presented the Jewish
problem in a new light. Taking the question beyond the restricted
circles of the upper classes and small bourgeoisie we succeeded in
transforming it into the driving motive of a great popular movement. But
the moment we were successful in placing this problem before the German
people in the light of an idea that would unite them in one struggle the
Jew reacted. He resorted to his old tactics. With amazing alacrity he
hurled the torch of discord into the patriotic movement and opened a
rift there. In bringing forward the ultramontane question and in the
mutual quarrels that it gave rise to between Catholicism and
Protestantism lay the sole possibility, as conditions then were, of
occupying public attention with other problems and thus ward off the
attack which had been concentrated against Jewry. The men who dragged
our people into this controversy can never make amends for the crime
they then committed against the nation. Anyhow, the Jew has attained the
ends he desired. Catholics and Protestants are fighting with one another
to their hearts' content, while the enemy of Aryan humanity and all
Christendom is laughing up his sleeve.

Once it was possible to occupy the attention of the public for several
years with the struggle between federalism and unification, wearing out
their energies in this mutual friction while the Jew trafficked in the
freedom of the nation and sold our country to the masters of
international high finance. So in our day he has succeeded again, this
time by raising ructions between the two German religious denominations
while the foundations on which both rest are being eaten away and
destroyed through the poison injected by the international and
cosmopolitan Jew.

Look at the ravages from which our people are suffering daily as a
result of being contaminated with Jewish blood. Bear in mind the fact
that this poisonous contamination can be eliminated from the national
body only after centuries, or perhaps never. Think further of how the
process of racial decomposition is debasing and in some cases even
destroying the fundamental Aryan qualities of our German people, so that
our cultural creativeness as a nation is gradually becoming impotent and
we are running the danger, at least in our great cities, of falling to
the level where Southern Italy is to-day. This pestilential adulteration
of the blood, of which hundreds of thousands of our people take no
account, is being systematically practised by the Jew to-day.
Systematically these negroid parasites in our national body corrupt our
innocent fair-haired girls and thus destroy something which can no
longer be replaced in this world.

The two Christian denominations look on with indifference at the
profanation and destruction of a noble and unique creature who was given
to the world as a gift of God's grace. For the future of the world,
however, it does not matter which of the two triumphs over the other,
the Catholic or the Protestant. But it does matter whether Aryan
humanity survives or perishes. And yet the two Christian denominations
are not contending against the destroyer of Aryan humanity but are
trying to destroy one another. Everybody who has the right kind of
feeling for his country is solemnly bound, each within his own
denomination, to see to it that he is not constantly talking about the
Will of God merely from the lips but that in actual fact he fulfils the
Will of God and does not allow God's handiwork to be debased. For it was
by the Will of God that men were made of a certain bodily shape, were
given their natures and their faculties. Whoever destroys His work wages
war against God's Creation and God's Will. Therefore everyone should
endeavour, each in his own denomination of course, and should consider
it as his first and most solemn duty to hinder any and everyone whose
conduct tends, either by word or deed, to go outside his own religious
body and pick a quarrel with those of another denomination. For, in view
of the religious schism that exists in Germany, to attack the essential
characteristics of one denomination must necessarily lead to a war of
extermination between the two Christian denominations. Here there can be
no comparison between our position and that of France, or Spain or
Italy. In those three countries one may, for instance, make propaganda
for the side that is fighting against ultramontanism without thereby
incurring the danger of a national rift among the French, or Spanish or
Italian people. In Germany, however, that cannot be so, for here the
Protestants would also take part in such propaganda. And thus the
defence which elsewhere only Catholics organize against clerical
aggression in political matters would assume with us the character of a
Protestant attack against Catholicism. What may be tolerated by the
faithful in one denomination even when it seems unjust to them, will at
once be indignantly rejected and opposed on A PRIORI grounds if it
should come from the militant leaders of another denomination. This is
so true that even men who would be ready and willing to fight for the
removal of manifest grievances within their own religious denomination
will drop their own fight and turn their activities against the outsider
the moment the abolition of such grievances is counselled or demanded by
one who is not of the same faith. They consider it unjustified and
inadmissible and incorrect for outsiders to meddle in matters which do
not affect them at all. Such attempts are not excused even when they are
inspired by a feeling for the supreme interests of the national
community; because even in our day religious feelings still have deeper
roots than all feeling for political and national expediency. That
cannot be changed by setting one denomination against another in bitter
conflict. It can be changed only if, through a spirit of mutual
tolerance, the nation can be assured of a future the greatness of which
will gradually operate as a conciliating factor in the sphere of
religion also. I have no hesitation in saying that in those men who seek
to-day to embroil the patriotic movement in religious quarrels I see
worse enemies of my country than the international communists are. For
the National Socialist Movement has set itself to the task of converting
those communists. But anyone who goes outside the ranks of his own
Movement and tends to turn it away from the fulfilment of its mission is
acting in a manner that deserves the severest condemnation. He is acting
as a champion of Jewish interests, whether consciously or unconsciously
does not matter. For it is in the interests of the Jews to-day that the
energies of the patriotic movement should be squandered in a religious
conflict, because it is beginning to be dangerous for the Jews. I have
purposely used the phrase about SQUANDERING the energies of the
Movement, because nobody but some person who is entirely ignorant of
history could imagine that this movement can solve a question which the
greatest statesmen have tried for centuries to solve, and tried in vain.

Anyhow the facts speak for themselves. The men who suddenly discovered,
in 1924, that the highest mission of the patriotic movement was to fight
ultramontanism, have not succeeded in smashing ultramontanism, but they
succeeded in splitting the patriotic movement. I have to guard against
the possibility of some immature brain arising in the patriotic movement
which thinks that it can do what even a Bismarck failed to do. It will
be always one of the first duties of those who are directing the
National Socialist Movement to oppose unconditionally any attempt to
place the National Socialist Movement at the service of such a conflict.
And anybody who conducts a propaganda with that end in view must be
expelled forthwith from its ranks.

As a matter of fact we succeeded until the autumn of 1923 in keeping our
movement away from such controversies. The most devoted Protestant could
stand side by side with the most devoted Catholic in our ranks without
having his conscience disturbed in the slightest as far as concerned his
religious convictions. The bitter struggle which both waged in common
against the wrecker of Aryan humanity taught them natural respect and
esteem. And it was just in those years that our movement had to engage
in a bitter strife with the Centre Party not for religious ends but for
national, racial, political and economic ends. The success we then
achieved showed that we were right, but it does not speak to-day in
favour of those who thought they knew better.

In recent years things have gone so far that patriotic circles, in
god-forsaken blindness of their religious strife, could not recognize
the folly of their conduct even from the fact that atheist Marxist
newspapers advocated the cause of one religious denomination or the
other, according as it suited Marxist interests, so as to create
confusion through slogans and declarations which were often immeasurably
stupid, now molesting the one party and again the other, and thus poking
the fire to keep the blaze at its highest.

But in the case of a people like the Germans, whose history has so often
shown them capable of fighting for phantoms to the point of complete
exhaustion, every war-cry is a mortal danger. By these slogans our
people have often been drawn away from the real problems of their
existence. While we were exhausting our energies in religious wars the
others were acquiring their share of the world. And while the patriotic
movement is debating with itself whether the ultramontane danger be
greater than the Jewish, or vice versa, the Jew is destroying the racial
basis of our existence and thereby annihilating our people. As far as
regards that kind of 'patriotic' warrior, on behalf of the National
Socialist Movement and therefore of the German people I pray with all my
heart: "Lord, preserve us from such friends, and then we can easily deal
with our enemies."

The controversy over federation and unification, so cunningly
propagandized by the Jews in 1919-1920 and onwards, forced National
Socialism, which repudiated the quarrel, to take up a definite stand in
relation to the essential problem concerned in it. Ought Germany to be a
confederacy or a military State? What is the practical significance of
these terms? To me it seems that the second question is more important
than the first, because it is fundamental to the understanding of the
whole problem and also because the answer to it may help to clear up
confusion and therewith have a conciliating effect.

What is a Confederacy? (Note 22)

[Note 22. Before 1918 Germany was a federal Empire, composed of
twenty-five federal states.]

By a Confederacy we mean a union of sovereign states which of their own
free will and in virtue of their sovereignty come together and create a
collective unit, ceding to that unit as much of their own sovereign
rights as will render the existence of the union possible and will
guarantee it.

But the theoretical formula is not wholly put into practice by any
confederacy that exists to-day. And least of all by the American Union,
where it is impossible to speak of original sovereignty in regard to the
majority of the states. Many of them were not included in the federal
complex until long after it had been established. The states that make
up the American Union are mostly in the nature of territories, more or
less, formed for technical administrative purposes, their boundaries
having in many cases been fixed in the mapping office. Originally these
states did not and could not possess sovereign rights of their own.
Because it was the Union that created most of the so-called states.
Therefore the sovereign rights, often very comprehensive, which were
left, or rather granted, to the various territories correspond not only
to the whole character of the Confederation but also to its vast space,
which is equivalent to the size of a Continent. Consequently, in
speaking of the United States of America one must not consider them as
sovereign states but as enjoying rights or, better perhaps, autarchic
powers, granted to them and guaranteed by the Constitution.

Nor does our definition adequately express the condition of affairs in
Germany. It is true that in Germany the individual states existed as
states before the REICH and that the REICH was formed from them. The
REICH, however, was not formed by the voluntary and equal co-operation
of the individual states, but rather because the state of Prussia
gradually acquired a position of hegemony over the others. The
difference in the territorial area alone between the German states
prevents any comparison with the American Union. The great difference in
territorial area between the very small German states that then existed
and the larger, or even still more the largest, demonstrates the
inequality of their achievements and shows that they could not take an
equal part in founding and shaping the federal Empire. In the case of
most of these individual states it cannot be maintained that they ever
enjoyed real sovereignty; and the term 'State Sovereignty' was really
nothing more than an administrative formula which had no inner meaning.
As a matter of fact, not only developments in the past but also in our
own time wiped out several of these so-called 'Sovereign States' and
thus proved in the most definite way how frail these 'sovereign' state
formations were.

I cannot deal here with the historical question of how these individual
states came to be established, but I must call attention to the fact
that hardly in any case did their frontiers coincide with ethical
frontiers of the inhabitants. They were purely political phenomena which
for the most part emerged during the sad epoch when the German Empire
was in a state of exhaustion and was dismembered. They represented both
cause and effect in the process of exhaustion and partition of our

The Constitution of the old REICH took all this into account, at least
up to a certain degree, in so far as the individual states were not
accorded equal representation in the Reichstag, but a representation
proportionate to their respective areas, their actual importance and the
role which they played in the formation of the REICH.

The sovereign rights which the individual states renounced in order to
form the REICH were voluntarily ceded only to a very small degree. For
the most part they had no practical existence or they were simply taken
by Prussia under the pressure of her preponderant power. The principle
followed by Bismarck was not to give the REICH what he could take from
the individual states but to demand from the individual states only what
was absolutely necessary for the REICH. A moderate and wise policy. On
the one side Bismarck showed the greatest regard for customs and
traditions; on the other side his policy secured for the new REICH from
its foundation onwards a great measure of love and willing co-operation.
But it would be a fundamental error to attribute Bismarck's decision to
any conviction on his part that the REICH was thus acquiring all the
rights of sovereignty which would suflice for all time. That was far
from Bismarck's idea. On the contrary, he wished to leave over for the
future what it would be difficult to carry through at the moment and
might not have been readily agreed to by the individual states. He
trusted to the levelling effect of time and to the pressure exercised by
the process of evolution, the steady action of which appeared more
effective than an attempt to break the resistance which the individual
states offered at the moment. By this policy he showed his great ability
in the art of statesmanship. And, as a matter of fact, the sovereignty
of the REICH has continually increased at the cost of the sovereignty of
the individual states. The passing of time has achieved what Bismarck
hoped it would.

The German collapse and the abolition of the monarchical form of
government necessarily hastened this development. The German federal
states, which had not been grounded on ethnical foundations but arose
rather out of political conditions, were bound to lose their importance
the moment the monarchical form of government and the dynasties
connected with it were abolished, for it was to the spirit inherent in
these that the individual states owned their political origin and
development. Thus deprived of their internal RAISON D'ÊTRE, they
renounced all right to survival and were induced by purely practical
reasons to fuse with their neighbours or else they joined the more
powerful states out of their own free will. That proved in a striking
manner how extraordinarily frail was the actual sovereignty these small
phantom states enjoyed, and it proved too how lightly they were
estimated by their own citizens.

Though the abolition of the monarchical regime and its representatives
had dealt a hard blow to the federal character of the REICH, still more
destructive, from the federal point of view, was the acceptance of the
obligations that resulted from the 'peace' treaty.

It was only natural and logical that the federal states should lose all
sovereign control over the finances the moment the REICH, in consequence
of a lost war, was subjected to financial obligations which could never
be guaranteed through separate treaties with the individual states. The
subsequent steps which led the REICH to take over the posts and railways
were an enforced advance in the process of enslaving our people, a
process which the peace treaties gradually developed. The REICH was
forced to secure possession of resources which had to be constantly
increased in order to satisfy the demands made by further extortions.

The form in which the powers of the REICH were thus extended to embrace
the federal states was often ridiculously stupid, but in itself the
procedure was logical and natural. The blame for it must be laid at the
door of these men and those parties that failed in the hour of need to
concentrate all their energies in an effort to bring the war to a
victorious issue. The guilt lies on those parties which, especially in
Bavaria, catered for their own egotistic interests during the war and
refused to the REICH what the REICH had to requisition to a tenfold
greater measure when the war was lost. The retribution of History!
Rarely has the vengeance of Heaven followed so closely on the crime as
it did in this case. Those same parties which, a few years previously,
placed the interests of their own states--especially in Bavaria--before
those of the REICH had now to look on passively while the pressure of
events forced the REICH, in its own interests, to abolish the existence
of the individual states. They were the victims of their own defaults.

It was an unparalleled example of hypocrisy to raise the cry of
lamentation over the loss which the federal states suffered in being
deprived of their sovereign rights. This cry was raised before the
electorate, for it is only to the electorate that our contemporary
parties address themselves. But these parties, without exception, outbid
one another in accepting a policy of fulfilment which, by the sheer
force of circumstances and in its ultimate consequences, could not but
lead to a profound alteration in the internal structure of the REICH.
Bismarck's REICH was free and unhampered by any obligations towards the
outside world.

Bismarck's REICH never had to shoulder such heavy and entirely
unproductive obligations as those to which Germany was subjected under
the Dawes Plan. Also in domestic affairs Bismarck's REICH was able to
limit its powers to a few matters that were absolutely necessary for its
existence. Therefore it could dispense with the necessity of a financial
control over these states and could live from their contributions. On
the other side the relatively small financial tribute which the federal
states had to pay to the REICH induced them to welcome its existence.
But it is untrue and unjust to state now, as certain propagandists do,
that the federal states are displeased with the REICH merely because of
their financial subjection to it. No, that is not how the matter really
stands. The lack of sympathy for the political idea embodied in the
REICH is not due to the loss of sovereign rights on the part of the
individual states. It is much more the result of the deplorable fashion
in which the present régime cares for the interests of the German
people. Despite all the celebrations in honour of the national flag and
the Constitution, every section of the German people feels that the
present REICH is not in accordance with its heart's desire. And the Law
for the Protection of the Republic may prevent outrages against
republican institutions, but it will not gain the love of one single
German. In its constant anxiety to protect itself against its own
citizens by means of laws and sentences of imprisonment, the Republic
has aroused sharp and humiliating criticism of all republican
institutions as such.

For another reason also it is untrue to say, as certain parties affirm
to-day, that the REICH has ceased to be popular on account of its
overbearing conduct in regard to certain sovereign rights which the
individual states had heretofore enjoyed. Supposing the REICH had not
extended its authority over the individual states, there is no reason to
believe that it would find more favour among those states if the general
obligations remained so heavy as they now are. On the contrary, if the
individual states had to pay their respective shares of the highly
increased tribute which the REICH has to meet to-day in order to fulfil
the provisions of the Versailles Dictate, the hostility towards the
REICH would be infinitely greater. For then not only would it prove
difficult to collect the respective contributions due to the REICH from
the federal states, but coercive methods would have to be employed in
making the collections. The Republic stands on the footing of the peace
treaties and has neither the courage nor the intention to break them.
That being so, it must observe the obligations which the peace treaties
have imposed on it. The responsibility for this situation is to be
attributed solely to those parties who preach unceasingly to the patient
electoral masses on the necessity of maintaining the autonomy of the
federal states, while at the same time they champion and demand of the
REICH a policy which must necessarily lead to the suppression of even
the very last of those so-called 'sovereign' rights.

I say NECESSARILY because the present REICH has no other possible means
of bearing the burden of charges which an insane domestic and foreign
policy has laid on it. Here still another wedge is placed on the former,
to drive it in still deeper. Every new debt which the REICH contracts,
through the criminal way in which the interests of Germany are
represented VIS-À-VIS foreign countries, necessitates a new and stronger
blow which drives the under wedges still deeper, That blow demands
another step in the progressive abolition of the sovereign rights of the
individual states, so as not to allow the germs of opposition to rise up
into activity or even to exist.

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« Reply #81 on: July 19, 2008, 01:44:39 am »

The chief characteristic difference between the policy of the present
REICH and that of former times lies in this: The old REICH gave freedom
to its people at home and showed itself strong towards the outside
world, whereas the Republic shows itself weak towards the stranger and
oppresses its own citizens at home. In both cases one attitude
determines the other. A vigorous national State does not need to make
many laws for the interior, because of the affection and attachment of
its citizens. The international servile State can live only by coercing
its citizens to render it the services it demands. And it is a piece of
impudent falsehood for the present regime to speak of 'Free citizens'.
Only the old Germany could speak in that manner. The present Republic is
a colony of slaves at the service of the stranger. At best it has
subjects, but not citizens. Hence it does not possess a national flag
but only a trade mark, introduced and protected by official decree and
legislative measures. This symbol, which is the Gessler's cap of German
Democracy, will always remain alien to the spirit of our people. On its
side, the Republic having no sense of tradition or respect for past
greatness, dragged the symbol of the past in the mud, but it will be
surprised one day to discover how superficial is the devotion of its
citizens to its own symbol. The Republic has given to itself the
character of an intermezzo in German history. And so this State is bound
constantly to restrict more and more the sovereign rights of the
individual states, not only for general reasons of a financial character
but also on principle. For by enforcing a policy of financial blackmail,
to squeeze the last ounce of substance out of its people, it is forced
also to take their last rights away from them, lest the general
discontent may one day flame up into open rebellion.

We, National Socialists, would reverse this formula and would adopt the
following axiom: A strong national REICH which recognizes and protects
to the largest possible measure the rights of its citizens both within
and outside its frontiers can allow freedom to reign at home without
trembling for the safety of the State. On the other hand, a strong
national Government can intervene to a considerable degree in the
liberties of the individual subject as well as in the liberties of the
constituent states without thereby weakening the ideal of the REICH; and
it can do this while recognizing its responsibility for the ideal of the
REICH, because in these particular acts and measures the individual
citizen recognizes a means of promoting the prestige of the nation as a

Of course, every State in the world has to face the question of
unification in its internal organization. And Germany is no exception in
this matter. Nowadays it is absurd to speak of 'statal sovereignty' for
the constituent states of the REICH, because that has already become
impossible on account of the ridiculously small size of so many of these
states. In the sphere of commerce as well as that of administration the
importance of the individual states has been steadily decreasing. Modern
means of communication and mechanical progress have been increasingly
restricting distance and space. What was once a State is to-day only a
province and the territory covered by a modern State had once the
importance of a continent. The purely technical difficulty of
administering a State like Germany is not greater than that of governing
a province like Brandenburg a hundred years ago. And to-day it is easier
to cover the distance from Munich to Berlin than it was to cover the
distance from Munich to Starnberg a hundred years ago. In view of the
modern means of transport, the whole territory of the REICH to-day is
smaller than that of certain German federal states at the time of the
Napoleonic wars. To close one's eyes to the consequences of these facts
means to live in the past. There always were, there are and always will
be, men who do this. They may retard but they cannot stop the
revolutions of history.

We, National Socialists, must not allow the consequences of that truth
to pass by us unnoticed. In these matters also we must not permit
ourselves to be misled by the phrases of our so-called national
bourgeois parties. I say 'phrases', because these same parodies do not
seriously believe that it is possible for them to carry out their
proposals, and because they themselves are the chief culprits and also
the accomplices responsible for the present state of affairs. Especially
in Bavaria, the demands for a halt in the process of centralization can
be no more than a party move behind which there is no serious idea. If
these parties ever had to pass from the realm of phrase-making into that
of practical deeds they would present a sorry spectacle. Every so-called
'Robbery of Sovereign Rights' from Bavaria by the REICH has met with no
practical resistance, except for some fatuous barking by way of protest.
Indeed, when anyone seriously opposed the madness that was shown in
carrying out this system of centralization he was told by those same
parties that he understood nothing of the nature and needs of the State
to-day. They slandered him and pronounced him anathema and persecuted
him until he was either shut up in prison or illegally deprived of the
right of public speech. In the light of these facts our followers should
become all the more convinced of the profound hypocrisy which
characterizes these so-called federalist circles. To a certain extent
they use the federalist doctrine just as they use the name of religion,
merely as a means of promoting their own base party interests.

A certain unification, especially in the field of transport, appears
logical. But we, National Socialists, feel it our duty to oppose with
all our might such a development in the modern State, especially when
the measures proposed are solely for the purpose of screening a
disastrous foreign policy and making it possible. And just because the
present REICH has threatened to take over the railways, the posts, the
finances, etc., not from the high standpoint of a national policy, but
in order to have in its hands the means and pledges for an unlimited
policy of fulfilment--for that reason we, National Socialists, must take
every step that seems suitable to obstruct and, if possible, definitely
to prevent such a policy. We must fight against the present system of
amalgamating institutions that are vitally important for the existence
of our people, because this system is being adopted solely to facilitate
the payment of milliards and the transference of pledges to the
stranger, under the post-War provisions which our politicians have

For these reasons also the National Socialist Movement has to take up a
stand against such tendencies.

Moreover, we must oppose such centralization because in domestic affairs
it helps to reinforce a system of government which in all its
manifestations has brought the greatest misfortunes on the German
nation. The present Jewish-Democratic REICH, which has become a
veritable curse for the German people, is seeking to negative the force
of the criticism offered by all the federal states which have not yet
become imbued with the spirit of the age, and is trying to carry out
this policy by crushing them to the point of annihilation. In face of
this we National Socialists must try to ground the opposition of the
individual states on such a basis that it will be able to operate with a
good promise of success. We must do this by transforming the struggle
against centralization into something that will be an expression of the
higher interests of the German nation as such. Therefore, while the
Bavarian Populist Party, acting from its own narrow and particularist
standpoint, fights to maintain the 'special rights' of the Bavarian
State, we ought to stand on quite a different ground in fighting for the
same rights. Our grounds ought to be those of the higher national
interests in opposition to the November Democracy.

A still further reason for opposing a centralizing process of that kind
arises from the certain conviction that in great part this so-called
nationalization does not make for unification at all and still less for
simplification. In many cases it is adopted simply as a means of
removing from the sovereign control of the individual states certain
institutions which they wish to place in the hands of the revolutionary
parties. In German History favouritism has never been of so base a
character as in the democratic republic. A great portion of this
centralization to-day is the work of parties which once promised that
they would open the way for the promotion of talent, meaning thereby
that they would fill those posts and offices entirely with their own
partisans. Since the foundation of the Republic the Jews especially have
been obtaining positions in the economic institutions taken over by the
REICH and also positions in the national administration, so that the one
and the other have become preserves of Jewry.

For tactical reasons, this last consideration obliges us to watch with
the greatest attention every further attempt at centralization and fight
it at each step. But in doing this our standpoint must always be that of
a lofty national policy and never a pettifogging particularism.

This last observation is necessary, lest an opinion might arise among
our own followers that we do not accredit to the REICH the right of
incorporating in itself a sovereignty which is superior to that of the
constituent states. As regards this right we cannot and must not
entertain the slightest doubt. Because for us the State is nothing but a
form. Its substance, or content, is the essential thing. And that is the
nation, the people. It is clear therefore that every other interest must
be subordinated to the supreme interests of the nation. In particular we
cannot accredit to any other state a sovereign power and sovereign
rights within the confines of the nation and the REICH, which represents
the nation. The absurdity which some federal states commit by
maintaining 'representations' abroad and corresponding foreign
'representations' among themselves--that must cease and will cease.
Until this happens we cannot be surprised if certain foreign countries
are dubious about the political unity of the REICH and act accordingly.
The absurdity of these 'representations' is all the greater because they
do harm and do not bring the slightest advantage. If the interests of a
German abroad cannot be protected by the ambassador of the REICH, much
less can they be protected by the minister from some small federal state
which appears ridiculous in the framework of the present world order.
The real truth is that these small federal states are envisaged as
points of attack for attempts at secession, which prospect is always
pleasing to a certain foreign State. We, National Socialists, must not
allow some noble caste which has become effete with age to occupy an
ambassadorial post abroad, with the idea that by engrafting one of its
withered branches in new soil the green leaves may sprout again. Already
in the time of the old REICH our diplomatic representatives abroad were
such a sorry lot that a further trial of that experience would be out of
the question.

It is certain that in the future the importance of the individual states
will be transferred to the sphere of our cultural policy. The monarch
who did most to make Bavaria an important centre was not an obstinate
particularist with anti-German tendencies, but Ludwig I who was as much
devoted to the ideal of German greatness as he was to that of art. His
first consideration was to use the powers of the state to develop the
cultural position of Bavaria and not its political power. And in doing
this he produced better and more durable results than if he had followed
any other line of conduct. Up to this time Munich was a provincial
residence town of only small importance, but he transformed it into the
metropolis of German art and by doing so he made it an intellectual
centre which even to-day holds Franconia to Bavaria, though the
Franconians are of quite a different temperament. If Munich had remained
as it had been earlier, what has happened in Saxony would have been
repeated in Bavaria, with the difference that Leipzig and Bavarian
Nürnberg would have become, not Bavarian but Franconian cities. It was
not the cry of "Down with Prussia" that made Munich great. What made
this a city of importance was the King who wished to present it to the
German nation as an artistic jewel that would have to be seen and
appreciated, and so it has turned out in fact. Therein lies a lesson for
the future. The importance of the individual states in the future will
no longer lie in their political or statal power. I look to them rather
as important ethnical and cultural centres. But even in this respect
time will do its levelling work. Modern travelling facilities shuffle
people among one another in such a way that tribal boundaries will fade
out and even the cultural picture will gradually become more of a
uniform pattern.

The army must definitely be kept clear of the influence of the
individual states. The coming National Socialist State must not fall
back into the error of the past by imposing on the army a task which is
not within its sphere and never should have been assigned to it. The
German army does not exist for the purpose of being a school in which
tribal particularisms are to be cultivated and preserved, but rather as
a school for teaching all the Germans to understand and adapt their
habits to one another. Whatever tends to have a separating influence in
the life of the nation ought to be made a unifying influence in the
army. The army must raise the German boy above the narrow horizon of his
own little native province and set him within the broad picture of the
nation. The youth must learn to know, not the confines of his own region
but those of the fatherland, because it is the latter that he will have
to defend one day. It is therefore absurd to have the German youth do
his military training in his own native region. During that period he
ought to learn to know Germany. This is all the more important to-day,
since young Germans no longer travel on their own account as they once
used to do and thus enlarge their horizon. In view of this, is it not
absurd to leave the young Bavarian recruit at Munich, the recruit from
Baden at Baden itself and the Württemberger at Stuttgart and so on? And
would it not be more reasonable to show the Rhine and the North Sea to
the Bavarian, the Alps to the native of Hamburg and the mountains of
Central Germany to the boy from East Prussia? The character proper to
each region ought to be maintained in the troops but not in the training
garrisons. We may disapprove of every attempt at unification but not
that of unifying the army. On the contrary, even though we should wish
to welcome no other kind of unification, this must be greeted with joy.
In view of the size of the present army of the REICH, it would be absurd
to maintain the federal divisions among the troops. Moreover, in the
unification of the German army which has actually been effected we see a
fact which we must not renounce but restore in the future national army.

Finally a new and triumphant idea should burst every chain which tends
to paralyse its efforts to push forward. National Socialism must claim
the right to impose its principles on the whole German nation, without
regard to what were hitherto the confines of federal states. And we must
educate the German nation in our ideas and principles. As the Churches
do not feel themselves bound or limited by political confines, so the
National Socialist Idea cannot feel itself limited to the territories of
the individual federal states that belong to our Fatherland.

The National Socialist doctrine is not handmaid to the political
interests of the single federal states. One day it must become teacher
to the whole German nation. It must determine the life of the whole
people and shape that life anew. For this reason we must imperatively
demand the right to overstep boundaries that have been traced by a
political development which we repudiate.

The more completely our ideas triumph, the more liberty can we concede
in particular affairs to our citizens at home.
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« Reply #82 on: July 19, 2008, 01:44:53 am »



The year 1921 was specially important for me from many points of view.

When I entered the German Labour Party I at once took charge of the
propaganda, believing this branch to be far the most important for the
time being. Just then it was not a matter of pressing necessity to
cudgel one's brains over problems of organization. The first necessity
was to spread our ideas among as many people as possible. Propaganda
should go well ahead of organization and gather together the human
material for the latter to work up. I have never been in favour of hasty
and pedantic methods of organization, because in most cases the result
is merely a piece of dead mechanism and only rarely a living
organization. Organization is a thing that derives its existence from
organic life, organic evolution. When the same set of ideas have found a
lodgement in the minds of a certain number of people they tend of
themselves to form a certain degree of order among those people and out
of this inner formation something that is very valuable arises. Of
course here, as everywhere else, one must take account of those human
weaknesses which make men hesitate, especially at the beginning, to
submit to the control of a superior mind. If an organization is imposed
from above downwards in a mechanical fashion, there is always the danger
that some individual may push himself forward who is not known for what
he is and who, out of jealousy, will try to hinder abler persons from
taking a leading place in the movement. The damage that results from
that kind of thing may have fatal consequences, especially in a new

For this reason it is advisable first to propagate and publicly expound
the ideas on which the movement is founded. This work of propaganda
should continue for a certain time and should be directed from one
centre. When the ideas have gradually won over a number of people this
human material should be carefully sifted for the purpose of selecting
those who have ability in leadership and putting that ability to the
test. It will often be found that apparently insignificant persons will
nevertheless turn out to be born leaders.

Of course, it is quite a mistake to suppose that those who show a very
intelligent grasp of the theory underlying a movement are for that
reason qualified to fill responsible positions on the directorate. The
contrary is very frequently the case.

Great masters of theory are only very rarely great organizers also. And
this is because the greatness of the theorist and founder of a system
consists in being able to discover and lay down those laws that are
right in the abstract, whereas the organizer must first of all be a man
of psychological insight. He must take men as they are, and for that
reason he must know them, not having too high or too low an estimate of
human nature. He must take account of their weaknesses, their baseness
and all the other various characteristics, so as to form something out
of them which will be a living organism, endowed with strong powers of
resistance, fitted to be the carrier of an idea and strong enough to
ensure the triumph of that idea.

But it is still more rare to find a great theorist who is at the same
time a great leader. For the latter must be more of an agitator, a truth
that will not be readily accepted by many of those who deal with
problems only from the scientific standpoint. And yet what I say is only
natural. For an agitator who shows himself capable of expounding ideas
to the great masses must always be a psychologist, even though he may be
only a demagogue. Therefore he will always be a much more capable leader
than the contemplative theorist who meditates on his ideas, far from the
human throng and the world. For to be a leader means to be able to move
the masses. The gift of formulating ideas has nothing whatsoever to do
with the capacity for leadership. It would be entirely futile to discuss
the question as to which is the more important: the faculty of
conceiving ideals and human aims or that of being able to have them put
into practice. Here, as so often happens in life, the one would be
entirely meaningless without the other. The noblest conceptions of the
human understanding remain without purpose or value if the leader cannot
move the masses towards them. And, conversely, what would it avail to
have all the genius and elan of a leader if the intellectual theorist
does not fix the aims for which mankind must struggle. But when the
abilities of theorist and organizer and leader are united in the one
person, then we have the rarest phenomenon on this earth. And it is that
union which produces the great man.

As I have already said, during my first period in the Party I devoted
myself to the work of propaganda. I had to succeed in gradually
gathering together a small nucleus of men who would accept the new
teaching and be inspired by it. And in this way we should provide the
human material which subsequently would form the constituent elements of
the organization. Thus the goal of the propagandist is nearly always
fixed far beyond that of the organizer.

If a movement proposes to overthrow a certain order of things and
construct a new one in its place, then the following principles must be
clearly understood and must dominate in the ranks of its leadership:
Every movement which has gained its human material must first divide
this material into two groups: namely, followers and members.

It is the task of the propagandist to recruit the followers and it is
the task of the organizer to select the members.

The follower of a movement is he who understands and accepts its aims;
the member is he who fights for them.

The follower is one whom the propaganda has converted to the doctrine of
the movement. The member is he who will be charged by the organization
to collaborate in winning over new followers from which in turn new
members can be formed.

To be a follower needs only the passive recognition of the idea. To be a
member means to represent that idea and fight for it. From ten followers
one can have scarcely more than two members. To be a follower simply
implies that a man has accepted the teaching of the movement; whereas to
be a member means that a man has the courage to participate actively in
diffusing that teaching in which he has come to believe.

Because of its passive character, the simple effort of believing in a
political doctrine is enough for the majority, for the majority of
mankind is mentally lazy and timid. To be a member one must be
intellectually active, and therefore this applies only to the minority.

Such being the case, the propagandist must seek untiringly to acquire
new followers for the movement, whereas the organizer must diligently
look out for the best elements among such followers, so that these
elements may be transformed into members. The propagandist need not
trouble too much about the personal worth of the individual proselytes
he has won for the movement. He need not inquire into their abilities,
their intelligence or character. From these proselytes, however, the
organizer will have to select those individuals who are most capable of
actively helping to bring the movement to victory.

The propagandist aims at inducing the whole people to accept his
teaching. The organizer includes in his body of membership only those
who, on psychological grounds, will not be an impediment to the further
diffusion of the doctrines of the movement.

The propagandist inculcates his doctrine among the masses, with the idea
of preparing them for the time when this doctrine will triumph, through
the body of combatant members which he has formed from those followers
who have given proof of the necessary ability and will-power to carry
the struggle to victory.

The final triumph of a doctrine will be made all the more easy if the
propagandist has effectively converted large bodies of men to the belief
in that doctrine and if the organization that actively conducts the
fight be exclusive, vigorous and solid.

When the propaganda work has converted a whole people to believe in a
doctrine, the organization can turn the results of this into practical
effect through the work of a mere handful of men. Propaganda and
organization, therefore follower and member, then stand towards one
another in a definite mutual relationship. The better the propaganda has
worked, the smaller will the organization be. The greater the number of
followers, so much the smaller can be the number of members. And
conversely. If the propaganda be bad, the organization must be large.
And if there be only a small number of followers, the membership must be
all the larger--if the movement really counts on being successful.

The first duty of the propagandist is to win over people who can
subsequently be taken into the organization. And the first duty of the
organization is to select and train men who will be capable of carrying
on the propaganda. The second duty of the organization is to disrupt the
existing order of things and thus make room for the penetration of the
new teaching which it represents, while the duty of the organizer must
be to fight for the purpose of securing power, so that the doctrine may
finally triumph.

A revolutionary conception of the world and human existence will always
achieve decisive success when the new WELTANSCHAUUNG has been taught to
a whole people, or subsequently forced upon them if necessary, and when,
on the other hand, the central organization, the movement itself, is in
the hands of only those few men who are absolutely indispensable to form
the nerve-centres of the coming State.

Put in another way, this means that in every great revolutionary
movement that is of world importance the idea of this movement must
always be spread abroad through the operation of propaganda. The
propagandist must never tire in his efforts to make the new ideas
clearly understood, inculcating them among others, or at least he must
place himself in the position of those others and endeavour to upset
their confidence in the convictions they have hitherto held. In order
that such propaganda should have backbone to it, it must be based on an
organization. The organization chooses its members from among those
followers whom the propaganda has won. That organization will become all
the more vigorous if the work of propaganda be pushed forward
intensively. And the propaganda will work all the better when the
organization back of it is vigorous and strong in itself.

Hence the supreme task of the organizer is to see to it that any discord
or differences which may arise among the members of the movement will
not lead to a split and thereby cramp the work within the movement.
Moreover, it is the duty of the organization to see that the fighting
spirit of the movement does not flag or die out but that it is
constantly reinvigorated and restrengthened. It is not necessary the
number of members should increase indefinitely. Quite the contrary would
be better. In view of the fact that only a fraction of humanity has
energy and courage, a movement which increases its own organization
indefinitely must of necessity one day become plethoric and inactive.
Organizations, that is to say, groups of members, which increase their
size beyond certain dimensions gradually lose their fighting force and
are no longer in form to back up the propagation of a doctrine with
aggressive elan and determination.

Now the greater and more revolutionary a doctrine is, so much the more
active will be the spirit inspiring its body of members, because the
subversive energy of such a doctrine will frighten way the
chicken-hearted and small-minded bourgeoisie. In their hearts they may
believe in the doctrine but they are afraid to acknowledge their belief
openly. By reason of this very fact, however, an organization inspired
by a veritable revolutionary idea will attract into the body of its
membership only the most active of those believers who have been won for
it by its propaganda. It is in this activity on the part of the
membership body, guaranteed by the process of natural selection, that we
are to seek the prerequisite conditions for the continuation of an
active and spirited propaganda and also the victorious struggle for the
success of the idea on which the movement is based.

The greatest danger that can threaten a movement is an abnormal increase
in the number of its members, owing to its too rapid success. So long as
a movement has to carry on a hard and bitter fight, people of weak and
fundamentally egotistic temperament will steer very clear of it; but
these will try to be accepted as members the moment the party achieves a
manifest success in the course of its development.

It is on these grounds that we are to explain why so many movements
which were at first successful slowed down before reaching the
fulfilment of their purpose and, from an inner weakness which could not
otherwise be explained, gave up the struggle and finally disappeared
from the field. As a result of the early successes achieved, so many
undesirable, unworthy and especially timid individuals became members of
the movement that they finally secured the majority and stifled the
fighting spirit of the others. These inferior elements then turned the
movement to the service of their personal interests and, debasing it to
the level of their own miserable heroism, no longer struggled for the
triumph of the original idea. The fire of the first fervour died out,
the fighting spirit flagged and, as the bourgeois world is accustomed to
say very justly in such cases, the party mixed water with its wine.
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« Reply #83 on: July 19, 2008, 01:45:12 am »

For this reason it is necessary that a movement should, from the sheer
instinct of self-preservation, close its lists to new membership the
moment it becomes successful. And any further increase in its
organization should be allowed to take place only with the most careful
foresight and after a painstaking sifting of those who apply for
membership. Only thus will it be possible to keep the kernel of the
movement intact and fresh and sound. Care must be taken that the conduct
of the movement is maintained exclusively in the hands of this original
nucleus. This means that the nucleus must direct the propaganda which
aims at securing general recognition for the movement. And the movement
itself, when it has secured power in its hands, must carry out all those
acts and measures which are necessary in order that its ideas should be
finally established in practice.

With those elements that originally made the movement, the organization
should occupy all the important positions that have been conquered and
from those elements the whole directorate should be formed. This should
continue until the maxims and doctrines of the party have become the
foundation and policy of the new State. Only then will it be permissible
gradually to give the reins into the hands of the Constitution of that
State which the spirit of the movement has created. But this usually
happens through a process of mutual rivalry, for here it is less a
question of human intelligence than of the play and effect of the forces
whose development may indeed be foreseen from the start but not
perpetually controlled.

All great movements, whether of a political or religious nature, owe
their imposing success to the recognition and adoption of those
principles. And no durable success is conceivable if these laws are not

As director of propaganda for the party, I took care not merely to
prepare the ground for the greatness of the movement in its subsequent
stages, but I also adopted the most radical measures against allowing
into the organization any other than the best material. For the more
radical and exciting my propaganda was, the more did it frighten weak
and wavering characters away, thus preventing them from entering the
first nucleus of our organization. Perhaps they remained followers, but
they did not raise their voices. On the contrary, they maintained a
discreet silence on the fact. Many thousands of persons then assured me
that they were in full agreement with us but they could not on any
account become members of our party. They said that the movement was so
radical that to take part in it as members would expose them to grave
censures and grave dangers, so that they would rather continue to be
looked upon as honest and peaceful citizens and remain aside, for the
time being at least, though devoted to our cause with all their hearts.

And that was all to the good. If all these men who in their hearts did
not approve of revolutionary ideas came into our movement as members at
that time, we should be looked upon as a pious confraternity to-day and
not as a young movement inspired with the spirit of combat.

The lively and combative form which I gave to all our propaganda
fortified and guaranteed the radical tendency of our movement, and the
result was that, with a few exceptions, only men of radical views were
disposed to become members.

It was due to the effect of our propaganda that within a short period of
time hundreds of thousands of citizens became convinced in their hearts
that we were right and wished us victory, although personally they were
too timid to make sacrifices for our cause or even participate in it.

Up to the middle of 1921 this simple activity of gathering in followers
was sufficient and was of value to the movement. But in the summer of
that year certain events happened which made it seem opportune for us to
bring our organization into line with the manifest successes which the
propaganda had achieved.

An attempt made by a group of patriotic visionaries, supported by the
chairman of the party at that time, to take over the direction of the
party led to the break up of this little intrigue and, by a unanimous
vote at a general meeting, entrusted the entire direction of the party
to my own hands. At the same time a new statute was passed which
invested sole responsibility in the chairman of the movement, abolished
the system of resolutions in committee and in its stead introduced the
principle of division of labour which since that time has worked

From August 1st, 1921, onwards I undertook this internal reorganization
of the party and was supported by a number of excellent men. I shall
mention them and their work individually later on.

In my endeavour to turn the results gained by the propaganda to the
advantage of the organization and thus stabilize them, I had to abolish
completely a number of old customs and introduce regulations which none
of the other parties possessed or had adopted.

In the years 1920-21 the movement was controlled by a committee elected
by the members at a general meeting. The committee was composed of a
first and second treasurer, a first and second secretary, and a first
and second chairman at the head of it. In addition to these there was a
representative of the members, the director of propaganda, and various

Comically enough, the committee embodied the very principle against
which the movement itself wanted to fight with all its energy, namely,
the principle of parliamentarianism. Here was a principle which
personified everything that was being opposed by the movement, from the
smallest local groups to the district and regional groups, the state
groups and finally the national directorate itself. It was a system
under which we all suffered and are still suffering.

It was imperative to change this state of affairs forthwith, if this bad
foundation in the internal organization was not to keep the movement
insecure and render the fulfilment of its high mission impossible.

The sessions of the committee, which were ruled by a protocol, and in
which decisions were made according to the vote of the majority,
presented the picture of a miniature parliament. Here also there was no
such thing as personal responsibility. And here reigned the same
absurdities and illogical state of affairs as flourish in our great
representative bodies of the State. Names were presented to this
committee for election as secretaries, treasurers, representatives of
the members of the organization, propaganda agents and God knows what
else. And then they all acted in common on every particular question and
decided it by vote. Accordingly, the director of propaganda voted on a
question that concerned the man who had to do with the finances and the
latter in his turn voted on a question that concerned only the
organization as such, the organizer voting on a subject that had to do
with the secretarial department, and so on.

Why select a special man for propaganda if treasurers and scribes and
commissaries, etc., had to deliver judgment on questions concerning it?
To a person of commonsense that sort of thing seemed as incomprehensible
as it would be if in a great manufacturing concern the board of
directors were to decide on technical questions of production or if,
inversely, the engineers were to decide on questions of administration.

I refused to countenance that kind of folly and after a short time I
ceased to appear at the meetings of the committee. I did nothing else
except attend to my own department of propaganda and I did not permit
any of the others to poke their heads into my activities. Conversely, I
did not interfere in the affairs of others.

When the new statute was approved and I was appointed as president, I
had the necessary authority in my hands and also the corresponding right
to make short shrift of all that nonsense. In the place of decisions by
the majority vote of the committee, the principle of absolute
responsibility was introduced.

The chairman is responsible for the whole control of the movement. He
apportions the work among the members of the committee subordinate to
him and for special work he selects other individuals. Each of these
gentlemen must bear sole responsibility for the task assigned to him. He
is subordinate only to the chairman, whose duty is to supervise the
general collaboration, selecting the personnel and giving general
directions for the co-ordination of the common work.

This principle of absolute responsibility is being adopted little by
little throughout the movement. In the small local groups and perhaps
also in the regional and district groups it will take yet a long time
before the principle can be thoroughly imposed, because timid and
hesitant characters are naturally opposed to it. For them the idea of
bearing absolute responsibility for an act opens up an unpleasant
prospect. They would like to hide behind the shoulders of the majority
in the so-called committee, having their acts covered by decisions
passed in that way. But it seems to me a matter of absolute necessity to
take a decisive stand against that view, to make no concessions
whatsoever to this fear of responsibility, even though it takes some
time before we can put fully into effect this concept of duty and
ability in leadership, which will finally bring forward leaders who have
the requisite abilities to occupy the chief posts.

In any case, a movement which must fight against the absurdity of
parliamentary institutions must be immune from this sort of thing. Only
thus will it have the requisite strength to carry on the struggle.

At a time when the majority dominates everywhere else a movement which
is based on the principle of one leader who has to bear personal
responsibility for the direction of the official acts of the movement
itself will one day overthrow the present situation and triumph over the
existing regime. That is a mathematical certainty.

This idea made it necessary to reorganize our movement internally. The
logical development of this reorganization brought about a clear-cut
distinction between the economic section of the movement and the general
political direction. The principle of personal responsibility was
extended to all the administrative branches of the party and it brought
about a healthy renovation, by liberating them from political influences
and allowing them to operate solely on economic principles.

In the autumn of 1921, when the party was founded, there were only six
members. The party did not have any headquarters, nor officials, nor
formularies, nor a stamp, nor printed material of any sort. The
committee first held its sittings in a restaurant on the Herrengasse and
then in a café at Gasteig. This state of affairs could not last. So I at
once took action in the matter. I went around to several restaurants and
hotels in Munich, with the idea of renting a room in one of them for the
use of the Party. In the old Sterneckerbräu im Tal, there was a small
room with arched roof, which in earlier times was used as a sort of
festive tavern where the Bavarian Counsellors of the Holy Roman Empire
foregathered. It was dark and dismal and accordingly well suited to its
ancient uses, though less suited to the new purpose it was now destined
to serve. The little street on which its one window looked out was so
narrow that even on the brightest summer day the room remained dim and
sombre. Here we took up our first fixed abode. The rent came to fifty
marks per month, which was then an enormous sum for us. But our
exigencies had to be very modest. We dared not complain even when they
removed the wooden wainscoting a few days after we had taken possession.
This panelling had been specially put up for the Imperial Counsellors.
The place began to look more like a grotto than an office.

Still it marked an important step forward. Slowly we had electric light
installed and later on a telephone. A table and some borrowed chairs
were brought, an open paper-stand and later on a cupboard. Two
sideboards, which belonged to the landlord, served to store our
leaflets, placards, etc.

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« Reply #84 on: July 19, 2008, 01:45:32 am »

As time went on it turned out impossible to direct the course of the
movement merely by holding a committee meeting once a week. The current
business administration of the movement could not be regularly attended
to except we had a salaried official.

But that was then very difficult for us. The movement had still so few
members that it was hard to find among them a suitable person for the
job who would be content with very little for himself and at the same
time would be ready to meet the manifold demands which the movement
would make on his time and energy.

After long searching we discovered a soldier who consented to become our
first administrator. His name was Schüssler, an old war comrade of mine.
At first he came to our new office every day between six and eight
o'clock in the evening. Later on he came from five to eight and
subsequently for the whole afternoon. Finally it became a full-time job
and he worked in the office from morning until late at night. He was an
industrious, upright and thoroughly honest man, faithful and devoted to
the movement. He brought with him a small Adler typewriter of his own.
It was the first machine to be used in the service of the party.
Subsequently the party bought it by paying for it in installments. We
needed a small safe in order to keep our papers and register of
membership from danger of being stolen--not to guard our funds, which
did not then exist. On the contrary, our financial position was so
miserable that I often had to dip my hand into my own personal savings.

After eighteen months our business quarters had become too small, so we
moved to a new place in the Cornelius Strasse. Again our office was in a
restaurant, but instead of one room we now had three smaller rooms and
one large room with great windows. At that time this appeared a
wonderful thing to us. We remained there until the end of November 1923.

In December 1920, we acquired the VÖLKISCHER BEOBACHTER. This newspaper
which, as its name implies, championed the claims of the people, was now
to become the organ of the German National Socialist Labour Party. At
first it appeared twice weekly; but at the beginning of 1928 it became a
daily paper, and at the end of August in the same year it began to
appear in the large format which is now well known.

As a complete novice in journalism I then learned many a lesson for
which I had to pay dearly.

In contradistinction to the enormous number of papers in Jewish hands,
there was at that time only one important newspaper that defended the
cause of the people. This was a matter for grave consideration. As I
have often learned by experience, the reason for that state of things
must be attributed to the incompetent way in which the business side of
the so-called popular newspapers was managed. These were conducted too
much according to the rule that opinion should prevail over action that
produces results. Quite a wrong standpoint, for opinion is of itself
something internal and finds its best expression in productive activity.
The man who does valuable work for his people expresses thereby his
excellent sentiments, whereas another who merely talks about his
opinions and does nothing that is of real value or use to the people is
a person who perverts all right thinking. And that attitude of his is
also pernicious for the community.

The VÖLKISCHE BEOBACHTER was a so-called 'popular' organ, as its name
indicated. It had all the good qualities, but still more the errors and
weaknesses, inherent in all popular institutions. Though its contents
were excellent, its management as a business concern was simply
impossible. Here also the underlying idea was that popular newspapers
ought to be subsidized by popular contributions, without recognizing
that it had to make its way in competition with the others and that it
was dishonest to expect the subscriptions of good patriots to make up
for the mistaken management of the undertaking.

I took care to alter those conditions promptly, for I recognized the
danger lurking in them. Luck was on my side here, inasmuch as it brought
me the man who since that time has rendered innumerable services to the
movement, not only as business manager of the newspaper but also as
business manager of the party. In 1914, in the War, I made the
acquaintance of Max Amann, who was then my superior and is to-day
general business Director of the Party. During four years in the War I
had occasion to observe almost continually the unusual ability, the
diligence and the rigorous conscientiousness of my future collaborator.

In the summer of 1921 I applied to my old regimental comrade, whom I met
one day by chance, and asked him to become business manager of the
movement. At that time the movement was passing through a grave crisis
and I had reason to be dissatisfied with several of our officials, with
one of whom I had had a very bitter experience. Amann then held a good
situation in which there were also good prospects for him.

After long hesitation he agreed to my request, but only on condition
that he must not be at the mercy of incompetent committees. He must be
responsible to one master, and only one.

It is to the inestimable credit of this first business manager of the
party, whose commercial knowledge is extensive and profound, that he
brought order and probity into the various offices of the party. Since
that time these have remained exemplary and cannot be equalled or
excelled in this by any other branches of the movement. But, as often
happens in life, great ability provokes envy and disfavour. That had
also to be expected in this case and borne patiently.

Since 1922 rigorous regulations have been in force, not only for the
commercial construction of the movement but also in the organization of
it as such. There exists now a central filing system, where the names
and particulars of all the members are enrolled. The financing of the
party has been placed on sound lines. The current expenditure must be
covered by the current receipts and special receipts can be used only
for special expenditures. Thus, notwithstanding the difficulties of the
time the movement remained practically without any debts, except for a
few small current accounts. Indeed, there was a permanent increase in
the funds. Things are managed as in a private business. The employed
personnel hold their jobs in virtue of their practical efficiency and
could not in any manner take cover behind their professed loyalty to the
party. A good National Socialist proves his soundness by the readiness,
diligence and capability with which he discharges whatever duties are
assigned to him in whatever situation he holds within the national
community. The man who does not fulfil his duty in the job he holds
cannot boast of a loyalty against which he himself really sins.

Adamant against all kinds of outer influence, the new business director
of the party firmly maintained the standpoint that there were no
sinecure posts in the party administration for followers and members of
the movement whose pleasure is not work. A movement which fights so
energetically against the corruption introduced into our civil service
by the various political parties must be immune from that vice in its
own administrative department. It happened that some men were taken on
the staff of the paper who had formerly been adherents of the Bavarian
People's Party, but their work showed that they were excellently
qualified for the job. The result of this experiment was generally
excellent. It was owing to this honest and frank recognition of
individual efficiency that the movement won the hearts of its employees
more swiftly and more profoundly than had ever been the case before.
Subsequently they became good National Socialists and remained so. Not
in word only, but they proved it by the steady and honest and
conscientious work which they performed in the service of the new
movement. Naturally a well qualified party member was preferred to
another who had equal qualifications but did not belong to the party.
The rigid determination with which our new business chief applied these
principles and gradually put them into force, despite all
misunderstandings, turned out to be of great advantage to the movement.
To this we owe the fact that it was possible for us--during the
difficult period of the inflation, when thousands of businesses failed
and thousands of newspapers had to cease publication--not only to keep
the commercial department of the movement going and meet all its
obligations but also to make steady progress with the VÖLKISCHE
BEOBACHTER. At that time it came to be ranked among the great

The year 1921 was of further importance for me by reason of the fact
that in my position as chairman of the party I slowly but steadily
succeeded in putting a stop to the criticisms and the intrusions of some
members of the committee in regard to the detailed activities of the
party administration. This was important, because we could not get a
capable man to take on a job if nincompoops were constantly allowed to
butt in, pretending that they knew everything much better; whereas in
reality they had left only general chaos behind them. Then these
wise-acres retired, for the most part quite modestly, to seek another
field for their activities where they could supervise and tell how
things ought to be done. Some men seemed to have a mania for sniffing
behind everything and were, so to say, always in a permanent state of
pregnancy with magnificent plans and ideas and projects and methods.
Naturally their noble aim and ideal were always the formation of a
committee which could pretend to be an organ of control in order to be
able to sniff as experts into the regular work done by others. But it is
offensive and contrary to the spirit of National Socialism when
incompetent people constantly interfere in the work of capable persons.
But these makers of committees do not take that very much into account.
In those years I felt it my duty to safeguard against such annoyance all
those who were entrusted with regular and responsible work, so that
there should be no spying over the shoulder and they would be guaranteed
a free hand in their day's work.

The best means of making committees innocuous, which either did nothing
or cooked up impracticable decisions, was to give them some real work to
do. It was then amusing to see how the members would silently fade away
and were soon nowhere to be found. It made me think of that great
institution of the same kind, the Reichstag. How quickly they would
evanesce if they were put to some real work instead of talking,
especially if each member were made personally responsible for the work
assigned to him.

I always demanded that, just as in private life so also in the movement,
one should not tire of seeking until the best and honestest and
manifestly the most competent person could be found for the position of
leader or administrator in each section of the movement. Once installed
in his position he was given absolute authority and full freedom of
action towards his subordinates and full responsibility towards his
superiors. Nobody was placed in a position of authority towards his
subordinates unless he himself was competent in the work entrusted to
them. In the course of two years I brought my views more and more into
practice; so that to-day, at least as far as the higher direction of the
movement is concerned, they are accepted as a matter of course.

The manifest success of this attitude was shown on November 9th, 1923.
Four years previously, when I entered the movement, it did not have even
a rubber stamp. On November 9th, 1923, the party was dissolved and its
property confiscated. The total sum realized by all the objects of value
and the paper amounted to more than 170,000 gold marks.



Owing to the rapid growth of the movement, in 1922 we felt compelled to
take a definite stand on a question which has not been fully solved even

In our efforts to discover the quickest and easiest way for the movement
to reach the heart of the broad masses we were always confronted with
the objection that the worker could never completely belong to us while
his interests in the purely vocational and economic sphere were cared
for by a political organization conducted by men whose principles were
quite different from ours.

That was quite a serious objection. The general belief was that a
workman engaged in some trade or other could not exist if he did not
belong to a trade union. Not only were his professional interests thus
protected but a guarantee of permanent employment was simply
inconceivable without membership in a trade union. The majority of the
workers were in the trades unions. Generally speaking, the unions had
successfully conducted the battle for the establishment of a definite
scale of wages and had concluded agreements which guaranteed the worker
a steady income. Undoubtedly the workers in the various trades benefited
by the results of that campaign and, for honest men especially,
conflicts of conscience must have arisen if they took the wages which
had been assured through the struggle fought by the trades unions and if
at the same time the men themselves withdrew from the fight.

It was difficult to discuss this problem with the average bourgeois
employer. He had no understanding (or did not wish to have any) for
either the material or moral side of the question. Finally he declared
that his own economic interests were in principle opposed to every kind
of organization which joined together the workmen that were dependent on
him. Hence it was for the most part impossible to bring these bourgeois
employers to take an impartial view of the situation. Here, therefore,
as in so many other cases, it was necessary to appeal to disinterested
outsiders who would not be subject to the temptation of fixing their
attention on the trees and failing to see the forest. With a little good
will on their part, they could much more easily understand a state of
affairs which is of the highest importance for our present and future

In the first volume of this book I have already expressed my views on
the nature and purpose and necessity of trade unions. There I took up
the standpoint that unless measures are undertaken by the State (usually
futile in such cases) or a new ideal is introduced in our education,
which would change the attitude of the employer towards the worker, no
other course would be open to the latter except to defend his own
interests himself by appealing to his equal rights as a contracting
party within the economic sphere of the nation's existence. I stated
further that this would conform to the interests of the national
community if thereby social injustices could be redressed which
otherwise would cause serious damage to the whole social structure. I
stated, moreover, that the worker would always find it necessary to
undertake this protective action as long as there were men among the
employers who had no sense of their social obligations nor even of the
most elementary human rights. And I concluded by saying that if such
self-defence be considered necessary its form ought to be that of an
association made up of the workers themselves on the basis of trades
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« Reply #85 on: July 19, 2008, 01:45:48 am »

This was my general idea and it remained the same in 1922. But a clear
and precise formula was still to be discovered. We could not be
satisfied with merely understanding the problem. It was necessary to
come to some conclusions that could be put into practice. The following
questions had to be answered:

(1) Are trade unions necessary?

(2) Should the German National Socialist Labour Party itself operate on
a trade unionist basis or have its members take part in trade unionist
activities in some form or other?

(3) What form should a National Socialist Trades Union take? What are
the tasks confronting us and the ends we must try to attain?

(4) How can we establish trade unions for such tasks and aims?

I think that I have already answered the first question adequately. In
the present state of affairs I am convinced that we cannot possibly
dispense with the trades unions. On the contrary, they are among the
most important institutions in the economic life of the nation. Not only
are they important in the sphere of social policy but also, and even
more so, in the national political sphere. For when the great masses of
a nation see their vital needs satisfied through a just trade unionist
movement the stamina of the whole nation in its struggle for existence
will be enormously reinforced thereby.

Before everything else, the trades unions are necessary as building
stones for the future economic parliament, which will be made up of
chambers representing the various professions and occupations.

The second question is also easy to answer. If the trade unionist
movement is important, then it is clear that National Socialism ought to
take a definite stand on that question, not only theoretically but also
in practice. But how? That is more difficult to see clearly.

The National Socialist Movement, which aims at establishing the National
Socialist People's State, must always bear steadfastly in mind the
principle that every future institution under that State must be rooted
in the movement itself. It is a great mistake to believe that by
acquiring possession of supreme political power we can bring about a
definite reorganization, suddenly starting from nothing, without the
help of a certain reserve stock of men who have been trained beforehand,
especially in the spirit of the movement. Here also the principle holds
good that the spirit is always more important than the external form
which it animates; since this form can be created mechanically and
quickly. For instance, the leadership principle may be imposed on an
organized political community in a dictatorial way. But this principle
can become a living reality only by passing through the stages that are
necessary for its own evolution. These stages lead from the smallest
cell of the State organism upwards. As its bearers and representatives,
the leadership principle must have a body of men who have passed through
a process of selection lasting over several years, who have been
tempered by the hard realities of life and thus rendered capable of
carrying the principle into practical effect.

It is out of the question to think that a scheme for the Constitution of
a State can be pulled out of a portfolio at a moment's notice and
'introduced' by imperative orders from above. One may try that kind of
thing but the result will always be something that has not sufficient
vitality to endure. It will be like a stillborn infant. The idea of it
calls to mind the origin of the Weimar Constitution and the attempt to
impose on the German people a new Constitution and a new flag, neither
of which had any inner relation to the vicissitudes of our people's
history during the last half century.

The National Socialist State must guard against all such experiments. It
must grow out of an organization which has already existed for a long
time. This organization must possess National Socialist life in itself,
so that finally it may be able to establish a National Socialist State
that will be a living reality.

As I have already said, the germ cells of this State must lie in the
administrative chambers which will represent the various occupations and
professions, therefore first of all in the trades unions. If this
subsequent vocational representation and the Central Economic Parliament
are to be National Socialist institutions, these important germ cells
must be vehicles of the National Socialist concept of life. The
institutions of the movement are to be brought over into the State; for
the State cannot call into existence all of a sudden and as if by magic
those institutions which are necessary to its existence, unless it
wishes to have institutions that are bound to remain completely

Looking at the matter from the highest standpoint, the National
Socialist Movement will have to recognize the necessity of adopting its
own trade-unionist policy.

It must do this for a further reason, namely because a real National
Socialist education for the employer as well as for the employee, in the
spirit of a mutual co-operation within the common framework of the
national community, cannot be secured by theoretical instruction,
appeals and exhortations, but through the struggles of daily life. In
this spirit and through this spirit the movement must educate the
several large economic groups and bring them closer to one another under
a wider outlook. Without this preparatory work it would be sheer
illusion to hope that a real national community can be brought into
existence. The great ideal represented by its philosophy of life and for
which the movement fights can alone form a general style of thought
steadily and slowly. And this style will show that the new state of
things rests on foundations that are internally sound and not merely an
external façade.

Hence the movement must adopt a positive attitude towards the
trade-unionist idea. But it must go further than this. For the enormous
number of members and followers of the trade-unionist movement it must
provide a practical education which will meet the exigencies of the
coming National Socialist State.

The answer to the third question follows from what has been already

The National Socialist Trades Union is not an instrument for class
warfare, but a representative organ of the various occupations and
callings. The National Socialist State recognizes no 'classes'. But,
under the political aspect, it recognizes only citizens with absolutely
equal rights and equal obligations corresponding thereto. And, side by
side with these, it recognizes subjects of the State who have no
political rights whatsoever.

According to the National Socialist concept, it is not the task of the
trades union to band together certain men within the national community
and thus gradually transform these men into a class, so as to use them
in a conflict against other groups similarly organized within the
national community. We certainly cannot assign this task to the trades
union as such. This was the task assigned to it the moment it became a
fighting weapon in the hands of the Marxists. The trades union is not
naturally an instrument of class warfare; but the Marxists transformed
it into an instrument for use in their own class struggle. They created
the economic weapon which the international Jew uses for the purpose of
destroying the economic foundations of free and independent national
States, for ruining their national industry and trade and thereby
enslaving free nations to serve Jewish world-finance, which transcends
all State boundaries.

In contradistinction to this, the National Socialist Trades Union must
organize definite groups and those who participate in the economic life
of the nation and thus enhance the security of the national economic
system itself, reinforcing it by the elimination of all those anomalies
which ultimately exercise a destructive influence on the social body of
the nation, damaging the vital forces of the national community,
prejudicing the welfare of the State and, by no means as a last
consequence, bringing evil and destruction on economic life itself.

Therefore in the hands of the National Socialist Trades Union the strike
is not an instrument for disturbing and dislocating the national
production, but for increasing it and making it run smoothly, by
fighting against all those annoyances which by reason of their unsocial
character hinder efficiency in business and thereby hamper the existence
of the whole nation. For individual efficiency stands always in casual
relation to the general social and juridical position of the individual
in the economic process. Individual efficiency is also the sole root of
the conviction that the economic prosperity of the nation must
necessarily redound to the benefit of the individual citizen.

The National Socialist employee will have to recognize the fact that the
economic prosperity of the nation brings with it his own material

The National Socialist employer must recognize that the happiness and
contentment of his employees are necessary pre-requisites for the
existence and development of his own economic prosperity.

National Socialist workers and employers are both together the delegates
and mandatories of the whole national community. The large measure of
personal freedom which is accorded to them for their activities must be
explained by the fact that experience has shown that the productive
powers of the individual are more enhanced by being accorded a generous
measure of freedom than by coercion from above. Moreover, by according
this freedom we give free play to the natural process of selection which
brings forward the ablest and most capable and most industrious. For the
National Socialist Trades Union, therefore, the strike is a means that
may, and indeed must, be resorted to as long as there is not a National
Socialist State yet. But when that State is established it will, as a
matter of course, abolish the mass struggle between the two great groups
made up of employers and employees respectively, a struggle which has
always resulted in lessening the national production and injuring the
national community. In place of this struggle, the National Socialist
State will take over the task of caring for and defending the rights of
all parties concerned. It will be the duty of the Economic Chamber
itself to keep the national economic system in smooth working order and
to remove whatever defects or errors it may suffer from. Questions that
are now fought over through a quarrel that involves millions of people
will then be settled in the Representative Chambers of Trades and
Professions and in the Central Economic Parliament. Thus employers and
employees will no longer find themselves drawn into a mutual conflict
over wages and hours of work, always to the detriment of their mutual
interests. But they will solve these problems together on a higher
plane, where the welfare of the national community and of the State will
be as a shining ideal to throw light on all their negotiations.

Here again, as everywhere else, the inflexible principle must be
observed, that the interests of the country must come before party

The task of the National Socialist Trades Union will be to educate and
prepare its members to conform to these ideals. That task may be stated
as follows: All must work together for the maintenance and security of
our people and the People's State, each one according to the abilities
and powers with which Nature has endowed him and which have been
developed and trained by the national community.

Our fourth question was: How shall we establish trades unions for such
tasks and aims? That is far more difficult to answer.

Generally speaking, it is easier to establish something in new territory
than in old territory which already has its established institutions. In
a district where there is no existing business of a special character
one can easily establish a new business of this character. But it is
more difficult if the same kind of enterprise already exists and it is
most difficult of all when the conditions are such that only one
enterprise of this kind can prosper. For here the promoters of the new
enterprise find themselves confronted not only with the problem of
introducing their own business but also that of how to bring about the
destruction of the other business already existing in the district, so
that the new enterprise may be able to exist.

It would be senseless to have a National Socialist Trades Union side by
side with other trades unions. For this Trades Union must be thoroughly
imbued with a feeling for the ideological nature of its task and of the
resulting obligation not to tolerate other similar or hostile
institutions. It must also insist that itself alone is necessary, to the
exclusion of all the rest. It can come to no arrangement and no
compromise with kindred tendencies but must assert its own absolute and
exclusive right.

There were two ways which might lead to such a development:

(1) We could establish our Trades Union and then gradually take up the
fight against the Marxist International Trades Union.

(2) Or we could enter the Marxist Trades Union and inculcate a new
spirit in it, with the idea of transforming it into an instrument in the
service of the new ideal.

The first way was not advisable, by reason of the fact that our
financial situation was still the cause of much worry to us at that time
and our resources were quite slender. The effects of the inflation were
steadily spreading and made the particular situation still more
difficult for us, because in those years one could scarcely speak of any
material help which the trades unions could extend to their members.
From this point of view, there was no reason why the individual worker
should pay his dues to the union. Even the Marxist unions then existing
were already on the point of collapse until, as the result of Herr
Cuno's enlightened Ruhr policy, millions were suddenly poured into their
coffers. This so-called 'national' Chancellor of the REICH should go
down in history as the Redeemer of the Marxist trades unions.

We could not count on similar financial facilities. And nobody could be
induced to enter a new Trades Union which, on account of its financial
weakness, could not offer him the slightest material benefit. On the
other hand, I felt bound absolutely to guard against the creation of
such an organization which would only be a shelter for shirkers of the
more or less intellectual type.

At that time the question of personnel played the most important role. I
did not have a single man whom I might call upon to carry out this
important task. Whoever could have succeeded at that time in
overthrowing the Marxist unions to make way for the triumph of the
National Socialist corporative idea, which would then take the place of
the ruinous class warfare--such a person would be fit to rank with the
very greatest men our nation has produced and his bust should be
installed in the Valhalla at Regensburg for the admiration of posterity.

But I knew of no person who could qualify for such a pedestal.

In this connection we must not be led astray by the fact that the
international trades unions are conducted by men of only mediocre
significance, for when those unions were founded there was nothing else
of a similar kind already in existence. To-day the National Socialist
Movement must fight against a monster organization which has existed for
a long time, rests on gigantic foundations and is carefully constructed
even in the smallest details. An assailant must always exercise more
intelligence than the defender, if he is to overthrow the latter. The
Marxist trade-unionist citadel may be governed to-day by mediocre
leaders, but it cannot be taken by assault except through the dauntless
energy and genius of a superior leader on the other side. If such a
leader cannot be found it is futile to struggle with Fate and even more
foolish to try to overthrow the existing state of things without being
able to construct a better in its place.

Here one must apply the maxim that in life it is often better to allow
something to go by the board rather than try to half do it or do it
badly, owing to a lack of suitable means.

To this we must add another consideration, which is not at all of a
demagogic character. At that time I had, and I still have to-day, a
firmly rooted conviction that when one is engaged in a great ideological
struggle in the political field it would be a grave mistake to mix up
economic questions with this struggle in its earlier stages. This
applies particularly to our German people. For if such were to happen in
their case the economic struggle would immediately distract the energy
necessary for the political fight. Once the people are brought to
believe that they can buy a little house with their savings they will
devote themselves to the task of increasing their savings and no spare
time will be left to them for the political struggle against those who,
in one way or another, will one day secure possession of the pennies
that have been saved. Instead of participating in the political conflict
on behalf of the opinions and convictions which they have been brought
to accept they will now go further with their 'settlement' idea and in
the end they will find themselves for the most part sitting on the
ground amidst all the stools.
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« Reply #86 on: July 19, 2008, 01:49:28 am »

To-day the National Socialist Movement is at the beginning of its
struggle. In great part it must first of all shape and develop its
ideals. It must employ every ounce of its energy in the struggle to have
its great ideal accepted, and the success of this effort is not
conceivable unless the combined energies of the movement be entirely at
the service of this struggle.

To-day we have a classical example of how the active strength of a
people becomes paralysed when that people is too much taken up with
purely economic problems.

The Revolution which took place in November 1918 was not made by the
trades unions, but it was carried out in spite of them. And the people
of Germany did not wage any political fight for the future of their
country because they thought that the future could be sufficiently
secured by constructive work in the economic field.

We must learn a lesson from this experience, because in our case the
same thing must happen under the same circumstances. The more the
combined strength of our movement is concentrated in the political
struggle, the more confidently may we count on being successful along
our whole front. But if we busy ourselves prematurely with trade
unionist problems, settlement problems, etc., it will be to the
disadvantage of our own cause, taken as a whole. For, though these
problems may be important, they cannot be solved in an adequate manner
until we have political power in our hand and are able to use it in the
service of this idea. Until that day comes these problems can have only
a paralysing effect on the movement. And if it takes them up too soon
they will only be a hindrance in the effort to attain its own
ideological aims. It may then easily happen that trade unionist
considerations will control the political direction of the movement,
instead of the ideological aims of the movement directing the way that
the trades unions are to take.

The movement and the nation can derive advantage from a National
Socialist trade unionist organization only if the latter be so
thoroughly inspired by National Socialist ideas that it runs no danger
of falling into step behind the Marxist movement. For a National
Socialist Trades Union which would consider itself only as a competitor
against the Marxist unions would be worse than none. It must declare war
against the Marxist Trades Union, not only as an organization but, above
all, as an idea. It must declare itself hostile to the idea of class and
class warfare and, in place of this, it must declare itself as the
defender of the various occupational and professional interests of the
German people.

Considered from all these points of view it was not then advisable, nor
is it yet advisable, to think of founding our own Trades Union. That
seemed clear to me, at least until somebody appeared who was obviously
called by fate to solve this particular problem.

Therefore there remained only two possible ways. Either to recommend our
own party members to leave the trades unions in which they were enrolled
or to remain in them for the moment, with the idea of causing as much
destruction in them as possible.

In general, I recommended the latter alternative.

Especially in the year 1922-23 we could easily do that. For, during the
period of inflation, the financial advantages which might be reaped from
a trades union organization would be negligible, because we could expect
to enroll only a few members owing to the undeveloped condition of our
movement. The damage which might result from such a policy was all the
greater because its bitterest critics and opponents were to be found
among the followers of the National Socialist Party.

I had already entirely discountenanced all experiments which were
destined from the very beginning to be unsuccessful. I would have
considered it criminal to run the risk of depriving a worker of his
scant earnings in order to help an organization which, according to my
inner conviction, could not promise real advantages to its members.

Should a new political party fade out of existence one day nobody would
be injured thereby and some would have profited, but none would have a
right to complain. For what each individual contributes to a political
movement is given with the idea that it may ultimately come to nothing.
But the man who pays his dues to a trade union has the right to expect
some guarantee in return. If this is not done, then the directors of
such a trade union are swindlers or at least careless people who ought
to be brought to a sense of their responsibilities.

We took all these viewpoints into consideration before making our
decision in 1922. Others thought otherwise and founded trades unions.
They upbraided us for being short-sighted and failing to see into the
future. But it did not take long for these organizations to disappear
and the result was what would have happened in our own case. But the
difference was that we should have deceived neither ourselves nor those
who believed in us.



The erratic manner in which the foreign affairs of the REICH were
conducted was due to a lack of sound guiding principles for the
formation of practical and useful alliances. Not only was this state of
affairs continued after the Revolution, but it became even worse.

For the confused state of our political ideas in general before the War
may be looked upon as the chief cause of our defective statesmanship;
but in the post-War period this cause must be attributed to a lack of
honest intentions. It was natural that those parties who had fully
achieved their destructive purpose by means of the Revolution should
feel that it would not serve their interests if a policy of alliances
were adopted which must ultimately result in the restoration of a free
German State. A development in this direction would not be in conformity
with the purposes of the November crime. It would have interrupted and
indeed put an end to the internationalization of German national economy
and German Labour. But what was feared most of all was that a successful
effort to make the REICH independent of foreign countries might have an
influence in domestic politics which one day would turn out disastrous
for those who now hold supreme power in the government of the REICH. One
cannot imagine the revival of a nation unless that revival be preceded
by a process of nationalization. Conversely, every important success in
the field of foreign politics must call forth a favourable reaction at
home. Experience proves that every struggle for liberty increases the
national sentiment and national self-consciousness and therewith gives
rise to a keener sensibility towards anti-national elements and
tendencies. A state of things, and persons also, that may be tolerated
and even pass unnoticed in times of peace will not only become the
object of aversion when national enthusiasm is aroused but will even
provoke positive opposition, which frequently turns out disastrous for
them. In this connection we may recall the spy-scare that became
prevalent when the war broke out, when human passion suddenly manifested
itself to such a heightened degree as to lead to the most brutal
persecutions, often without any justifiable grounds, although everybody
knew that the danger resulting from spies is greater during the long
periods of peace; but, for obvious reasons, they do not then attract a
similar amount of public attention. For this reason the subtle instinct
of the State parasites who came to the surface of the national body
through the November happenings makes them feel at once that a policy of
alliances which would restore the freedom of our people and awaken
national sentiment might possibly ruin their own criminal existence.

Thus we may explain the fact that since 1918 the men who have held the
reins of government adopted an entirely negative attitude towards
foreign affairs and that the business of the State has been almost
constantly conducted in a systematic way against the interests of the
German nation. For that which at first sight seemed a matter of chance
proved, on closer examination, to be a logical advance along the road
which was first publicly entered upon by the November Revolution of

Undoubtedly a distinction ought to be made between (1) the responsible
administrators of our affairs of State, or rather those who ought to be
responsible; (2) the average run of our parliamentary politicasters, and
(3) the masses of our people, whose sheepish docility corresponds to
their want of intelligence.

The first know what they want. The second fall into line with them,
either because they have been already schooled in what is afoot or
because they have not the courage to take an uncompromising stand
against a course which they know and feel to be detrimental. The third
just submit to it because they are too stupid to understand.

While the German National Socialist Labour Party was only a small and
practically unknown society, problems of foreign policy could have only
a secondary importance in the eyes of many of its members. This was the
case especially because our movement has always proclaimed the
principle, and must proclaim it, that the freedom of the country in its
foreign relations is not a gift that will be bestowed upon us by Heaven
or by any earthly Powers, but can only be the fruit of a development of
our inner forces. We must first root out the causes which led to our
collapse and we must eliminate all those who are profiting by that
collapse. Then we shall be in a position to take up the fight for the
restoration of our freedom in the management of our foreign relations.

It will be easily understood therefore why we did not attach so much
importance to foreign affairs during the early stages of our young
movement, but preferred to concentrate on the problem of internal

But when the small and insignificant society expanded and finally grew
too large for its first framework, the young organization assumed the
importance of a great association and we then felt it incumbent on us to
take a definite stand on problems regarding the development of a foreign
policy. It was necessary to lay down the main lines of action which
would not only be in accord with the fundamental ideas of our
WELTANSCHAUUNG but would actually be an expansion of it in the
practical world of foreign affairs.

Just because our people have had no political education in matters
concerning our relations abroad, it was necessary to teach the leaders
in the various sections of our movement, and also the masses of the
people, the chief principles which ought to guide the development of our
foreign relations. That was one of the first tasks to be accomplished in
order to prepare the ground for the practical carrying out of a foreign
policy which would win back the independence of the nation in managing
its external affairs and thus restore the real sovereignty of the REICH.

The fundamental and guiding principles which we must always bear in mind
when studying this question is that foreign policy is only a means to an
end and that the sole end to be pursued is the welfare of our own
people. Every problem in foreign politics must be considered from this
point of view, and this point of view alone. Shall such and such a
solution prove advantageous to our people now or in the future, or will
it injure their interests? That is the question.

This is the sole preoccupation that must occupy our minds in dealing
with a question. Party politics, religious considerations, humanitarian
ideals--all such and all other preoccupations must absolutely give way
to this.

Before the War the purpose to which German foreign policy should have
been devoted was to assure the supply of material necessities for the
maintenance of our people and their children. And the way should have
been prepared which would lead to this goal. Alliances should have been
established which would have proved beneficial to us from this point of
view and would have brought us the necessary auxiliary support. The task
to be accomplished is the same to-day, but with this difference: In
pre-War times it was a question of caring for the maintenance of the
German people, backed up by the power which a strong and independent
State then possessed, but our task to-day is to make our nation powerful
once again by re-establishing a strong and independent State. The
re-establishment of such a State is the prerequisite and necessary
condition which must be fulfilled in order that we may be able
subsequently to put into practice a foreign policy which will serve to
guarantee the existence of our people in the future, fulfilling their
needs and furnishing them with those necessities of life which they
lack. In other words, the aim which Germany ought to pursue to-day in
her foreign policy is to prepare the way for the recovery of her liberty
to-morrow. In this connection there is a fundamental principle which we
must keep steadily before our minds. It is this: The possibility of
winning back the independence of a nation is not absolutely bound up
with the question of territorial reintegration but it will suffice if a
small remnant, no matter how small, of this nation and State will exist,
provided it possesses the necessary independence to become not only the
vehicle of' the common spirit of the whole people but also to prepare
the way for the military fight to reconquer the nation's liberty.

When a people who amount to a hundred million souls tolerate the yoke of
common slavery in order to prevent the territory belonging to their
State from being broken up and divided, that is worse than if such a
State and such a people were dismembered while one fragment still
retained its complete independence. Of course, the natural proviso here
is that this fragment must be inspired with a consciousness of the
solemn duty that devolves upon it, not only to proclaim persistently the
inviolable unity of its spiritual and cultural life with that of its
detached members but also to prepare the means that are necessary for
the military conflict which will finally liberate and re-unite the
fragments that are suffering under oppression.

One must also bear in mind the fact that the restoration of lost
districts which were formerly parts of the State, both ethnically and
politically, must in the first instance be a question of winning back
political power and independence for the motherland itself, and that in
such cases the special interests of the lost districts must be
uncompromisingly regarded as a matter of secondary importance in the
face of the one main task, which is to win back the freedom of the
central territory. For the detached and oppressed fragments of a nation
or an imperial province cannot achieve their liberation through the
expression of yearnings and protests on the part of the oppressed and
abandoned, but only when the portion which has more or less retained its
sovereign independence can resort to the use of force for the purpose of
reconquering those territories that once belonged to the common

Therefore, in order to reconquer lost territories the first condition to
be fulfilled is to work energetically for the increased welfare and
reinforcement of the strength of that portion of the State which has
remained over after the partition. Thus the unquenchable yearning which
slumbers in the hearts of the people must be awakened and restrengthened
by bringing new forces to its aid, so that when the hour comes all will
be devoted to the one purpose of liberating and uniting the whole
people. Therefore, the interests of the separated territories must be
subordinated to the one purpose. That one purpose must aim at obtaining
for the central remaining portion such a measure of power and might that
will enable it to enforce its will on the hostile will of the victor and
thus redress the wrong. For flaming protests will not restore the
oppressed territories to the bosom of a common REICH. That can be done
only through the might of the sword.

The forging of this sword is a work that has to be done through the
domestic policy which must be adopted by a national government. To see
that the work of forging these arms is assured, and to recruit the men
who will bear them, that is the task of the foreign policy.

In the first volume of this book I discussed the inadequacy of our
policy of alliances before the War. There were four possible ways to
secure the necessary foodstuffs for the maintenance of our people. Of
these ways the fourth, which was the most unfavourable, was chosen.
Instead of a sound policy of territorial expansion in Europe, our rulers
embarked on a policy of colonial and trade expansion. That policy was
all the more mistaken inasmuch as they presumed that in this way the
danger of an armed conflict would be averted. The result of the attempt
to sit on many stools at the same time might have been foreseen. It let
us fall to the ground in the midst of them all. And the World War was
only the last reckoning presented to the REICH to pay for the failure of
its foreign policy.
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Aryan Warrior
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« Reply #87 on: July 19, 2008, 01:49:46 am »

The right way that should have been taken in those days was the third
way I indicated: namely, to increase the strength of the REICH as a
Continental Power by the acquisition of new territory in Europe. And at
the same time a further expansion, through the subsequent acquisition of
colonial territory, might thus be brought within the range of practical
politics. Of course, this policy could not have been carried through
except in alliance with England, or by devoting such abnormal efforts to
the increase of military force and armament that, for forty or fifty
years, all cultural undertakings would have to be completely relegated
to the background. This responsibility might very well have been
undertaken. The cultural importance of a nation is almost always
dependent on its political freedom and independence. Political freedom
is a prerequisite condition for the existence, or rather the creation,
of great cultural undertakings. Accordingly no sacrifice can be too
great when there is question of securing the political freedom of a
nation. What might have to be deducted from the budget expenses for
cultural purposes, in order to meet abnormal demands for increasing the
military power of the State, can be generously paid back later on.
Indeed, it may be said that after a State has concentrated all its
resources in one effort for the purpose of securing its political
independence a certain period of ease and renewed equilibrium sets in.
And it often happens that the cultural spirit of the nation, which had
been heretofore cramped and confined, now suddenly blooms forth. Thus
Greece experienced the great Periclean era after the miseries it had
suffered during the Persian Wars. And the Roman Republic turned its
energies to the cultivation of a higher civilization when it was freed
from the stress and worry of the Punic Wars.

Of course, it could not be expected that a parliamentary majority of
feckless and stupid people would be capable of deciding on such a
resolute policy for the absolute subordination of all other national
interests to the one sole task of preparing for a future conflict of
arms which would result in establishing the security of the State. The
father of Frederick the Great sacrificed everything in order to be ready
for that conflict; but the fathers of our absurd parliamentarian
democracy, with the Jewish hall-mark, could not do it.

That is why, in pre-War times, the military preparation necessary to
enable us to conquer new territory in Europe was only very mediocre, so
that it was difficult to obtain the support of really helpful allies.

Those who directed our foreign affairs would not entertain even the idea
of systematically preparing for war. They rejected every plan for the
acquisition of territory in Europe. And by preferring a policy of
colonial and trade expansion, they sacrificed the alliance with England,
which was then possible. At the same time they neglected to seek the
support of Russia, which would have been a logical proceeding. Finally
they stumbled into the World War, abandoned by all except the
ill-starred Habsburgs.

The characteristic of our present foreign policy is that it follows no
discernible or even intelligible lines of action. Whereas before the War
a mistake was made in taking the fourth way that I have mentioned, and
this was pursued only in a halfhearted manner, since the Revolution not
even the sharpest eye can detect any way that is being followed. Even
more than before the War, there is absolutely no such thing as a
systematic plan, except the systematic attempts that are made to destroy
the last possibility of a national revival.

If we make an impartial examination of the situation existing in Europe
to-day as far as concerns the relation of the various Powers to one
another, we shall arrive at the following results:

For the past three hundred years the history of our Continent has been
definitely determined by England's efforts to keep the European States
opposed to one another in an equilibrium of forces, thus assuring the
necessary protection of her own rear while she pursued the great aims of
British world-policy.

The traditional tendency of British diplomacy ever since the reign of
Queen Elizabeth has been to employ systematically every possible means
to prevent any one Power from attaining a preponderant position over the
other European Powers and, if necessary, to break that preponderance by
means of armed intervention. The only parallel to this has been the
tradition of the Prussian Army. England has made use of various forces
to carry out its purpose, choosing them according to the actual
situation or the task to be faced; but the will and determination to use
them has always been the same. The more difficult England's position
became in the course of history the more the British Imperial Government
considered it necessary to maintain a condition of political paralysis
among the various European States, as a result of their mutual
rivalries. When the North American colonies obtained their political
independence it became still more necessary for England to use every
effort to establish and maintain the defence of her flank in Europe. In
accordance with this policy she reduced Spain and the Netherlands to the
position of inferior naval Powers. Having accomplished this, England
concentrated all her forces against the increasing strength of France,
until she brought about the downfall of Napoleon Bonaparte and therewith
destroyed the military hegemony of France, which was the most dangerous
rival that England had to fear.

The change of attitude in British statesmanship towards Germany took
place only very slowly, not only because the German nation did not
represent an obvious danger for England as long as it lacked national
unification, but also because public opinion in England, which had been
directed to other quarters by a system of propaganda that had been
carried out for a long time, could be turned to a new direction only by
slow degrees. In order to reach the proposed ends the calmly reflecting
statesman had to bow to popular sentiment, which is the most powerful
motive-force and is at the same time the most lasting in its energy.
When the statesman has attained one of his ends, he must immediately
turn his thoughts to others; but only by degrees and the slow work of
propaganda can the sentiment of the masses be shaped into an instrument
for the attainment of the new aims which their leaders have decided on.

As early as 1870-71 England had decided on the new stand it would take.
On certain occasions minor oscillations in that policy were caused by
the growing influence of America in the commercial markets of the world
and also by the increasing political power of Russia; but,
unfortunately, Germany did not take advantage of these and, therefore,
the original tendency of British diplomacy was only reinforced.

England looked upon Germany as a Power which was of world importance
commercially and politically and which, partly because of its enormous
industrial development, assumed such threatening proportions that the
two countries already contended against one another in the same sphere
and with equal energy. The so-called peaceful conquest of the world by
commercial enterprise, which, in the eyes of those who governed our
public affairs at that time, represented the highest peak of human
wisdom, was just the thing that led English statesmen to adopt a policy
of resistance. That this resistance assumed the form of an organized
aggression on a vast scale was in full conformity with a type of
statesmanship which did not aim at the maintenance of a dubious world
peace but aimed at the consolidation of British world-hegemony. In
carrying out this policy, England allied herself with those countries
which had a definite military importance. And that was in keeping with
her traditional caution in estimating the power of her adversary and
also in recognizing her own temporary weakness. That line of conduct
cannot be called unscrupulous; because such a comprehensive organization
for war purposes must not be judged from the heroic point of view but
from that of expediency. The object of a diplomatic policy must not be
to see that a nation goes down heroically but rather that it survives in
a practical way. Hence every road that leads to this goal is opportune
and the failure to take it must be looked upon as a criminal neglect of

When the German Revolution took place England's fears of a German world
hegemony came to a satisfactory end.

From that time it was not an English interest to see Germany totally
cancelled from the geographic map of Europe. On the contrary, the
astounding collapse which took place in November 1918 found British
diplomacy confronted with a situation which at first appeared untenable.

For four-and-a-half years the British Empire had fought to break the
presumed preponderance of a Continental Power. A sudden collapse now
happened which removed this Power from the foreground of European
affairs. That collapse disclosed itself finally in the lack of even the
primordial instinct of self-preservation, so that European equilibrium
was destroyed within forty-eight hours. Germany was annihilated and
France became the first political Power on the Continent of Europe.

The tremendous propaganda which was carried on during this war for the
purpose of encouraging the British public to stick it out to the end
aroused all the primitive instincts and passions of the populace and was
bound eventually to hang as a leaden weight on the decisions of British
statesmen. With the colonial, economical and commercial destruction of
Germany, England's war aims were attained. Whatever went beyond those
aims was an obstacle to the furtherance of British interests. Only the
enemies of England could profit by the disappearance of Germany as a
Great Continental Power in Europe. In November 1918, however, and up to
the summer of 1919, it was not possible for England to change its
diplomatic attitude; because during the long war it had appealed, more
than it had ever done before, to the feelings of the populace. In view
of the feeling prevalent among its own people, England could not change
its foreign policy; and another reason which made that impossible was
the military strength to which other European Powers had now attained.
France had taken the direction of peace negotiations into her own hands
and could impose her law upon the others. During those months of
negotiations and bargaining the only Power that could have altered the
course which things were taking was Germany herself; but Germany was
torn asunder by a civil war, and her so-called statesmen had declared
themselves ready to accept any and every dictate imposed on them.

Now, in the comity of nations, when one nation loses its instinct for
self-preservation and ceases to be an active member it sinks to the
level of an enslaved nation and its territory will have to suffer the
fate of a colony.

To prevent the power of France from becoming too great, the only form
which English negotiations could take was that of participating in
France's lust for aggrandizement.

As a matter of fact, England did not attain the ends for which she went
to war. Not only did it turn out impossible to prevent a Continental
Power from obtaining a preponderance over the ratio of strength in the
Continental State system of Europe, but a large measure of preponderance
had been obtained and firmly established.

In 1914 Germany, considered as a military State, was wedged in between
two countries, one of which had equal military forces at its disposal
and the other had greater military resources. Then there was England's
overwhelming supremacy at sea. France and Russia alone hindered and
opposed the excessive aggrandizement of Germany. The unfavourable
geographical situation of the REICH, from the military point of view,
might be looked upon as another coefficient of security against an
exaggerated increase of German power. From the naval point of view, the
configuration of the coast-line was unfavourable in case of a conflict
with England. And though the maritime frontier was short and cramped,
the land frontier was widely extended and open.

France's position is different to-day. It is the first military Power
without a serious rival on the Continent. It is almost entirely
protected by its southern frontier against Spain and Italy. Against
Germany it is safeguarded by the prostrate condition of our country. A
long stretch of its coast-line faces the vital nervous system of the
British Empire. Not only could French aeroplanes and long-range
batteries attack the vital centres of the British system, but submarines
can threaten the great British commercial routes. A submarine campaign
based on France's long Atlantic coast and on the European and North
African coasts of the Mediterranean would have disastrous consequences
for England.

Thus the political results of the war to prevent the development of
German power was the creation of a French hegemony on the Continent. The
military result was the consolidation of France as the first Continental
Power and the recognition of American equality on the sea. The economic
result was the cession of great spheres of British interests to her
former allies and associates.

The Balkanization of Europe, up to a certain degree, was desirable and
indeed necessary in the light of the traditional policy of Great
Britain, just as France desired the Balkanization of Germany.

What England has always desired, and will continue to desire, is to
prevent any one Continental Power in Europe from attaining a position of
world importance. Therefore England wishes to maintain a definite
equilibrium of forces among the European States--for this equilibrium
seems a necessary condition of England's world-hegemony.

What France has always desired, and will continue to desire, is to
prevent Germany from becoming a homogeneous Power. Therefore France
wants to maintain a system of small German States whose forces would
balance one another and over which there should be no central
government. Then, by acquiring possession of the left bank of the Rhine,
she would have fulfilled the pre-requisite conditions for the
establishment and security of her hegemony in Europe.

The final aims of French diplomacy must be in perpetual opposition to
the final tendencies of British statesmanship.

Taking these considerations as a starting-point, anyone who investigates
the possibilities that exist for Germany to find allies must come to the
conclusion that there remains no other way of forming an alliance except
to approach England. The consequences of England's war policy were and
are disastrous for Germany. However, we cannot close our eyes to the
fact that, as things stand to-day, the necessary interests of England no
longer demand the destruction of Germany. On the contrary, British
diplomacy must tend more and more, from year to year, towards curbing
France's unbridled lust after hegemony. Now, a policy of alliances
cannot be pursued by bearing past grievances in mind, but it can be
rendered fruitful by taking account of past experiences. Experience
should have taught us that alliances formed for negative purposes suffer
from intrinsic weakness. The destinies of nations can be welded together
only under the prospect of a common success, of common gain and
conquest, in short, a common extension of power for both contracting
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Aryan Warrior
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« Reply #88 on: July 19, 2008, 01:50:06 am »

The ignorance of our people on questions of foreign politics is clearly
demonstrated by the reports in the daily Press which talk about
"friendship towards Germany" on the part of one or the other foreign
statesman, whereby this professed friendship is taken as a special
guarantee that such persons will champion a policy that will be
advantageous to our people. That kind of talk is absurd to an incredible
degree. It means speculating on the unparalleled simplicity of the
average German philistine when he comes to talking politics. There is
not any British, American, or Italian statesman who could ever be
described as 'pro-German'. Every Englishman must naturally be British
first of all. The same is true of every American. And no Italian
statesman would be prepared to adopt a policy that was not pro-Italian.
Therefore, anyone who expects to form alliances with foreign nations on
the basis of a pro-German feeling among the statesmen of other countries
is either an ass or a deceiver. The necessary condition for linking
together the destinies of nations is never mutual esteem or mutual
sympathy, but rather the prospect of advantages accruing to the
contracting parties. It is true that a British statesman will always
follow a pro-British and not a pro-German policy; but it is also true
that certain definite interests involved in this pro-British policy may
coincide on various grounds with German interests. Naturally that can be
so only to a certain degree and the situation may one day be completely
reversed. But the art of statesmanship is shown when at certain periods
there is question of reaching a certain end and when allies are found
who must take the same road in order to defend their own interests.

The practical application of these principles at the present time must
depend on the answer given to the following questions: What States are
not vitally interested in the fact that, by the complete abolition of a
German Central Europe, the economic and military power of France has
reached a position of absolute hegemony? Which are the States that, in
consideration of the conditions which are essential to their own
existence and in view of the tradition that has hitherto been followed
in conducting their foreign policy, envisage such a development as a
menace to their own future?

Finally, we must be quite clear on the following point: France is and
will remain the implacable enemy of Germany. It does not matter what
Governments have ruled or will rule in France, whether Bourbon or
Jacobin, Napoleonic or Bourgeois-Democratic, Clerical Republican or Red
Bolshevik, their foreign policy will always be directed towards
acquiring possession of the Rhine frontier and consolidating France's
position on this river by disuniting and dismembering Germany.

England did not want Germany to be a world Power. France desired that
there should be no Power called Germany. Therefore there was a very
essential difference. To-day we are not fighting for our position as a
World-Power but only for the existence of our country, for national
unity and the daily bread of our children. Taking this point of view
into consideration, only two States remain to us as possible allies in
Europe--England and Italy.

England is not pleased to see a France on whose military power there is
no check in Europe, so that one day she might undertake the support of a
policy which in some way or other might come into conflict with British
interests. Nor can England be pleased to see France in possession of
such enormous coal and iron mines in Western Europe as would make it
possible for her one day to play a role in world-commerce which might
threaten danger to British interests. Moreover, England can never be
pleased to see a France whose political position on the Continent, owing
to the dismemberment of the rest of Europe, seems so absolutely assured
that she is not only able to resume a French world-policy on great lines
but would even find herself compelled to do so. The bombs which were
once dropped by the Zeppelins might be multiplied by the thousand every
night. The military predominance of France is a weight that presses
heavily on the hearts of the World Empire over which Great Britain

Nor can Italy desire, nor will she desire, any further strengthening of
France's power in Europe. The future of Italy will be conditioned by the
development of events in the Mediterranean and by the political
situation in the area surrounding that sea. The reason that led Italy
into the War was not a desire to contribute towards the aggrandizement
of France but rather to deal her hated Adriatic rival a mortal blow. Any
further increase of France's power on the Continent would hamper the
development of Italy's future, and Italy does not deceive herself by
thinking that racial kindred between the nations will in any way
eliminate rivalries.

Serious and impartial consideration proves that it is these two States,
Great Britain and Italy, whose natural interests not only do not
contrast with the conditions essential to the existence of the German
nation but are identical with them, to a certain extent.

But when we consider the possibilities of alliances we must be careful
not to lose sight of three factors. The first factor concerns ourselves;
the other two concern the two States I have mentioned.

Is it at all possible to conclude an alliance with Germany as it is
to-day? Can a Power which would enter into an alliance for the purpose
of securing assistance in an effort to carry out its own OFFENSIVE
aims--can such a Power form an alliance with a State whose rulers have
for years long presented a spectacle of deplorable incompetence and
pacifist cowardice and where the majority of the people, blinded by
democratic and Marxist teachings, betray the interests of their own
people and country in a manner that cries to Heaven for vengeance? As
things stand to-day, can any Power hope to establish useful relations
and hope to fight together for the furtherance of their common interests
with this State which manifestly has neither the will nor the courage to
move a finger even in the defence of its bare existence? Take the case
of a Power for which an alliance must be much more than a pact to
guarantee a state of slow decomposition, such as happened with the old
and disastrous Triple Alliance. Can such a Power associate itself for
life or death with a State whose most characteristic signs of activity
consist of a rampant servility in external relations and a scandalous
repression of the national spirit at home? Can such a Power be
associated with a State in which there is nothing of greatness, because
its whole policy does not deserve it? Or can alliances be made with
Governments which are in the hands of men who are despised by their own
fellow-citizens and consequently are not respected abroad?

No. A self-respecting Power which expects something more from alliances
than commissions for greedy Parliamentarians will not and cannot enter
into an alliance with our present-day Germany. Our present inability to
form alliances furnishes the principle and most solid basis for the
combined action of the enemies who are robbing us. Because Germany does
not defend itself in any other way except by the flamboyant protests of
our parliamentarian elect, there is no reason why the rest of the world
should take up the fight in our defence. And God does not follow the
principle of granting freedom to a nation of cowards, despite all the
implications of our 'patriotic' associations. Therefore, for those
States which have not a direct interest in our annihilation no other
course remains open except to participate in France's campaign of
plunder, at least to make it impossible for the strength of France to be
exclusively aggrandized thereby.

In the second place, we must not forget that among the nations which
were formerly our enemies mass-propaganda has turned the opinions and
feelings of large sections of the population in a fixed direction. When
for years long a foreign nation has been presented to the public as a
horde of 'Huns', 'Robbers', 'Vandals', etc., they cannot suddenly be
presented as something different, and the enemy of yesterday cannot be
recommended as the ally of tomorrow.

But the third factor deserves greater attention, since it is of
essential importance for establishing future alliances in Europe.

From the political point of view it is not in the interests of Great
Britain that Germany should be ruined even still more, but such a
proceeding would be very much in the interests of the international
money-markets manipulated by the Jew. The cleavage between the official,
or rather traditional, British statesmanship and the controlling
influence of the Jew on the money-markets is nowhere so clearly
manifested as in the various attitudes taken towards problems of British
foreign policy. Contrary to the interests and welfare of the British
State, Jewish finance demands not only the absolute economic destruction
of Germany but its complete political enslavement. The
internationalization of our German economic system, that is to say, the
transference of our productive forces to the control of Jewish
international finance, can be completely carried out only in a State
that has been politically Bolshevized. But the Marxist fighting forces,
commanded by international and Jewish stock-exchange capital, cannot
finally smash the national resistance in Germany without friendly help
from outside. For this purpose French armies would first have to invade
and overcome the territory of the German REICH until a state of
international chaos would set in, and then the country would have to
succumb to Bolshevik storm troops in the service of Jewish international

Hence it is that at the present time the Jew is the great agitator for
the complete destruction of Germany. Whenever we read of attacks against
Germany taking place in any part of the world the Jew is always the
instigator. In peace-time, as well as during the War, the Jewish-Marxist
stock-exchange Press systematically stirred up hatred against Germany,
until one State after another abandoned its neutrality and placed itself
at the service of the world coalition, even against the real interests
of its own people.

The Jewish way of reasoning thus becomes quite clear. The Bolshevization
of Germany, that is to say, the extermination of the patriotic and
national German intellectuals, thus making it possible to force German
Labour to bear the yoke of international Jewish finance--that is only
the overture to the movement for expanding Jewish power on a wider scale
and finally subjugating the world to its rule. As has so often happened
in history, Germany is the chief pivot of this formidable struggle. If
our people and our State should fall victims to these oppressors of the
nations, lusting after blood and money, the whole earth would become the
prey of that hydra. Should Germany be freed from its grip, a great
menace for the nations of the world would thereby be eliminated.

It is certain that Jewry uses all its subterranean activities not only
for the purpose of keeping alive old national enmities against Germany
but even to spread them farther and render them more acute wherever
possible. It is no less certain that these activities are only very
partially in keeping with the true interests of the nations among whose
people the poison is spread. As a general principle, Jewry carries on
its campaign in the various countries by the use of arguments that are
best calculated to appeal to the mentality of the respective nations and
are most likely to produce the desired results; for Jewry knows what the
public feeling is in each country. Our national stock has been so much
adulterated by the mixture of alien elements that, in its fight for
power, Jewry can make use of the more or less 'cosmopolitan' circles
which exist among us, inspired by the pacifist and international
ideologies. In France they exploit the well-known and accurately
estimated chauvinistic spirit. In England they exploit the commercial
and world-political outlook. In short, they always work upon the
essential characteristics that belong to the mentality of each nation.
When they have in this way achieved a decisive influence in the
political and economic spheres they can drop the limitations which their
former tactics necessitated, now disclosing their real intentions and
the ends for which they are fighting. Their work of destruction now goes
ahead more quickly, reducing one State after another to a mass of ruins
on which they will erect the everlasting and sovereign Jewish Empire.

In England, and in Italy, the contrast between the better kind of solid
statesmanship and the policy of the Jewish stock-exchange often becomes
strikingly evident.

Only in France there exists to-day more than ever before a profound
accord between the views of the stock-exchange, controlled by the Jews,
and the chauvinistic policy pursued by French statesmen. This identity
of views constitutes an immense, danger for Germany. And it is just for
this reason that France is and will remain by far the most dangerous
enemy. The French people, who are becoming more and more obsessed by
negroid ideas, represent a threatening menace to the existence of the
white race in Europe, because they are bound up with the Jewish campaign
for world-domination. For the contamination caused by the influx of
negroid blood on the Rhine, in the very heart of Europe, is in accord
with the sadist and perverse lust for vengeance on the part of the
hereditary enemy of our people, just as it suits the purpose of the cool
calculating Jew who would use this means of introducing a process of
bastardization in the very centre of the European Continent and, by
infecting the white race with the blood of an inferior stock, would
destroy the foundations of its independent existence.

France's activities in Europe to-day, spurred on by the French lust for
vengeance and systematically directed by the Jew, are a criminal attack
against the life of the white race and will one day arouse against the
French people a spirit of vengeance among a generation which will have
recognized the original sin of mankind in this racial pollution.

As far as concerns Germany, the danger which France represents involves
the duty of relegating all sentiment to a subordinate place and
extending the hand to those who are threatened with the same menace and
who are not willing to suffer or tolerate France's lust for hegemony.

For a long time yet to come there will be only two Powers in Europe with
which it may be possible for Germany to conclude an alliance. These
Powers are Great Britain and Italy.

If we take the trouble to cast a glance backwards on the way in which
German foreign policy has been conducted since the Revolution we must,
in view of the constant and incomprehensible acts of submission on the
part. of our governments, either lose heart or become fired with rage
and take up the cudgels against such a regime. Their way of acting
cannot be attributed to a want of understanding, because what seemed to
every thinking man to be inconceivable was accomplished by the leaders
of the November parties with their Cyclopean intellects. They bowed to
France and begged her favour. Yes, during all these recent years, with
the touching simplicity of incorrigible visionaries, they went on their
knees to France again and again. They perpetuaily wagged their tails
before the GRANDE NATION. And in each trick-o'-the-loop which the French
hangmen performed with his rope they recognized a visible change of
feeling. Our real political wire-pullers never shared in this absurd
credulity. The idea of establishing a friendship with France was for
them only a means of thwarting every attempt on Germany's part to adopt
a practical policy of alliances. They had no illusions about French aims
or those of the men behind the scenes in France. What induced them to
take up such an attitude and to act as if they honestly believed that
the fate of Germany could possibly be changed in this way was the cool
calculation that if this did not happen our people might take the reins
into their own hands and choose another road.

Of course it is difficult for us to propose England as our possible ally
in the future. Our Jewish Press has always been adept in concentrating
hatred against England particularly. And many of our good German
simpletons perch on these branches which the Jews have limed to capture
them. They babble about a restoration of German sea power and protest
against the robbery of our colonies. Thus they furnish material which
the contriving Jew transmits to his clansmen in England, so that it can
be used there for purposes of practical propaganda. For our
simple-minded bourgeoisie who indulge in politics can take in only
little by little the idea that to-day we have not to fight for
'sea-power' and such things. Even before the War it was absurd to direct
the national energies of Germany towards this end without first having
secured our position in Europe. Such a hope to-day reaches that peak of
absurdity which may be called criminal in the domain of politics.

Often one becomes really desperate on seeing how the Jewish wire-pullers
succeeded in concentrating the attention of the people on things which
are only of secondary importance to-day, They incited the people to
demonstrations and protests while at the same time France was tearing
our nation asunder bit by bit and systematically removing the very
foundations of our national independence.

In this connection I have to think of the Wooden Horse in the riding of
which the Jew showed extraordinary skill during these years. I mean
South Tyrol.

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Aryan Warrior
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Posts: 736

« Reply #89 on: July 19, 2008, 01:50:22 am »

Yes, South Tyrol. The reason why I take up this question here is just
because I want to call to account that shameful CANAILLE who relied on
the ignorance and short memories of large sections of our people and
stimulated a national indignation which is as foreign to the real
character of our parliamentary impostors as the idea of respect for
private property is to a magpie.

I should like to state here that I was one of those who, at the time
when the fate of South Tyrol was being decided--that is to say, from
August 1914 to November 1918--took my place where that country also
could have been effectively defended, namely, in the Army. I did my
share in the fighting during those years, not merely to save South Tyrol
from being lost but also to save every other German province for the

The parliamentary sharpers did not take part in that combat. The whole
CANAILLE played party politics. On the other hand, we carried on the
fight in the belief that a victorious issue of the War would enable the
German nation to keep South Tyrol also; but the loud-mouthed traitor
carried on a seditious agitation against such a victorious issue, until
the fighting Siegfried succumbed to the dagger plunged in his back. It
was only natural that the inflammatory and hypocritical speeches of the
elegantly dressed parliamentarians on the Vienna RATHAUS PLATZ or in
front of the FELDHERRNHALLE in Munich could not save South Tyrol for
Germany. That could be done only by the fighting battalions at the
Front. Those who broke up that fighting front betrayed South Tyrol, as
well as the other districts of Germany.

Anyone who thinks that the South Tyrol question can be solved to-day by
protests and manifestations and processions organized by various
associations is either a humbug or merely a German philistine.

In this regard it must be quite clearly understood that we cannot get
back the territories we have lost if we depend on solemn imprecations
before the throne of the Almighty God or on pious hopes in a League of
Nations, but only by the force of arms.

Therefore the only remaining question is: Who is ready to take up arms
for the restoration of the lost territories?

As far as concerns myself personally, I can state with a good conscience
that I would have courage enough to take part in a campaign for the
reconquest of South Tyrol, at the head of parliamentarian storm
battalions consisting of parliamentarian gasconaders and all the party
leaders, also the various Councillors of State. Only the Devil knows
whether I might have the luck of seeing a few shells suddenly burst over
this 'burning' demonstration of protest. I think that if a fox were to
break into a poultry yard his presence would not provoke such a
helter-skelter and rush to cover as we should witness in the band of

The vilest part of it all is that these talkers themselves do not
believe that anything can be achieved in this way. Each one of them
knows very well how harmless and ineffective their whole pretence is.
They do it only because it is easier now to babble about the restoration
of South Tyrol than to fight for its preservation in days gone by.

Each one plays the part that he is best capable of playing in life. In
those days we offered our blood. To-day these people are engaged in
whetting their tusks.

It is particularly interesting to note to-day how legitimist circles in
Vienna preen themselves on their work for the restoration of South
Tyrol. Seven years ago their august and illustrious Dynasty helped, by
an act of perjury and treason, to make it possible for the victorious
world-coalition to take away South Tyrol. At that time these circles
supported the perfidious policy adopted by their Dynasty and did not
trouble themselves in the least about the fate of South Tyrol or any
other province. Naturally it is easier to-day to take up the fight for
this territory, since the present struggle is waged with 'the weapons of
the mind'. Anyhow, it is easier to join in a 'meeting of protestation'
and talk yourself hoarse in giving vent to the noble indignation that
fills your breast, or stain your finger with the writing of a newspaper
article, than to blow up a bridge, for instance, during the occupation
of the Ruhr.

The reason why certain circles have made the question of South Tyrol the
pivot of German-Italian relations during the past few years is quite
evident. Jews and Habsburg legitimists are greatly interested in
preventing Germany from pursuing a policy of alliance which might lead
one day to the resurgence of a free German fatherland. It is not out of
love for South Tyrol that they play this role to-day--for their policy
would turn out detrimental rather than helpful to the interests of that
province--but through fear of an agreement being established between
Germany and Italy.

A tendency towards lying and calumny lies in the nature of these people,
and that explains how they can calmly and brazenly attempt to twist
things in such a way as to make it appear that we have 'betrayed' South

There is one clear answer that must be given to these gentlemen. It is
this: Tyrol has been betrayed, in the first place, by every German who
was sound in limb and body and did not offer himself for service at the
Front during 1914-1918 to do his duty towards his country.

In the second place, Tyrol was betrayed by every man who, during those
years did not help to reinforce the national spirit and the national
powers of resistance, so as to enable the country to carry through the
War and keep up the fight to the very end.

In the third place, South Tyrol was betrayed by everyone who took part
in the November Revolution, either directly by his act or indirectly by
a cowardly toleration of it, and thus broke the sole weapon that could
have saved South Tyrol.

In the fourth place, South Tyrol was betrayed by those parties and their
adherents who put their signatures to the disgraceful treaties of
Versailles and St. Germain.

And so the matter stands, my brave gentlemen, who make your protests
only with words.

To-day I am guided by a calm and cool recognition of the fact that the
lost territories cannot be won back by the whetted tongues of
parliamentary spouters but only by the whetted sword; in other words,
through a fight where blood will have to be shed.

Now, I have no hesitations in saying that to-day, once the die has been
cast, it is not only impossible to win back South Tyrol through a war
but I should definitely take my stand against such a movement, because I
am convinced that it would not be possible to arouse the national
enthusiasm of the German people and maintain it in such a way as would
be necessary in order to carry through such a war to a successful issue.
On the contrary, I believe that if we have to shed German blood once
again it would be criminal to do so for the sake of liberating 200,000
Germans, when more than seven million neighbouring Germans are suffering
under foreign domination and a vital artery of the German nation has
become a playground for hordes of African niggers.

If the German nation is to put an end to a state of things which
threatens to wipe it off the map of Europe it must not fall into the
errors of the pre-War period and make the whole world its enemy. But it
must ascertain who is its most dangerous enemy so that it can
concentrate all its forces in a struggle to beat him. And if, in order
to carry through this struggle to victory, sacrifices should be made in
other quarters, future generations will not condemn us for that. They
will take account of the miseries and anxieties which led us to make
such a bitter decision, and in the light of that consideration they will
more clearly recognize the brilliancy of our success.

Again I must say here that we must always be guided by the fundamental
principle that, as a preliminary to winning back lost provinces, the
political independence and strength of the motherland must first be

The first task which has to be accomplished is to make that independence
possible and to secure it by a wise policy of alliances, which
presupposes an energetic management of our public affairs.

But it is just on this point that we, National Socialists, have to guard
against being dragged into the tow of our ranting bourgeois patriots who
take their cue from the Jew. It would be a disaster if, instead of
preparing for the coming struggle, our Movement also were to busy itself
with mere protests by word of mouth.

It was the fantastic idea of a Nibelungen alliance with the decomposed
body of the Habsburg State that brought about Germany's ruin. Fantastic
sentimentality in dealing with the possibilities of foreign policy
to-day would be the best means of preventing our revival for innumerable
years to come.

Here I must briefly answer the objections which may be raised in regard
to the three questions I have put.

1. Is it possible at all to form an alliance with the present Germany,
whose weakness is so visible to all eyes?

2. Can the ex-enemy nations change their attitude towards Germany?

3. In other nations is not the influence of Jewry stronger than the
recognition of their own interests, and does not this influence thwart
all their good intentions and render all their plans futile?

I think that I have already dealt adequately with one of the two aspects
of the first point. Of course nobody will enter into an alliance with
the present Germany. No Power in the world would link its fortunes with
a State whose government does not afford grounds for the slightest
confidence. As regards the attempt which has been made by many of our
compatriots to explain the conduct of the Government by referring to the
woeful state of public feeling and thus excuse such conduct, I must
strongly object to that way of looking at things.

The lack of character which our people have shown during the last six
years is deeply distressing. The indifference with which they have
treated the most urgent necessities of our nation might veritably lead
one to despair. Their cowardice is such that it often cries to heaven
for vengeance. But one must never forget that we are dealing with a
people who gave to the world, a few years previously, an admirable
example of the highest human qualities. From the first days of August
1914 to the end of the tremendous struggle between the nations, no
people in the world gave a better proof of manly courage, tenacity and
patient endurance, than this people gave who are so cast down and
dispirited to-day. Nobody will dare to assert that the lack of character
among our people to-day is typical of them. What we have to endure
to-day, among us and around us, is due only to the influence of the sad
and distressing effects that followed the high treason committed on
November 9th, 1918. More than ever before the word of the poet is true:
that evil can only give rise to evil. But even in this epoch those
qualities among our people which are fundamentally sound are not
entirely lost. They slumber in the depths of the national conscience,
and sometimes in the clouded firmament we see certain qualities like
shining lights which Germany will one day remember as the first symptoms
of a revival. We often see young Germans assembling and forming
determined resolutions, as they did in 1914, freely and willingly to
offer themselves as a sacrifice on the altar of their beloved
Fatherland. Millions of men have resumed work, whole-heartedly and
zealously, as if no revolution had ever affected them. The smith is at
his anvil once again. And the farmer drives his plough. The scientist is
in his laboratory. And everybody is once again attending to his duty
with the same zeal and devotion as formerly.

The oppression which we suffer from at the hands of our enemies is no
longer taken, as it formerly was, as a matter for laughter; but it is
resented with bitterness and anger. There can be no doubt that a great
change of attitude has taken place.

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